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xAbstract
This qualitative, multi-case study research examines the dynamic processes undertaken at 
three universities in their review and negotiation of policy and programming following newly 
imposed federal compliance requirements. Organizing review teams to interpret and respond to 
Title IX obligations set out in the highly contentious and ambiguous 2011 Dear Colleague Letter 
on campus sexual violence, these universities developed forward-thinking results that enhanced 
opportunity for the institution and its students. In doing so, the universities exceeded minimal 
compliance expectations by creating new organizational structures and protocols that influenced 
not only change on campus, but broader field developments and the construction of compliance. 
This study looks at the institutional processes that enabled such advances to occur. It 
examines how decision makers from these universities were able to foster collaboration among 
diverse constituents to take into account the universities’ legal obligations and considerations of 
importance to the organizations and society as they enacted change. Adopting a new institutional 
theoretical approach and drawing on a proactive law framework to understand how organizations 
and its members navigate this complex environment, this study demonstrates institutional actors’ 
discretion in interpreting and responding to the law as they develop substantive practices. By 
analyzing the mechanisms that guide an organization’s response to a contentious legal 
compliance issue, this study expands theoretical understanding of how institutions address their 
socio-legal environment. 
Organizational effectiveness necessitates that institutions draw on different design and 
intervention strategies to address a broad range of situations. In the context of the review 
xi
process, institutional actors across multiple organizational positions played vital roles in the 
teams’ successes. Leadership was demonstrated at various levels across subject-matter experts. 
These leaders’ abilities to engage others in collective action and induce cooperation proved 
essential in overcoming tension, ambiguity, and pressure from different constituents to advance 
successful policy negotiations and arrive at substantive solutions. Participants did not perceive 
any one group or interest as dominating the negotiation process. Despite the increasingly legal 
environment in which universities operate, neither legalistic decision criteria nor any inherent or 
perceived authority from legal counsel was found to take priority over organizational, 
interpersonal, or social factors relevant to organizational decision making. 
    This research is important because models and practices perceived as legitimate diffuse 
across fields and are adopted by other organizations, influencing normative standards and the 
courts’ interpretation of what good compliance entails. By addressing the organizational 
dynamics and behavior underlying university responses to compliance obligations, this study 
advances greater understanding of the internal negotiation of process and strategy in explaining 
organizational adaptation in uncertain times. Although the Dear Colleague Letter provides the 
specific context for this inquiry, the research findings are relevant to other complex university 
policy considerations in which the dynamic negotiation of social, organizational, and legal 
influences takes place. With changes to the university’s regulatory environment accelerating and 
pressure to comply with burgeoning legal obligations mounting, this research is necessary to 
better understand how universities’ responses to laws - through its faculty, staff, students, and 
leaders - shape normative practices and the construction of compliance as universities adapt to 
escalating and complex legal obligations.
1Chapter 1: Introduction
Colleges and universities operate in a complex and shifting legal environment, with 
regulations and the law touching virtually everything they do, frequently heavy-handedly (Alger, 
2008; Dunham, 2010; Gajda, 2009; McLendon & Hearn, 2006; Olivas, 2005; Toma, 2011). Such 
legal obligations, often ambiguous and costly to implement, create tension and uncertainty within 
universities (Dunham, 2010; Gajda, 2009; Task Force on Federal Regulation of Higher 
Education, 2015). Overwhelmed by the weight of their responsibilities under the law, some 
universities take minimal measures to meet their legal obligations (Edelman, 1992; Koss, 
Wilgus, & Williamsen, 2014; Siedel, 2002; Vendituoli, 2014b; Wilson, 2014a). Such responses 
often create the symbolic illusion of complying without substantive effect (Edelman, 1990, 1992, 
2007; Edelman, Leachman, & McAdam, 2010; Siedel, 2002). Other institutions, however, 
surpass compliance expectations. Here we find industry leaders and innovators aligning policies, 
procedures, and programming with institutional mission while exceeding minimal legal 
obligations. Some of the compliance actions they take become institutionalized by way of 
organizational mimicry and normative practice (Edelman, 1990, 1992, 2007; Edelman, 
Leachman, & McAdam, 2010; Meyer, Ramirez, Frank, & Schofer, 2007; Meyer & Rowan, 
1978). Evolving into taken-for-granted standards, their actions shape not only the organization 
and those in it, but influence our understanding of acceptable forms of compliance (Edelman, 
Fuller, & Mara-Drita, 2001; Edelman, Leachman, & McAdam, 2010; Edelman & Suchman, 
1997; Scott, 1994; Suchman & Edelman, 1996).   
2Despite evidence that universities, and the individuals working within them, possess the power to 
construct the meaning of compliance, shape the law, and mediate the effects of regulations on 
institutional policies, we know little about the organizational environment in which the dynamic 
negotiation of social, organizational, and legal influences takes place (Edelman, Fuller, & Mara-
Drita, 2001; Edelman, Leachman, & McAdam, 2010; Edelman & Suchman, 1997; McLendon & 
Hearn, 2006; Scott, 1994; Sitkin & Bies, 1994; Suchman & Edelman, 1996). There is little 
systematic, empirical research into the phenomenon of how higher education decision makers 
negotiate the internal interpretation of external legal pressures as they consider institutional and 
constituent interests while addressing legal obligations (Edelman, 1992; Gornitza & Larsen, 
2004; Gould, 2001). Examining how decisions originating from a legally derived change are 
negotiated among university decision makers, this study advances our understanding of the 
organizational environment of universities in which the dynamic negotiation of social, 
organizational, and legal influences takes place. In the current environment in which compliance 
requirements limit institutional autonomy, governmental oversight dilutes deference, and 
regulations constrain academic freedom, such insight holds important implications for the 
governance and values of higher education (Dunham, 2010; Gajda, 2009; Hanley, 2015; Olivas, 
2005).
One of the complex, ambiguous, and costly regulations garnering national attention both 
inside and outside higher education over recent years has been the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter 
(DCL) on campus sexual violence. Intending to clarify educational institutions’ existing 
obligations under Title IX, the DCL’s ambiguity has instead left university leaders confused, 
constrained, and besieged by both increasingly intense governmental oversight and unwanted 
public scrutiny of their actions. University leaders have responded to changing post DCL legal 
3and cultural expectations with a wave of structural elaboration (the transformation of pre-existing 
structures) designed to align policies, procedures, and programming with compliance 
obligations. Five years into this developing reform, the lines between addressing campus legal 
obligations while upholding institutional values remain blurred. Uncertainty persists as 
universities’ obligations to address culture, policies, and practices surrounding issues of campus 
sexual misconduct, harassment, and assault continue to be defined. This qualitative research 
utilizes a multi-case study strategy to examine the dynamic processes undertaken by three 
universities in their review and negotiation of policy and programming following newly imposed 
ambiguous, contentious, federal compliance requirements. It looks at the institutional actions 
advanced by university actors that enabled forward-thinking results that enhanced opportunity 
for the institution and its students. Beyond simply responding to minimal DCL requirements, the 
study examines how these three universities successfully exceeded compliance expectations to 
influence change on campus. 
Background 
The 2011 release of a “significant guidance document” by the federal government 
addressing university responsibilities related to sexual violence on campus changed both the 
legal and organizational landscapes of higher education. Known as the “Dear Colleague” Letter 
on Sexual Violence (Appendix A), the DCL describes universities’ duties to take immediate and 
effective steps to respond to campus sexual violence in accordance with Title IX of the 
Education Act. Despite four decades of case law1 under Title IX - a law intended to prevent 
gender discrimination - requiring universities to establish complaint and investigation procedures 
1 A summary of important cases and regulatory developments during this period can be found at 
Title IX Info, 2016; and Women’s Sports Foundation, 2016.
4for campus sexual misconduct, partial or complete disregard of Title IX obligations ran rampant. 
Incidents of sexual harassment and violence continued across campuses, with the majority of 
cases going unreported. Those who came forward felt stonewalled by inadequate institutional 
response and victim blaming (Krebs, Lindquist, Warner, Fisher, & Martin, 2007; Fisher, Cullen, 
& Turner, 2000). 
High profile cases and growing activism bringing institutional shortcomings and survivor 
stories to light contributed to the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights 
strengthening enforcement of existing Title IX law. Reminding universities of their legal 
obligations to maintain a safe campus free from gender discrimination, it released the DCL 
guidance. The Department of Education framed the DCL as not introducing any new law. 
Rather, it reinforced universities’ existing obligations under Title IX to fully and effectively 
respond to, as well as take steps to prevent, sexual acts enacted against a person’s will (U.S. 
Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter, 2011). Despite 
arguments that the Department of Education overreached and the DCL should be declared 
invalid (described in more detail in Chapter 2, see Legality of the DCL), to date the 2011 DCL 
remains in force. In addition to being met with arguments questioning its legitimacy and legality, 
the DCL guidance was widely perceived as vague and over-arching, presenting significant 
challenges to university decision makers attempting to satisfy expansive directives with few clear 
standards (Cohn, 2011; Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, 2014; Kelderman, 2014; 
Koss, et al., 2014; Peterson, 2014; Vendituoli, 2014b; Wilson, 2015a). Given the serious 
repercussions of withholding federal funding from institutions violating Title IX, most 
5institutions found they had little choice but to comply with the DCL.2 Although no university has 
ever had its funding affected in this manner, none want to risk being the test case in this new era 
of heightened enforcement of Title IX obligations (Dear Colleague Letter, 2011; Wilson, 2015a). 
The federal government’s strengthened stance to end sexual violence, introduced through 
the DCL, was precipitated by a variety of factors. Among them, the federal government was 
alarmed by data that continued to indicate a disturbing number of sexual assaults on university 
students. Multiple research studies provide evidence that at least one in five female students and 
one in sixteen male students are sexually assaulted during their undergraduate university 
experience in the United States (Anderson & Clement, 2015; Association of American 
Universities, 2015; Fisher et al., 2000; Krebs et al., 2007; U.S. Department of Education, Office 
for Civil Rights, Fact Sheet, 2011). The federal government recognized that devastating physical 
and emotional consequences resulting from crimes of a sexual nature – including depression, 
anxiety, suicidal behavior, post-traumatic stress, psychosomatic complaints, decline in academic 
performance, social isolation, and alcohol and drug abuse – interfere with students’ rights to 
receive an education free from discrimination (Chang, Lian, Yu, Qu, Zhang, Jia, Hu, Li, Wu, & 
Hirsch, 2015; Fact Sheet, 2011; Jordan, Combs, & Smith, 2014; Mason & Lodrick, 2013). The 
magnitude of these conditions is compounded when students continue to attend classes together, 
run into each other across campus, or live in the same residence hall as their alleged perpetrator 
(Association of American Universities, 2015). Confronted by hostile environments, victim 
blaming, and lackadaisical institutional response in the face of complaints, outspoken survivors 
2 A handful of colleges remain independent from federal funding, for example Hillsdale College, 
MI; Grove City College, PA; and Patrick Henry College, VA (Baumgardner, 2014). Close to 30 
waivers have also been granted to religiously affiliated colleges, exempting them from abiding 
by provisions of Title IX that are inconsistent with their religious beliefs, predominantly 
regarding issues of sexuality and gender (Stack, 2015).
6and advocates rallied for change. Coordinated and unrelenting activism and lobbying efforts 
resulted, creating a cultural shift in understanding and addressing campus sexual assault 
(Burroughs & Katz, 2015; Dick & Ziering, 2015; Flanagan & Tso, 2014; Not Alone, 2016; 
Perez-Pena, 2013; Know Your IX, n.d.; Schonfeld, 2014; SurvJustice, 2016). 
Credited as a crucial influence inciting stepped up investigation and enforcement of Title 
IX obligations, student activists demanding university accountability created ripples in cultural 
and institutional awareness of campus sexual violence. As the student activist movement grew 
and the federal government increased its scrutiny of institutional conduct, new organizational 
forms exploded onto the higher education scene. These included advocacy groups for accused 
students, lawyers specializing in representing male respondents in student hearings, safety and 
prevention apps for student use, packaged prevention programs for institutions, and consultants 
in everything Title IX related (Baker, 2014b; New, 2014). Third party, for-profit agencies touted 
their expertise in policy, training, and prevention consulting. Universities jumped at the 
opportunity to outsource some of this contentious and ambiguous work. The University of 
Missouri, for example, reportedly paid close to half a million dollars for a consultant to co-create 
its Title IX policies and training (U. of Missouri pays $500,000 for Title IX consulting, 2014).3 
George Washington University contracted with the president of a legal consulting firm to serve 
as interim Title IX coordinator (New, 2014).4 More than 2,000 higher education Title IX 
coordinators and investigators have been trained by a legally based, external, risk management 
agency developed in response to DCL obligations (New, 2014). Though perhaps filling a 
compliance obligation requiring prevention and response policies, such third party organizations 
are generally regarded as serving institutional interests, eliminating Title IX compliance-related 
3 National Center for Higher Education Risk Management, www.ncherm.org
4 Wise Results LLC (one person legal consulting firm out of Washington DC, no website).
7risk, and protecting university image. They are often perceived as indifferent in advancing issues 
of student safety, gender equity, or the prevention of sexual assault, all of which are mandated 
under the DCL and Title IX (Baker, 2014b; Fact Sheet, 2011; New, 2014). 
In addition to the unchartered territory institutional leaders must navigate in the face of 
national pressure to end sexual violence on campus, a plethora of connected legislation adds to 
their legal burden. Interplay between Title IX and the Clery Act (Clery), Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA), Campus SaVE Act (Campus SaVE), and The Family Educational Rights 
and Privacy Act (FERPA) has reinforced the government’s agenda to eradicate the hostile 
learning environments arising from sexual violence (American Council on Education, 2014; 
SurvJustice, 2016; U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Questions and 
Answers, 2014; White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault, 2014). With 
prescriptive rules and harsh judgment of university actions, university leaders are left feeling, 
five years after the release of the DCL, worried and confused over their institution’s 
responsibilities and actions regarding proper compliance under Title IX. 
Statement of the Problem
There is a dynamic process that takes place in the construction of universities’ sexual 
harassment and violence policies. But what do we know about that process? How do universities, 
seeking to balance educational mission with the judicial role imposed upon them by expanded 
legal requirements, consolidate confusing regulations, heightened concerns over campus 
responses, and institutional values in such a highly-charged and poorly defined environment? 
This research considers that process - one in which institutional policy is negotiated through a 
series of ongoing actions – resulting from a change in the institution’s legal environment. 
8We know little about what leads some universities to move beyond merely reacting to a legal 
problem toward advancing new, substantive policies. We do know that universities possess the 
power to influence legal compliance and shape norms as they select, interpret, and challenge 
laws (Edelman, et al., 2001; Edelman, et al., 2010; Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Scott, 1994; 
Suchman & Edelman, 1996). But extant literature and research has left us with inadequate 
knowledge about what goes into the construction of such norms. Issues such as how the problem 
is defined; what is taken into account when making decisions; whose interests are valued and 
why; and how innovation is supported greatly influence institutional outcome and field 
development. This dissertation research provides preliminary answer to those questions. With 
revised expectations under the DCL, universities are being called on to investigate and adjudicate 
serious crimes, often blurring the lines between risk mitigation and educational mission. To 
complement higher education legal analyses, practice, and policymaking, greater insight into this 
dynamic process is needed to illustrate whether (and if so - how) universities are able to develop 
forward-thinking results that enhanced opportunity for the institution and its students as they 
address compliance obligations. 
Purpose of the Study
University leaders and administrators, juggling the day-to-day demands of mitigating 
campus sexual misconduct matters with risk management and public accountability concerns, are 
eager for research that informs this contentious area of practice. This study examines the how 
and why of institutional decision making processes as universities reacted to changes in the 
Department of Education’s administrative guidance addressing campus sexual violence 
obligations. How did universities respond to the DCL and why did they choose to do it that way? 
I examine the deliberation and policy-making organizational processes at three universities that 
9provided information-rich, insightful, and varied approaches to understanding and addressing 
DCL compliance. These cases advance the study’s intent of informing our understanding of how 
universities can address legal obligations arising from a complex regulatory environment while 
enhancing opportunity for the institution and its students in the process. I studied three 
universities whose actions exceeded minimal compliance expectations. Institutional actors at 
these universities - leaders, decision makers, faculty, administrators, students, and other 
constituents – were able to use the DCL catalyst as an opportunity to advance change on campus. 
In doing so, they also influenced the organizational field and advanced issues of importance to 
society. Although the DCL provides the specific context for this inquiry, the research findings 
can be extrapolated to other complex university policy considerations in which the dynamic 
negotiation of social, organizational, and legal influences takes place.
With changes to the university’s regulatory environment accelerating, pressure to comply 
with burgeoning rules has most universities reacting to the legal issue at hand. By addressing 
only legal obligations, however, and not taking into account the broader cultural context when 
making decisions, some of the best options for innovation and transformation may be lost 
(Siedel, 2002). The purpose of this study is to investigate the processes through which 
institutional policy is negotiated and strengthened as universities address legal compliance 
obligations. Adapting a four-step model introduced under the proactive law framework (Siedel, 
2002; Siedel & Haapio, 2010, 2011), the study examines the process in which decision makers 
from these universities were able to progress from merely reacting the DCL to establishing 
promotive practices. In other words, moving beyond initial problem-solving responses that 
protect the institution from legal liability (reactive) to fostering collaboration and innovation in 
10
order to take into account not only legal obligations, but other considerations of importance to 
the organization and society (promotive). 
This study attempts to broaden our understanding of how, in the wake of ambiguous and 
contentious external legal requirements, universities can elevate decision making processes and 
policy outcomes by affirming possibilities within the scope of new regulations, rather than 
emphasizing compliance deficiencies. Being called on to fulfill a judicial role imposed upon 
them by expanded Title IX obligations, university leaders are intensely watching for strategies 
that satisfy compliance obligations while supporting institutional and community values. This 
study does not attempt to examine the complex cultural dynamics underlying the issue of sexual 
violence, harassment, and assault on campus. Nor is it intended to analyze the merits of different 
policies created in response to the law. Rather, it is a nuanced and in-depth examination of 
decision making processes that can be used to advance institutional capacity in moving beyond 
compliance to lawful, innovative responses to externally imposed legal directives. 
Conceptual Framework
This study is premised on circumstances in which an outside legal force affects the 
organization, and those in it, creating opposition in the university’s legal culture and 
environment. Organizational, legal, and educational scholars examining the close association of 
law and organizations refer to this concept as legalization (Gajda, 2009; Jasanoff, 1985; Meyer, 
1983; Olivas, 2005; Selznick, 1969; Sitkin & Bies, 1994). Universities are not powerless in 
shaping laws determined outside the boundaries of the organization (exogenously created). 
Rather, the policies and programs they create in response give meaning to the law, influencing 
the law’s interpretation and scope (endogenously created). This study is informed by the 
substantial literature in organizational theory of law being used by organizations to strategically 
11
shape responses to legal mandates as they construct the meaning of compliance, thereby 
mediating the impact of regulations on institutional policies. Universities possess the power to 
influence legal compliance and mediate the laws’ effects on their organizational interests as they 
select, interpret, and challenge laws (Edelman, 1992; Edelman et al., 2001; Edelman et al., 2010; 
Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Gornitza & Larsen, 2004; Gould, 2001; Scott, 1994; Suchman & 
Edelman, 1996). The extent to which they embrace and respond to legal concerns, however, 
varies (Edelman, 1990; Siedel, 2002; Siedel & Haapio, 2010, 2011; Sitkin & Bies, 1994). 
Multiple contributions to organizational theory provide the conceptual framework underlying the 
study’s goal of better understanding the institutional decision-making process under increasingly 
legalized circumstances. 
Research Questions
The over-arching purpose of this study is to better understand how university decision 
makers are able to enhanced opportunity for the institution and its students as they respond to 
externally imposed legal pressures. In order to gain insight into this process, I developed the 
following research questions to guide the study. The primary research question, how is 
institutional policy negotiated around an ambiguous, multi-interest, regulatory prompt, is 
supported by four sub-questions: How do multiple interests shape understanding of the issue? 
What influences the compliance outcomes chosen? In what ways are strategies on preventive 
solutions developed? Finally, how is space for innovation, collaboration, and/or proactivity 
created in the decision making process? Additional information relevant to the study’s research 
questions is communicated in the methodology section (see Chapter 3, Review of the Problem 
and Guiding Research Questions). 
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Nature of the Study
This qualitative, multi-case study research examines the organizational space in which 
university actors interpret ambiguous Title IX compliance obligations. Three public, 4-year, 
doctorate-granting, research universities that organized teams of university constituents to review 
and respond to the DCL provide the sample for this study. I gathered primary data from 21 one-
on-one, semi structured interviews of members of the universities’ Title IX DCL review teams. 
Participants held leadership positions within the dean of students office, academic advising, 
institutional equity, Title IX compliance, conduct, counseling services, athletics, housing, 
LGBTQ services, and ability and mobility services. The sample also included graduate and 
undergraduate students. Such participants, representing diverse areas of expertise across campus, 
are considered important contributors to issues of campus sexual violence (Armstrong, Hamilton, 
& Sweeney, 2006; Minow & Einolf, 2009; Miranda, 2013; Moynihan, Banyard, Arnold, 
Eckstein, & Stapleton, 2010). Secondary data also consisted of campus observations, 
participation in programming and awareness events, and document analysis of public records. 
Key Concepts: Overview and Definitions
Title IX encompasses much more than the issues raised by the DCL. As a gender 
discrimination law, it pertains to discrimination on the basis of sex in all education programs and 
activities, including hiring and employment practices, awarding scholarships, access to health 
care, quality of housing facilities, availability and funding of sport activities, etc. The DCL also 
addresses more than the issue of campus sexual violence. It prohibits gender-based aggression, 
intimidation, or hostility based on sex or sex stereotyping, even when such harassment does not 
involve sexual acts. Sexual violence is a form of sexual harassment prohibited under Title IX. 
Sexual violence, defined below, includes a number of sexual acts committed against a person’s 
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will. These include rape, sexual assault, sexual battery, and sexual coercion. Lack of consent to 
such acts renders them illegal. Perpetrators can be liable in a criminal court, which could result in 
conviction, jail or fines paid to the state. They can also be responsible in civil court for damages 
suffered by the complainant (plaintiff) and ordered to pay money to them. Within a school’s 
jurisdiction, a perpetrator can also be sanctioned for violating general student codes of conduct 
or specific codes governing sexual misconduct. 
Sexual misconduct policies referred to in this dissertation, unless otherwise noted, govern 
only student conduct. The DCL covers other permutations of sexual harassment, involving 
faculty and student, or supervisor and subordinate, for example. University policies against 
sexual harassment by faculty or staff, and the procedures to follow when filing a complaint of 
such activity, are often separate policies from the ones governing student behavior, however, or 
have yet to be addressed further to the DCL guidance. The DCL defines sexual violence as: 
Physical sexual acts perpetrated against a person’s will or where a person is incapable of 
giving consent due to the use of drugs or alcohol. An individual also may be unable to 
give consent due to an intellectual or other disability. A number of different acts fall into 
the category of sexual violence, including rape, sexual assault, sexual battery, and sexual 
coercion. All such acts of sexual violence are forms of sexual harassment covered under 
Title IX. (Dear Colleague Letter, 2011, p 1-2)
While some universities have begun to adopt this language, many continue to use the term sexual 
misconduct, which universities would normally define in its codes of conduct. I use the term 
university throughout the dissertation document to refer to accredited, degree-granting, federally 
funded colleges, universities, and other institutions of higher education.
Delimitations 
I imposed certain delimitations to complete this research study. Most notably, I chose to 
study three universities that showed initiative in its responses to the DCL, as opposed to a single 
institution or contrasting two different cases. The three research sites were not necessarily ideal 
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candidates, but due to the obstacles involved in recruiting participants, I elected to move forward 
with these institutions after having been turned down by others I had approached. In addition, I 
guaranteed anonymity to both individual participants and the universities themselves. I made this 
decision based on the sensitive nature of the topic, negative media attention of university 
missteps and inaction that affected climate at the time of sampling, institutional actors’ fear of 
Office for Civil Rights investigations and punitive reach, and belief that offering confidentiality 
would ease participants anxiety in contributing to this research. 
Organization of the Document
My dissertation is organized in a traditional social science format. Chapter 1 introduces 
my research topic, focus, and contributions of the study to the field of higher education. Chapter 
2 familiarizes the reader with various environmental considerations of importance to the study: 
the university legal environment, Title IX obligations, the impact of the DCL, and the complex, 
difficult, and sensitive dimensions intertwined in issues of campus sexual violence. It also 
identifies the conceptual frames that provide the theoretical grounding and research direction for 
the study. It is here that I synthesize relevant inter-disciplinary research from higher education, 
sociology, organizational studies, and law. Chapter 3 subsequently sets forth the methodological 
approach, rationale, and design I felt appropriate for undertaking this research study.
Collectively, chapters 4 to 7 convey the findings and discussions from the data. Chapter 4 
communicates the organizational contexts of the research sites, how addressing the DCL took on 
different forms at each site, and how the universities prepared their organization for change. 
Chapter 5 speaks to the multiple leadership roles actors adopted that were instrumental in the 
review teams’ success. Chapter 6 focuses on the collaboration dynamics involved in creating the 
team culture that enabled members to advance legally compliant and context appropriate policies 
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and protocols that exceeded compliance obligations. Tying up the findings, Chapter 7 addresses 
specific changes advanced by the review teams, the diffusion of these practices, and the intended 
and unintended positive effects that have resulted from universities’ post DCL efforts to address 
and combat campus sexual violence. Finally, Chapter 8 wraps-up the dissertation with my 
conclusions and recommendations for research and practice. 
Significance of the Study 
More than five years have passed since the Department of Education released its DCL 
guidance “clarifying” universities’ Title IX obligations. Since then, two additional 
“clarifications” have been issued addressing DCL ambiguities (Appendix B, Questions and 
Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, 2014; Appendix C, Dear Colleague Letter: Title IX 
Coordinators, 2015). A widely held perception across higher education is that the combined 
“guidance” documents have raised more issues than they have clarified (Duehren & Talkoff, 
2016; Mangan, 2016; New, 2016a, 2016b; Russell, 2015; Special Report on Title IX 
Enforcement, 2016; The Trends Report: 10 Key Shifts in Higher Education, 2016; Wilson, 
2015a, 2015b). The post DCL campus environment remains unsettled, with pressure on 
universities to address and prevent campus sexual violence more intense than ever. 
The Chronicle of Higher Education’s 2016 Trends Report named institutional “handling” 
of sexual assault complaints as a key shift in higher education, placing university leaders on the 
defensive “to stay ahead of the curve” (The Trends Report: 10 Key Shifts in Higher Education, 
2016). Intensifying enforcement, the Office for Civil Rights’ budget was increased by 107 
million dollars in 2016 to hire additional Title IX investigators (Special Report on Title IX 
Enforcement, 2016). Not only is the number of Title IX investigations against universities 
mounting, but the investigations themselves are becoming increasingly harsh (Special Report on 
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Title IX Enforcement, 2016; Wilson, 2015b). Issues of how best to address campus sexual 
violence persist, with controversial responses often pitting student concerns against institutional 
interests (Baker, 2014a; Baker, 2014b; Kingkade, 2014, 2015; New, 2016b). Balancing the 
complexities underlying the multiple issues implicated in campus sexual violence is complicated. 
It involves more than having an updated code, some investigators, and resources to provide to 
students (Wilson, 2016). Higher education leaders and practitioners are eager for research that 
will assist them in navigating increasingly intense governmental oversight, public scrutiny, and 
best practices in the Title IX compliance environment (Kelderman, 2014; New, 2016a, 2016b; 
Vendituoli, 2014b; Wilson, 2014a, 2015a, 2015b).
This research advances our understanding of the organizational environment in which the 
dynamic negotiation of social, organizational, and legal influences takes place by examining the 
process in which institutional policy is negotiated following a change in the institution’s legal 
environment. In doing so, institutional leaders will better understand how universities have the 
ability to shape the construction of legal responses as they enhance opportunity for the institution 
and its students while addressing compliance obligations. Such a study is important to the field 
of higher education in order to expand our understanding of how institutions respond to their 
growing responsibilities under Title IX and other regulations. Knowing more about how such 
responses are constructed will help us to understand normative practices being redefined as 
universities are thrust into new and developing roles – such as the investigators and adjudicators 
of serious crimes – that raise issues surrounding educational mission, shared-governance, 
institutional autonomy, judicial deference, and academic freedom. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Conceptual Frame
Organizational Environment
Higher education institutions in the United States are extremely diverse. That the sector is 
experiencing increasing amounts of organizational diversification and stratification as resources 
and status become more polarized has been well documented (Altbach, Gumport, & Berdahl, 
2011; Bastedo, 2009; Bess & Dee, 2012; Blackburn & Lawrence, 1995; Goldrick-Rab, 2010; 
Gumport, 1997; Stevens, Armstrong, & Arum, 2008). The extent to which universities are 
accountable and responsive to their environments depends, in large part, on institutional 
legitimacy and financial stability. With limited resources, universities are often called to choose 
between competing social, cultural, political, legal, or economic priorities. This often entails a 
balancing of interests and demands between internal and external stakeholders, including 
tensions existing between institutional self-interest, societal goals, and individual benefits (Bess 
and Dee, 2012). 
University as a Public Good 
Higher education has a long-standing tradition of fulfilling a public mission in society. Its 
responsibility in realizing significant social, cultural, political, economic, and technological 
benefits has significantly influenced public policies related to its affairs. The increasing 
commoditization of higher education as a private good available for trade, however, has shifted 
its duty to this core public commitment (Bowen, 1997; Harkavy, 2006; Kezar, Chambers & 
Burkhardt, 2005; Labaree, 1997; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). With the effectiveness of the 
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university premised on a covenant struck between the university and the general public in which 
society financially supports the university and grants it great autonomy, and in return the 
university invests its resources and freedoms to serve the larger public interest, shifts in this 
relationship appear to be weakening the basic social compact underlying higher education 
(Finkin & Post, 2009; Rhodes, 2001). Increasing federal encroachment and oversight on the 
academy has both contributed to this decline and attempted to preserve its noble commitment to 
the public good (Dunham, 2010; Gajda, 2009; McLendon & Hearn, 2006; Task Force on Federal 
Regulation of Higher Education, 2015; Toma, 2011; Yudof, 1981).  
Specific laws and statutes impose upon universities a duty to provide a safe and secure 
learning environment for the campus community (among others, the Campus Sexual Violence 
Elimination Act, 2013; Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime 
Statistics Act, 1990 et. seq.; Title IX of the United States Education Amendments of 1972, 2012; 
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act, 2013). An increase in reported campus crimes, 
including catastrophic mass shootings on campus, and greater public scrutiny of university 
actions have compelled universities to focus more attention on their role in providing safer 
campus environments (Letarte, 2014). The Department of Education intensified the campus 
safety discussion by setting out ambitious public policy objectives for universities through the 
DCL. Among them, universities are being asked to confront campus sexual harassment and 
violence, promptly and equitably address its effects, and prevent its recurrence (Dear Colleague 
Letter, 2011). Questions over goal displacement, mission drift, and appropriateness of 
universities fulfilling this quasi-criminal justice, investigative, and judicial role have contributed 
to a highly volatile sector in which confusion, controversy, and scrutiny eclipse universities’ 
every action (Harris, 2015; Henrick, 2013; Kelderman, 2014; Koss, et al., 2014; New, 2016a, 
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2016b; Vendituoli, 2014b; Wilson, 2014a, 2015a, 2015b; Yoffe, 2014). With the national 
conversation focusing on what universities are getting wrong as they address issues of campus 
sexual violence, this study helps to illuminate what universities may be getting right as they act 
to understand their legal responsibilities and construct compliance with the law. 
Legal Landscape 
The diffusion of legal considerations throughout all expanses of campus life has become 
an undeniable reality of university functioning in the 21st century. Universities are required to 
comply with a myriad of laws and regulations as they craft policies designed to satisfy divergent 
interests while adhering to core educational values. While avoiding legal liability is an important 
motivator in addressing legal issues facing universities, it is not necessarily the first or only 
concern. Universities respond to the law to establish legitimacy and advance self-interests 
(Feldman & Levy, 1994; McLendon & Hearn, 2006; Olivas, 2002; Tierney, 1993). Policy 
considerations, as well as the university’s mission and priorities, often lead institutions to do 
more than the law requires (Pavela & Kaplin, 2006; Roth, Sitkin, & House, 1994; Siedel, 2002; 
Siedel & Haapio, 2010, 2011). 
Three distinct facets of law make up an organization’s legal environment. The regulatory 
environment regulates organizational activity, usually at the hands of the state, to actively control 
organizational behavior. Title IX of the Education Act is an example of the U.S. Department of 
Education’s regulatory activity in higher education. The interactional environment provides an 
arena for organizational action, enabling institutional actors to influence how problems and 
disputes are constructed and resolved. Here we find lawsuits, public hearings, Freedom of 
Information Act requests, and numerous informal maneuvers and negotiations. The definitional 
environment defines the basic building blocks of organizational forms and interorganizational 
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relationships between social actors (Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Scott, 1994; Suchman, 1993). 
In this space, various classes of organizational actors are constructed by the legal system, which 
also delineates the relationships between them. Classification of higher education institutions (2-
year, 4 year, research, vocational, etc.) affects what the organizations are permitted to do (level 
of degree they can confer, for example) and influences the relations between actors (how 
contracts are written and enforced, what governance regimes can exist). Although this legal 
environment can constrain organizations, actors have the power to shape institutional rules 
through strategic behavior as they select, interpret, and challenge laws. This can be seen in 
lobbying, activism, and exploration of alternative models that diffuse throughout the 
organizational field into standards that become accepted by the courts (Scott, 1994). Together, 
these legal rules and processes operate to shape organizations and influence inter-organizational 
relations. 
Legal counsel is an integral institutional actor in inter-organizational relations where the 
law intersects with organizational life. Universities routinely rely on attorneys to provide legal 
advice, information, and recommendations to administrators on a myriad of complex and 
expanding issues. Campus lawyers support relationships at every administrative and operational 
level within the university (White, 2008). Not all universities have the benefit of in-house 
counsel, however. While the National Association of College and University Attorneys boasts a 
membership of over 3800 attorneys who provide legal advice to approximately 1500 member 
institutions, this loosely represents less than a third of the 4700 two and four year colleges in the 
United States (National Center for Educational Statistics, 2014; White, 2008). One study (albeit 
small with 87 responding institution) found that only 55% of respondents have in-house legal 
counsel. Among those institutions with a general counsel’s office, half were staffed by only one 
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attorney. Six percent of universities had a campus legal unit staffed by over 10 attorneys (Gelpi, 
2013). Other models of legal-service delivery for institutions with limited access to in-house 
legal counsel include relying on legal advice from attorneys who serve on the board of trustees, 
law professors, or the office of the state attorney general (Bickel, 1994). Such methods of legal-
service delivery cannot match the expertise of competent in-house legal counsel, who offer the 
advantage of not only navigating tricky legal situations because of their legal expertise, but 
because of their understanding of the organization and participation in strategic planning (Gelpi, 
2013; Siedel, 2002; White, 2008). Lawyers, particularly high status lawyers, play an important 
role filtering legal information for the organization. They are often the ones that read and 
interpret statutes and guidance, diffusing knowledge throughout the organization as they 
construct the meaning of law (Edelman, 2016; Edelman, Krieger, Eliason, Albiston, & Mellema, 
2011; Edelman, Uggen, & Erlanger, 1999). 
Campus Sexual Violence
An issue threatening students’ rights to equal access to education and universities’ 
provision of a safe educational environment is sexual violence on campus. Strengthened federal 
laws and guidance, combined with pressure from activists and national media attention of 
institutional failings and missteps around contested issues of campus sexual assault and justice 
for survivors, have created an environment in which colleges and universities are under greater 
scrutiny than ever to address this complex societal issue (Bazelon, 2015; Dear Colleague Letter, 
2011; Grigoriadis, 2014; Harris, 2015; Kelderman, 2014; Koss, et al., 2014; Peterson, 2014; 
Vendituoli, 2014a; Wilson, 2015a; White House Council on Women and Girls, 2014; White 
House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault, 2014). Acts of campus sexual 
violence have persisted - largely unchecked - for decades. A significant body of research reveals 
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that one in five female students and one in sixteen male students is sexually assaulted during 
college, with risks to members of the LGBTQ community being even higher (Anderson & 
Clement, 2015; Association of American Universities, 2015; Cantor, Fisher, Chibnall, 
Townsend, Lee, Bruce, & Thomas, 2015; Dear Colleague Letter, 2011; Fisher et al., 2000; Koss, 
Gidycz, & Wisniewski, 1987; Krebs et al., 2007; Thomas-Card & Eichele, 2015; U.S. 
Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, 2001). 
Linkages between experiences of sexual violence, decline in academic performance, social 
isolation, and mental health issues - including anxiety, depression, eating disorders, and suicidal 
behavior - have been clearly established (Chang et al., 2015; Dear Colleague Letter, 2011; Fact 
Sheet, 2011; Jordan, 2014; Jordan et al., 2014; Mason & Lodrick, 2013). There is little room left 
for doubt: Sexual violence is occurring on campuses across the country, it has detrimental 
consequences, and failing to take action to eliminate it has legal consequences. 
Despite a clear problem and legal obligations to address and mitigate matters connected 
to campus sexual violence, many universities continue to show indifference in fulfilling their 
moral and legal responsibilities to act. Socially constructed misconceptions about sexual 
violence, for example commonly held “rape myths,” continue to occupy much of the public 
discourse (Aronowitz, Lambert, & Davidoff, 2012; Bannon, Brosi, & Foubert, 2013; Burgess-
Proctor, Pickett, Parkhill, Hamill, Kirwan, & Kozak, 2016; Hayes, Abbott, & Cook, 2016; 
Hayes, Lorenz, & Bell, 2012; Rader, Rhineberger-Dunn, & Vasquez, 2016). Such 
misconceptions perpetuate false beliefs regarding incidences of sexual violence, questioning the 
circumstances of the scenario and attributing blame to those who have been assaulted (Burt, 
1980; Jimenez & Abreu, 2003; Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994). Victim blaming attaches a level of 
responsibility to the assaulted student because of behavior perceived to have contributed to the 
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incident, such as drinking alcohol, dressing provocatively, or perceptions of promiscuity (Burt, 
1980; Hayes-Smith & Levett, 2010; Macrae & Shepherd, 1989; Moor, 2010; Schwartz & 
Leggett, 1999; Whatley, 2005). It may also involve preconceived notions of what constitutes 
“real” sexual assault versus a regrettable sexual experience, and draws on issues of credibility as 
to whether the assaulted student lied about the incident (Burt, 1980; Edwards, Turchik, Dardis, 
Reynolds, & Gidycz, 2011; Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994; Payne, Lonsway, & Fitzgerald 1999). 
Even with methodologically rigorous research finding that only 2 to 10 percent of campus sexual 
assault accusations are false (Lisak, Gardinier, Nicksa, & Cote, 2010; Lonsway, Archambault, & 
Lisak, 2009), rape myths act to revictimize the assaulted person (especially when sanctioned by 
law enforcement officials, lawyers, and doctors), and serve as a mechanism for blame and 
silencing (Campbell, 1998; Ryan, 2011). These dynamics contribute to sexual assault being the 
most underreported serious crime in the country. Of the incidents that are reported by the general 
public (including but not limited to university occurrences), less than 5% are prosecuted. Of 
those, between 0.2 to 2.8 percent result in a conviction involving jail time for the assailant 
(Lonsway & Archambault, 2012). This leads to an understated theme drowned out by the “rape 
myth” narrative: that the number of perpetrators who avoid prosecution is far greater than the 
number of innocent people erroneously charged (Krakauer, 2015). The challenge for universities 
under the current regulatory regime is how to continue to narrow the gap, giving serious 
consideration to the issue while balancing educational mission and legal rights. 
Title IX 
Title IX of the Education Act prohibits federally funded recipients, such as universities, 
from discrimination on the basis of sex under any education program. The gender discrimination 
law affords protection to women, men, transgender, and gender nonconforming individuals in 
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diverse areas including parental rights, educational access, sexual harassment, employment, 
athletics, technology, and standardized testing. Although enacted in 1972 with an emphasis on 
equity in sport programs, it has undergone over 20 amendments and judicial interpretation that 
have expanded the scope of discrimination under Title IX (Gebser v. Lago, 1998; Haffer v. 
Temple University, 1988; Title IX, 1972 et seq.; Title IX Info, 2016, Women’s Sports 
Foundation, 2016).  
 Included under this broad charge is the issue of campus sexual violence. The Department 
of Education’s Office for Civil Rights, the federal agency charged with interpreting and 
regulating Title IX compliance, first established guidelines to protect students from sexual 
harassment in 1997. That guidance was revised through a formal rule-making process, resulting 
in the definitive – and still in effect - guide for universities’ legal obligations in the treatment, 
prevention, and administration of campus sexual harassment and assault (Revised Sexual 
Harassment Guidance, 2001). Despite these prevention and response obligations, incidents of 
sexual harassment and assault against students showed little improvement. Thousands of 
universities appeared to have inadequate, or non-existent, policies and protocols in place to 
adequately address, respond, and mitigate the problem. In April 2011, with rising incidents of 
campus sexual violence, institutional under reporting of the offenses, and studies linking student 
dysfunction (depression, substance abuse, suicide) and impeded academic progress to 
experiences of campus sexual violence, the Department of Education issued the DCL. Put 
forward as simply a supplement to the 2001 guidance, the DCL provoked major change in Title 
IX law, policy, and culture (Dear Colleague Letter, 2011; Franke & White, 2011; Henrick, 2013; 
Q&A with Harvard’s Title IX officer, 2014).
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Title IX is only as effective as the remedy it provides for noncompliance. With a dual 
enforcement scheme, a complaining student can sue the university in civil court for violation of 
the statute. This is often done through contentions that universities ignored students’ civil rights, 
perpetuated unsafe activity or specific risks on campus, or showed deliberate indifference to their 
allegations (Harris, 2015; Henrick, 2013; Title IX investigation tracker, 2016). If the suit were 
successful, money could be awarded for damages the student suffered as a result of the 
university’s actions (or inactions). This does not preclude the student from also filing a 
complaint with the Office for Civil Rights, the second method of enforcement. Should the 
complaint be substantiated and the university found to have violated Title IX, its federal funding 
could be revoked. This power has not been exercised in the more than forty-year history since 
the statute’s enactment. The closest this is known to have occurred was in 2014 when Tufts 
University revoked its agreement with the Office for Civil Rights to remedy its Title IX 
violations. The Office for Civil Rights responded by threatening to cut Tufts’ federal funding. 
The standoff between the government agency and the university was resolved when Tufts 
conceded to cure its breach (Henrick, 2013; Kelderman, 2014; Peterson, 2014).    
Dear Colleague Letter on Sexual Violence 
In the five years since its release, the 2011 DCL has significantly impacted higher 
education’s compliance culture and altered structural patterns and integration across university 
organizations. The 2011 letter was issued to remind schools of their Title IX accountability in 
responding to sexual violence allegations. It clarified and expanded some elements of regulation 
while defining new terminology and obligations. Prior to the 2011 letter, the prevailing 
terminology was of sexual harassment on campus. Sexual violence surfaced as an extreme form 
of hostile environment sexual harassment, defined in the 2011 letter as:
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Physical sexual acts perpetrated against a person’s will or where a person is incapable of 
giving consent due to the victim’s use of drugs or alcohol. An individual also may be unable 
to give consent due to an intellectual or other disability. A number of different acts fall into 
the category of sexual violence, including rape, sexual assault, sexual battery, and sexual 
coercion. All such acts of sexual violence are forms of sexual harassment covered under 
Title IX. [p 1-2.] 
This definition covers all permutations of sexual harassment in the campus environment: 
between students, involving faculty and student, among supervisor and subordinate, etc. Its 
jurisdiction also extends to allegations occurring off campus or outside the university’s education 
programs or activities (Dear Colleague Letter, 2011; Franke & White, 2011). As such, no 
member of the university community escapes its scope. The 2011 letter is not in itself a new law, 
yet represents a significant change to university legal environments, especially because the DCL 
is issued by the same governmental agency that investigates and enforces Title IX. Parts of the 
DCL are ambiguous, providing universities discretion in interpreting and responding to its 
direction. 
The 19-page DCL outlined 71 “shoulds,” 46 “mays,” 17 “recommends,” and 41 “musts” 
as guidance for universities to address issues of campus sexual misconduct (Five Colleges 
Compliance Website, 2012). Written in heavy legalese, the DCL offered broad suggestions with 
little context and few examples. In addition to outlining institutional obligations under Title IX 
regarding sexual violence, including mandatory language to be disseminated, minimal 
institutional response policies, Title IX coordinator roles and responsibilities, grievance 
procedures, and compliance requirements, the 2011 letter stipulates that preventive measures be 
implemented. These include education programs for new students, faculty, and staff; grievance 
procedures that provide for ending incident recurrence; maintaining a culture of prevention to 
stop harassment in the first place; and steps to prevent retaliation by the perpetrator against the 
accuser (Dear Colleague Letter, 2011; Franke & White, 2011). The letter offers little insight for 
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universities on the type of promotive or proactive practices effective in addressing campus 
sexual harassment and sexual violence. 
University leaders were alarmed by the flood of Office for Civil Rights investigations 
taking place on the heels of the 2011 DCL. In 2014, the Office for Civil Rights released a list of 
universities under investigation for Title IX sexual violence violations. Fifty-five universities had 
the dubious distinction of finding themselves on the list (Gray, 2014; U.S. Department of 
Education, Office for Civil Rights Press Release, 2014). Exponentially growing, there are now 
234 sexual violence investigations at 184 institutions. These investigations of alleged violations 
were originally contemplated to take 180 days to complete. Investigations have grown longer and 
more complex, some dragging on for years, with the average Title IX sexual misconduct 
investigation taking 1 year and 3 months to finish. Investigations have been evenly split between 
public and private institutions. The Office for Civil Rights has reached a decision in only 17% of 
their open cases. Some universities, more than 4 years after the investigation began, are still 
waiting for resolution (Mangan, 2016; Title IX investigation tracker, 2016).
The DCL requires that universities create and publicize sexual misconduct policies, 
provide prevention and education programs to combat sexual violence, and offer ample resources 
to aid survivors (Cantalupo, 2016; Henriksen, Mattick, & Fisher, 2016). Scurrying to respond to 
the more straightforward directives in the letter exposed additional layers of ambiguity. Despite 
clear guidance that universities must designate a Title IX coordinator, for example, issues 
addressing the scope of their responsibilities, necessary skills, or degree of independence were 
not raised in the DCL. Expertise for such a position proved to be wide-ranging. While some 
coordinators possessed backgrounds in law or as former federal Office for Civil Rights 
investigators, others held administrative positions in existing organizational units and gained 
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knowledge of applicable policies and misconduct practices through on-the-job training 
(Walesby, 2013). Organizational affiliation of Title IX coordinators also varied among 
institutions, with some coordinators operating directly out of the president’s office (University of 
California Berkley, University of Virginia) while others were housed in academic affairs (Yale, 
Northwestern), student affairs (Georgia State University, Rutgers) or human resource units of 
institutional equity and diversity (The State University of New York - Buffalo State, University 
of Arizona, University of Maine). Many institutions created structural changes, including 
reorganizing existing divisions or creating new organizational units (Harvard, Ohio State 
University, Penn State), to address the numerous and complicated issues connected to campus 
sexual misconduct, DCL, and Title IX obligations. 
Evidentiary Standard 
One of the more clear-cut shifts in the 2011 DCL revised the standard of proof required 
of university adjudication of campus sexual violence. The new “preponderance of evidence” 
standard replaced the stricter pre 2011 DCL “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard. 
Traditionally, the preponderance of evidence standard was used in civil suits where one party 
(plaintiff) would sue another party (defendant) for a perceived wrong (defamation, harassment, 
etc.). In a civil case, where money is awarded for damages and jail is not at issue, the 
preponderance of evidence (or more-likely-than-not) standard applies. Many universities were 
using the preponderance of evidence standard prior to the DCL. The DCL mandated that all 
schools now adopt that standard (Dear Colleague Letter, 2011). 
The switch in the burden of proof evolved from the public policy intent of ensuring that 
campus sexual assault adjudication would be equitable and impartial to both the accused and the 
complainant (Henrick, 2013; Title IX, 1972 et seq.; Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, 
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2001). It has resulted in a lowering of the evidentiary standard necessary for a finding of 
responsibility (or guilt) against an accused. Some argue the lower “more likely than not” burden 
of proof is an easier standard for the complainant to meet and does not sufficiently protect the 
rights of accused students. Courts have “recognize[d] that university sexual misconduct 
proceedings are serious matters with “tangible sanctions” like suspension or expulsion, and that 
states have an important interest in ensuring those procedures are fair” (Doe v. Hazard, 2016; 
Harris, 2016). As universities attempt to balance the rights of complainant and accused students, 
they have been met with an increase in civil lawsuits instigated by aggrieved students - on both 
sides of the issue - asserting discrimination on the basis of sex, due process violations, or breach 
of contract (Harris, 2015). Although generally an uphill battle for plaintiffs suing universities, 
courts are increasingly finding university policies or procedures to be “flawed and untenable,” 
ruling in the plaintiff’s favor or creating sufficient pressure for universities to settle the suit (Doe 
v. University of California, San Diego, 2015; Harris v. St. Joseph’s University, 2014; Mock v. 
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, 2015; Wells v. Xavier University, 2014).  
Legality of the DCL 
The prevailing legal interpretation of the 2011 DCL is that it is an “administrative 
guidance document” that adds clarity to interpreting the current state of Title IX law (34 C.F.R. § 
106, 1972 et seq.; Dear Colleague Letter, 2011; Henrick, 2013; Q&A with Harvard’s Title IX 
officer, 2014). However, alternative legal arguments have been raised as to the legality of the 
DCL’s mandates. While there seems to be agreement that guidance from the federal government 
is not law, there is division over the extent of “guidance” versus “rulemaking” in the DCL. The 
most striking example raised to clarify this point is the preponderance of evidence mandate. As 
mentioned above, the DCL explicitly changed the standard of proof universities must use in 
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adjudication of sexual assault complaints. According to the Office for Civil Rights, institutions 
not using the preponderance of evidence standard are not in compliance with Title IX and risk 
losing federal funding (Foundation for Individual Rights in Education [FIRE], 2014; Henrick, 
2013; U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Title IX and Sex Discrimination, 
2015). There seems to be mounting support for the argument that the DCL is invalid because its 
substantive rulemaking violates the Administrative Procedures Act. Enacted without either 
public notice or opportunity to comment, some believe the Office for Civil Rights violated the 
law when it issued the 2011 DCL (Cohn, 2011; FIRE, 2014; Harris, 2015; U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee on Financial & Contracting Oversight, 2014). The issue remains unresolved (due 
largely to interpretations of substantive versus non-substantive rule making) and universities 
continue to recognize the 2011 DCL and its subsequent clarifications as the law they are required 
to follow. There is considerable pressure on universities not to antagonize the Office for Civil 
Rights, who, until the ambit and authority of the DCL are resolved, remain subject to the Office 
for Civil Rights’ investigative and enforcement authority.       
Post DCL Regulations and Guidance 
Despite guidance, amendments, and new laws designed to increase transparency, reduce 
gender-related crime, respond to constituent needs, enhance student rights, set standards for 
disciplinary proceedings, initiate campus-wide prevention and education programs, and establish 
community partnerships (with local police, for example), campus sexual violence remains an 
area fraught with controversy, enmeshed in dispute, and besieged by politics. The 2011 DCL 
proposes some language and guidelines to address this critical problem. Given its lack of 
direction in certain areas and ambiguity in others, institutional approaches to address the multiple 
dimensions of the issue continue to evolve. Responding to the many unanswered questions raised 
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by the 2011 DCL, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights released a “significant 
guidance document” to “further clarify the legal requirements and guidance articulated in the 
DCL and the 2001 Guidance” and to provide “examples of proactive efforts schools can take to 
prevent sexual violence and remedies schools may use to end such conduct, prevent its 
recurrence, and address its effects” (Questions and Answers on Title IX Sexual Violence, 2014). 
The 52 question-answer items reference permissible institutional actions (as an example, “a 
school may use student disciplinary procedures, general Title IX grievance procedures, sexual 
harassment procedures, or separate procedures to resolve sexual violence complaints”), 
compulsory actions (for instance, schools are required to adopt and publish grievance 
procedures) and preferred actions (such as, “Title IX coordinators should not have other job 
responsibilities that may create a conflict of interest”) [emphasis added]. The Q&A was followed 
a year later by a Office of Civil rights guidance on Title IX coordinator responsibilities, advising 
universities support the coordinator’s duties, ensure their independence, and designate numerous 
deputy coordinators as needed (Dear Colleague Letter on Title IX Coordinators, 2015). In the 
four year period between the 2011 and 2015 DCLs, the Campus SAVE Act (2013), VAWA 
(2013) and amendments to Clery (2014) were all signed into law, expanding the capacity of the 
Clery crime disclosure act and overlaying prescriptive Title IX requirements. The scope of duties 
required by universities to create and publicize sexual misconduct policies, provide prevention 
and education programs to combat sexual violence, and offer resources to aid survivors were 
extended to a wider range of gender identity, domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking 
incidents (Cantalupo, 2016; Henriksen et al., 2016; Phillips Lytle, 2013). 
In addition to these different legislative actions, the Obama administration established an 
advisory task force in 2014 to coordinate responses and promote evidence-based practices 
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designed to address campus sexual assault and bring institutions into compliance with the law 
(White House Press Release, 2014). The White House Task Force to Protect Students from 
Sexual Assault released numerous reports, resource guides, tool kits, campus climate survey 
data, and recommendations for responding to sexual assault, all in an effort to raise awareness 
and increase resources available to respond and prevent campus sexual violence (Not Alone, 
2016). As universities construct responses to these extensive mandates, challenges will land 
before the courts for judicial interpretation. Universities have the opportunity to use the change 
in the law as a catalyst to design procedures and reframe the issue to move beyond basic 
compliance toward strengthening campus culture and values. Examining this issue through the 
organizational process of how universities are acting to understand and address their legal 
responsibilities, the current study offers insight into the interpersonal dynamics and 
organizational investment required to think broadly about the law to implement policies that 
become a source of institutional and societal opportunity and advancement as universities shape 
the law’s meaning. 
There is very little scholarly attention being paid to the legitimacy, symbolism, and 
substance underlying the development and implementation of universities’ sexual violence 
policies and protocols. In one emerging, but as of yet unpublished, research study combining 
sociological and higher education frameworks, a field-level examination of 380 universities in 
the United States analyzes whether institutions are responding to the letter of the law (exhibiting 
minimal or symbolic compliance), as opposed to the spirit of the law (to end sexual violence on 
campus) (Badke, Porter, Garrick, Armstrong, Levitsky, 2016). Another interdisciplinary study, 
drawing on perspectives from sociology, justice studies, and psychology, examines how 
universities plan and respond to issues of campus sexual violence. Preliminary results from this 
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research identify four organizational problem areas facing universities as they attempt, through 
their actors, to develop and implement effective sexual assault policies. First, arising from 
universities’ origins to serve “able-bodied, privileged white males” (Federation for the 
Humanities and Social Sciences, 2016), university policies and services are often insufficiently 
designed to meet the needs of non-traditional groups. Second, universities overwhelmingly lack 
the financial resources necessary to implement the changes they ideally seek. Third, conflict 
between protecting the university’s reputation and addressing students’ best interests is difficult 
for university administrators undertaking the revisions to solve. Finally, those charged with 
revising sexual violence policies must have adequate training and expertise around sexual assault 
matters (Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, 2016; Shanker, 2016). While these 
developing studies provide valuable insight into organizational considerations influencing 
universities’ construction and implementation of new policies, there remains a gap in the 
literature, and in our understanding, of how this internal reevaluation and reformulating process 
is shaping university behavior and policy negotiation in the construction of post DCL, Title IX 
compliance. 
Conceptual Framework
Examining the epidemic of campus sexual violence using the metaphor of a river helps to 
illustrate challenges with DCL/Title IX compliance: 
There is a river where lots of people wade. The bottom has lots of sharp rocks that cut 
people’s feet. The DCL specifies that universities adjudicate violence fairly. This could 
mean doing a good job bandaging up people’s feet after being cut. It also stipulates 
universities should conduct climate surveys. Maybe this means counting the rocks in the 
river, or counting how many people cut their feet on the rocks? It does nothing about the 
actual rocks in the river. Education and prevention programs are required. Many of these 
programs train people to avoid rocks or caution them to wear water shoes when wading 
in the river. The rocks are unaffected. Compliance with the DCL and Title IX does not 
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require the rocks be removed. Or that their sharpness be remedied. The law does not 
speak to effectiveness in education or prevention.5 
What will colleges and universities do about the rocks? How are they figuring this out? 
Do they just want to conceal the rocks when the rock counters come? How much will attending 
to the rocks cost? How much will it cost if they don’t? What are the ramifications of each? What 
are other universities doing about the rocks? Organizational research provides a means to 
examine these social, economic, political, and field-level considerations that shape behavior in 
universities (Bastedo, 2009; Bess & Dee, 2012; Fligstein, 2001a; Kezar & Dee, 2011; Rojas, 
2007). Analyzing organizations and their practice, as exemplified in this study by the decision-
making processes involved in understanding and responding to legally ambiguous mandates, can 
expand scholars’ understanding of organizational stability, adaptation, and change (Cameron, 
1984; Fligstein, 2001a; Kezar, 2001). It also provides insight on institutional influences affecting 
macro-level trends and micro-level individual behavior (Suchman & Edelman, 1996; Tierney & 
Bensimon, 1996). Intersecting legal and organizational analyses, organizational research 
provides important insight into universities’ meaning-building processes as actors shape 
understanding and construct responses to the law in uncertain environments (Suchman & 
Edelman, 1996). 
Organizational theory comprises a body of knowledge addressing how and why 
organizations function. It is concerned with understanding how the internal organizational 
structure of formal, complex, organizations operates to motivate actors and generate outcomes 
consistent with the goals of those who control the organization. It also considers how the external 
environment effects what goes on inside the organization (Fligstein, 2001a; Fligstein, 2001b; 
5 Modified from presentation by Holly Rider-Millkovich and Anne Huhman, SAPAC, Nov 11, 
2015, undergraduate lecture in Title IX seminar class, Organizational Studies 495, University of 
Michigan.  
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Heugens & Lander, 2009; Meyer, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 2006; Scott, 2001). Through these 
insights, it informs the practice of leadership and management (Bess & Dee, 2012; Fligstein, 
2001a). With its origins in industrial efficiency, organizational theory developed different lines 
of scholarship through contributions and competing theoretical perspectives from such 
disciplines as economics, political science, psychology, and sociology. These perspectives differ 
in terms of their conceptualization of organizational characteristics such as choice, influence, 
environment, development, and change.6 It is modern organizational theory with its integration 
of organizational and individual interests, emphasis on the dynamic process of interaction, and 
characteristics of adaptation that provides the theoretical foundation for this study (Fligstein, 
2001a; Hicks & Gullet, 1975; Scott & Davis, 2007).
Within this modern frame, subcategories of organizational theories emerged, each 
focusing on different influences affecting the organization. In his analysis of organizational 
theory in higher education, Richard Scott (2015) highlights some of these developments. He 
explains how contingency theorists, for example, maintained that organizations were affected by 
environmental complexity, turbulence, and the state of technology. Network theorists assumed 
effects from relational systems within the organization. Population ecologists theorized that 
competition for resources among organizations affected the organization’s development. Power 
processes were the source attributed by resource dependency theorists. Institutional theorists 
were motivated by cultural and symbolic systems. Figure 1, based on these descriptions by Scott 
(2015) of modern developments in organizational theory, provides a visual reference of the 
relationship between these different subcategories. I have connected a socio-legal layer evolving 
from institutional theory. The categories in the figure are by no means exhaustive. Rather, they 
6 See Fligstein (2001a) for an overview of the history of organizational theory and a visual 
depiction of its multiple interdisciplinary connections.
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are used to help illustrate connections among this study’s theoretical orientations, of the 
convergence of the sociology of law and the sociology of organizations that developed out of 
new institutional traditions, which itself emerged from institutional theory’s focus on 
organizational research. 
Organizational Theory
Resource Dependency Theory Population Ecology Theory Institutional Theory
"old" institutionalis "new" institutionalism
socio-legaltradition
Contingency Theory Network Theory Etc.
Figure 1 Subcategories of modern organizational theory   
Educational scholars, including Burton Clark (1970, 1972), Robert Zemsky (2001), and 
James Bess and Jay Dee (2012), have advanced strong arguments supporting the importance of 
organizational theory in understanding the practical affairs of universities. Though many of the 
theoretical principles underlying organizational theory evolved from profit-making 
organizations, their application to the managerial skills required in universities is just as relevant. 
As Bess and Dee argue: 
When applied correctly, theory can be used to identify the conceptual foundations of 
common problems that occur in organizations. Too often, organizational members tend to 
believe that each problem at their particular institution is totally unlike that at other, 
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similar institutions. However, because theory has been established on the basis of 
empirical research at many other such institutions, its precepts and predictions generally 
provide guidance in particular instances. As has often been noted, theory can be 
eminently practical when used correctly.
To understand organizational behavior in the context of an outside legal force that affects the 
organization, and those in it, in relation to its culture and environment, this study focuses on 
theory of the organization and administration of universities from an institutional perspective. 
Because this study ultimately deals with characteristics of human life that underlie behavior in 
organizations, applying other complementary or competing theories could also have been valid. 
Successful, legitimate, organizational solutions to problems, such as addressing the ambiguous 
legal requirements of the DCL, require meaningful contributions from multiple conceptual 
orientations (Bess & Dee, 2012). I have chosen institutional theory to ground this study’s 
orientation and actions. 
Institutional Theory
Institutional theory offers numerous insights that provide both theoretical grounding to 
this study and research direction. Adapted from concepts of both “old” institutionalism and 
“neo” or “new” institutionalism, institutional theory provides an understanding of process and 
strategy to explain organizational adaptation in uncertain environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Selznick, 1949, 1957, 1996). “Old” institutionalism is primarily 
concerned with technical forces that enhance efficiency and profit (Fligstein, 2001a; Suchman & 
Edelman, 1996). It views patterns of organizational interaction and adaptation as rationally 
responding to the organization’s internal and external environments through normative elements 
of role expectations and enforcement mechanisms (Parsons, 1951; Selznick, 1957, 1996). In this 
model, coercive and determinative laws and regulations are created outside the organization’s 
boundaries (exogenously created). They are then enforced in the external environment in which 
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the organization operates (Parsons, 1956, 1960). “New” institutionalism7 rejects this strict, 
rational, exogenous conception. Rather, it contends that organizations are shaped as much by 
their cultural environments as by rational calculations and technical imperatives (Suchman & 
Edelman, 1996). New institutionalism provides that actors within the organization play a 
powerful role in shaping cultural norms that influence institutional actions. In this way, the “rule-
like” frameworks (structures) and “rational myths” (symbols) actors create in response to 
environmental signals give meaning to the law, influencing the law’s definition and scope 
(endogenously created) (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Rowan & Miskel, 1999; Scott & Davis, 2007; 
Sitkin & Bies, 1994). Simply stated, whereas old institutionalism would perceive a legal 
regulation as a strict, codified set of rules, new institutionalism allows for a more fluid 
interpretation of the law’s intent in relation to the institutional field.
New institutional analyses in the study of education contend that universities are 
sustained more by shared beliefs (myths) than by technical exigencies or a logic of efficiency 
(Atkinson, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 2006; Scott, 2015). In this view, educational institutions 
maintain legitimacy in the public’s eyes by conforming to institutionalized norms and values 
(Meyer, 1977; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1983; March, 1980). Universities gain 
public (external) legitimacy by the socially constructed meaning its actors ascribe (internal) to 
rules and routines designed to make sense of a disorderly world (Meyer & Rowan, 2006). This 
social-constructionist view positions actors as crucial in establishing social reproduction and 
social change (Fligstein, 2001b; Meyer, 2008). With the significant role university leaders, 
decision makers, faculty, administrators, students, and other actors play in both maintaining local 
7 There are numerous versions of new institutionalism, each with several variants. Economists 
tend to favor rational action considerations, sociologists the social-constructionist form, and 
political scientists the mediated-conflict approach (DiMaggio, 1998; Meyer, 2008). New 
institutionalism in the context of this dissertation derived from modern sociological conceptions.   
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order and negotiating new order (Fligstein, 2001b; Meyer & Rowan, 2006), thinking about 
university structures and social actions that establish, sustain, and challenge these social 
arrangements is important. The ability to engage others in collective action and induce 
participants to cooperate, for example, is pivotal. Skilled strategic actors often provide identities 
and cultural frames that motivate others (Fligstein, 2001b). Proficient execution by such actors, 
especially those in dominant organizations, both reproduce and transform systems of meaning 
within organizational fields (Fligstein, 2001b; Giddens, 1984).   
Decision-making in universities is often a process assigned to a variety of actors with 
different skills and interests. Higher education relies on multiple forms of collaboration to 
achieve results (Bess & Dee, 2012). While there exists a range of definitions for collaboration in 
the literature, one meaning from institutional theory characterizes collaboration occurring within 
an organization as a cooperative and non-hierarchical relationship negotiated in an ongoing 
communicative process (Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002). Though Lawrence, Hardy, and 
Phillips’ study (2002) examined collaboration resulting from interorganizational relationships in 
nongovernmental organizations, its conception of how new practices, rules, and technologies 
transcend collaborations to effect change derive from institutional theory is applicable to higher 
education as well. The researchers found that collaboration among actors was instrumental in 
establishing new norms, understandings, and practices designed to produce innovative results 
(Lawrence et al., 2002). Flynn (n.d.) extrapolates from Lawrence et al.’s findings to use 
institutional theory in her development of a practical model of organizational collaboration. 
Lawrence et al. and Flynn’s research on the institutional effects of collaboration identify two 
important characteristics of a collaboration necessary to effect change: a high level of 
involvement among participants and a high level of embeddedness. In high-involvement 
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relationships, collaborators share expertise and knowledge to advance innovative results. Highly 
embedded collaborators, significantly engaged in interorganizational relationships, then draw on 
broader networks for multidirectional information flows. In higher education, examples of these 
interorganizational relationships might include sharing proposed solutions with colleagues at 
other universities, disseminating new practices through professional organizations, and advising 
federal policy makers of emerging best practices.        
Organizations, such as universities, operate as components in a larger system of relations. 
Transformation of this larger system occurs, in part, through the cooperation and skilled 
performances of actors inside and outside the organization. Though terminology and subtle 
characteristics regarding these larger systems may vary (with Bourdieu labeling these systems 
“fields” (1977; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) and Meyer and Scott (1983) preferring the term 
“sectors”), institutional theorists refer to these systems as organizational fields that comprise 
“those organizations which, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: 
key suppliers, resources and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations 
that produce similar services or products” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). The central 
agreement across these concepts is that they are larger systems of social order where organized 
groups of actors gather and frame their actions in relation to each other. Analyzing and attaining 
cooperation, maneuvering around more powerful actors, using rules and resources shrewdly, and 
building successful coalitions are necessary to achieving transformation. Leaders are essential to 
stabilize relations within the group. In addition to inducing cooperation among actors, leaders 
must have a vision to create something new, and frame the strategic moves required to achieve 
the vision (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 2001b; Giddens, 1984). With a sudden jolt or crisis (in 
this case the exogenously imposed DCL) impacting all of the organizations within a field, actors 
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begin to discuss a range of possible solutions. Leaders suggest new ideas, justifying and aligning 
them with normative structures. Where some degree of social consensus emerges, new norms 
take on a degree of legitimacy and diffuse across organizations (Greenwood, Suddaby, & 
Hinnings, 2002). These stages result in change within an organizational field. Organizations 
within the field start to become more similar to each other because of regulative, normative, and 
cognitive convergence of practices perceived by the field as legitimate (Fligstein, 2001b; 
Greenwood et al., 2002; Morphew, 2009; Scott, 2001). Institutionalization occurs when these 
converging elements move from abstraction among the actors to constituting repeated patterns of 
interaction in fields (Jepperson, 1991; Scott, 2001). New institutionalism focuses on how fields 
of action come into existence, how they remain stable, and how they serve as critical units that 
bridge organizational and societal transformation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1986; Fligstein, 2001b; 
Scott, 2001). 
With laws that regulate educational environments often ambiguous, universities are 
afforded wide latitude to construct responses to the law in ways that address conflicting 
pressures, environmental demands, and self-interest (Burstein, 1988; Edelman, 1992). Through 
their institutional actors, universities have been shown to have strategically shaped responses to 
broad legal mandates, mediating the laws’ effects on their organizational interests (Edelman, 
1992; Gornitza & Larsen, 2004; Gould, 2001). Framed by university’s espoused democratic 
values of upholding the public good (Bowen, 1999; Duderstadt & Womack, 2003; Kezar et al., 
2005) and informed by institutional theory’s focus on understanding process and strategy to 
explain organizational adaptation in uncertain environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977; Selznick, 1949, 1957, 1996), this study relies on a socio-legal conceptual 
framework within institutional theory to examine how university responses, arrived at through its 
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actors in response to their legal environment, are shaping not only legal compliance but 
structural elaboration within the field of higher education. 
Socio-Legal Scholarship 
Previous institutional research has established that legal rules and processes operate to 
shape organizations and influence inter-organizational relations. Foremost among socio-legal 
scholarship is Edelman’s research on the institutionalization of organizationally constructed 
symbols of compliance in response to civil rights mandates. Edelman (1990, 1992) found that 
organizations (including universities) created symbolic structures articulating compliance 
through legitimate forms of legal rhetoric and due process. Structural elaboration occurred 
through the creation of affirmative action offices and discrimination grievance procedures. These 
new organizational forms spread through the organizational field, socially constructing the 
meaning of civil rights compliance. Although the creation of affirmative action offices offered 
only a symbolic gesture of compliance - initially having little impact on the populations they 
were designed to protect – their existence became an expectation of compliance. Courts 
incorporated antidiscrimination policies as a necessary requirement to satisfy the statutory 
mandate. Organizational responses had shaped the compliance framework, demonstrating the 
complex reciprocity between the formal dictates of the law and the informal norms that 
determine practice (Edelman, 2016, 1992; Suchman & Edelman, 1996). 
Organizational responses (or non-responses) to legal mandates are influenced by a 
number of organizational attributes. These include such characteristics as autonomy, proximity 
to the public arena, competing interests, organizational innovation, organizational size, the desire 
to maintain organizational legitimacy, the role played by administrators in crafting policy, the 
institution having experienced a lawsuit, level of perceived threat, formal versus informal control 
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mechanisms, and the symbolic value of new measures upon the organization (Culnan, Smith, & 
Bies, 1994; Edelman, 1992; Feldman & Levy, 1994; Gould, 2001; Roth et al., 1994). Research 
on the legal and cultural environments of organizations also provides evidence of individuals 
within the organization possessing the power to construct the meaning of compliance, shape the 
law, and mediate the impact of regulations on institutional policies (Edelman et al., 2001; 
Edelman et al., 2010; Edelman & Suchman, 1997; Scott, 1994; Suchman & Edelman, 1996). 
Edelman (2016) refers to these institutional actors whose interpretation of the cultural 
environment shapes norms that influence institutional actions as “compliance professionals.” 
This emerging group of diverse individuals within and around organizations – consisting of 
consultants, lawyers, human resource professionals, compliance officers, and others – has 
responsibility for deducing law and managing compliance. They interpret and transform 
information between legal environment and organizational field; advising clients, making policy, 
resolving problems, and seeking change. Perceiving legal rules through a managerial lens, 
compliance professionals pursue rational responses within the context of the organization’s 
routines and goals. It is through the eyes of compliance professionals, who routinely reframe 
legal constructs in terms more conducive to managerial interests, that organizational 
administrators generally discern their institution’s legal environment (Edelman, 2016). 
Institutional actors (decision makers, leaders, managers, compliance professionals) have 
numerous interests and constituencies to balance. They must generate cooperation with both 
allies and opponents to produce meaningful results. Edelman’s legal endogeneity theory suggests 
that law acquires meaning within the social fields it seeks to regulate in part because broad and 
ambiguous laws leave actors considerable latitude to construct the meaning of compliance 
(Edelman, 1992, 2016; Edelman et al., 2010). Socio-legal literature contends that laws governing 
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organizations are purposefully ambiguous, addressing procedure over substance, which allows 
actors operating within them the opportunity to either reproduce or challenge existing social 
systems (Burstein, 1988; Edelman, 1992; Suchman & Edelman, 1996). These organizational 
actors not only "capture" the law, shaping it to fit their own interests, but "enact" the meaning of 
law through a complex and often inadvertent cycle of action, mimicry, and interpretation (Baier, 
March, & Saetren, 1988; Clune, 1983; Scheid-Cook, 1992; Suchman & Edelman, 1996; Weick, 
1979). 
Responses perceived as legitimate spread throughout the field, guiding change through a 
process of imitation and emulation known as institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Kezar, 2001; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott & Meyer, 1983). Socio-legal frameworks 
regard legal compliance as a form of institutional isomorphism, reproducing apparently 
successful practices within similar organizations (Suchman & Edelman, 1996), reinforcing new 
institutionalism’s contention that organizations look to each other, and to the professions, to 
draw meaning from ambiguous mandates. They then organize their operations accordingly. The 
more uncertain the law, the more intense the level of isomorphic change (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983 ; Edelman, 1992; Suchman & Edelman, 1996). Because the higher education field remains 
unsettled in terms of widespread adaption and legitimization of policies and practices deriving 
from DCL compliance, this study cannot draw conclusions as to the level and extent of 
institutional isomorphism that has occurred. However, the actions taken by the three university 
research participants provides an opportunity to consider which responses are emerging and why 
some are being accepted and legitimized. The socio-legal framework serves as a theoretical 
framework through which emerging practices can be examined and understood. 
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Isomorphism in Higher Education 
The main form of organizational change considered in institutional theory is isomorphic 
convergence. In such conceptualizations, change within an organizational field results from the 
movement of organizations toward homogeneity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Greenwood et al., 
2002; Levy, 2006). Leading institutional theorists DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Meyer, Scott, 
and Deal (1981), and Meyer and Rowan (1977), and subsequent scholars applying institutional 
theory to higher education (Bess & Dee, 2012; Kezar, 2001; Morphew, 2009; Scott, 2015) posit 
that organizations in fields such as higher education are extremely susceptible to isomorphic 
forces, due largely to difficult to measure goals (knowledge acquisition), unclear technology 
(optimal teaching methods), and highly professionalized organizational actors (specialized 
faculty, student affairs staff, and administrators). Because of the loosely coupled nature of 
universities (that units and events are responsive to each other yet preserve their own identity and 
separateness; Weick, 1976), normative entrenchment, professionalism, and high institutional 
commitment, universities tend to be homogeneous within their sector, striving to be like the 
peers they regard as elite (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Kezar, 2001; Sporn, 1999). To gain 
legitimacy and increase survival, they emulate other organizations operating in ways they 
consider prestigious or exemplary (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Kezar, 2001). “New” institution’s 
emphasis on interpretation, the internal negotiation of process, and adoption are critical 
components analyzed in this study to better understand organizational challenges inherent in 
university compliance environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Gates, 1997; Kezar, 2001; 
Kezar & Eckel, 2002; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996).
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Proactive Law Approach
Under the broad framework of institutional theory and its more specific socio-legal focus, 
organizations - through their actors - are capable of strategically shaping responses to law. 
Questions remain as to why some organizations take measures to move the organization beyond 
minimal compliance and how actors constructively influence such action. A body of scholarship 
that addresses this interplay between responding to legal obligations and moving beyond 
minimal requirements to improve practice is the organizational approach known as proactive 
law. At its core, this decision making method enables organizations to move beyond simply 
reacting to changes in law, guiding the organization toward a more comprehensive understanding 
of how the legal disruption could be used to create substantive policies and opportunities for the 
organization (Nordic School of Proactive Law, n.d.; Siedel, 2002; Siedel & Haapio, 2010, 2011). 
In terms of commercial achievement, this creates a competitive advantage for the organization 
(Bagley, 2008, 2010; Bird, 2008, 2010, 2011; Siedel, 2002; Siedel & Haapio, 2010, 2011). In 
higher education, this competitive edge is encouraged through innovation to attract students and 
maintain a market niche in a rapidly changing environment (Bess & Dee, 2012). Beyond simply 
the creation of a competitive advantage, the proactive law approach also offers contributions and 
innovation in areas that are not commonly the focus in legal decision making within 
organizations, such as collaborating across organizational boundaries to advance ideas, valuing 
outcomes for diverse stakeholder groups, and serving societal needs (Haapio, 2006; Nordic 
School of Proactive Law, n.d.; Proactive Think Tank, n.d.; Siedel & Haapio, 2010, 2011; Sorsa, 
2011).
An important element in the proactive law approach is the cultivation of teamwork and a 
collaborative, cross-professional process to achieve transformative organizational strategies in 
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solving challenges raised by the legal environment (Berger-Walliser, 2011; Siedel, 2002; Siedel 
& Haapio, 2010, 2011).  This approach emphasizes the need for dialogue between people with 
different understandings and expertise of legal and organizational issues for collaborative 
decision-making (Siedel & Haapio, 2010, 2011). By adopting a future-oriented (proactive) 
approach to law, minimizing prospective legal problems (prevention) while promoting 
collaboration and innovation to achieve desired goals (promotive), the framework moves 
decision makers beyond a reactive response to their legal obligations toward reframing legal 
problems as opportunities for the organization to innovate and create substantive contributions to 
practice. Research suggests that organizations differ in their willingness to embrace the proactive 
aspects of law (Siedel, 2002; Siedel & Haapio, 2010, 2011), extending the institutional concept 
that organizations vary in their responsiveness and sensitivity to legal demands (Edelman, 1990; 
Sitkin & Bies, 1994). 
Demonstrating a paradigm shift in the way organizations perceive and use law, this 
proactive approach reframes legal concerns as more than simply obligations to be answered. 
Rather, individuals within the affected organization are challenged to move beyond minimal 
compliance toward using the legal issue as a catalyst to strengthen relationships and create 
positive opportunities advancing both institutional and societal benefits. This study relies on this 
conceptualization to examine how universities are creating environments that promote innovative 
responses to legal compliance. Siedel (2002) and Siedel and Haapio’s (2010, 2011) four-step 
model examining how decision makers understand legal issues (step 1: clarity), respond to the 
obligations imposed (step 2: reactive), implement strategies to prevent the legal problem from 
recurring  (step 3: preventive), and foster collaboration and innovation to take into account not 
only legal obligations, but other considerations of importance to the organization and society 
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(step 4: promotive) was foundational in the development of the study’s interview protocol. By 
examining cross-departmental collaboration among legal and non-legal professionals that 
promote boundary spanning institutional strategies as policy decisions are negotiated, this 
framework helps us to better understand actors’ involvement in the institution’s constructions of 
compliance and how those actors contribute to the university moving beyond compliance.
The proactive law framework plays an important role in this study by providing concepts 
to help differentiate the actions of universities that are merely complying with minimal DCL 
requirements from those that are exceeding compliance obligations. While most organizations 
are compelled to react to the legal impetus, or face the consequences of non-compliance, the 
proactive law framework shows how an organization can progress beyond merely reacting to 
legal obligations toward reframing them as opportunities to innovate and create substantive 
contributions to practice. The university environment’s tendency to rely on inter-disciplinary, 
cross-unit committee review of institutional issues – important preconditions in this framework - 
provides an opportunity to apply proactive law concepts to university actors’ contributions that 
enhance opportunity for the institution and its students as they address DCL compliance.
Understanding What Is Going On 
The processes and structures of institutional decision-making in higher education have 
traditionally been shared among faculty and administrators (Birnbaum, 1988; Kezar & Eckel, 
2004). Shared governance in higher education was established on the belief that a climate of 
reason and persuasion among empowered professionals would create better results for the 
university than a governance model based on centralized command and control (Kezar & 
Gehrke, 2014). Retrenchment of shared governance toward more corporate approaches to 
decision making, grounded in a focus on the “bottom line,” is on the rise in universities. This 
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“bottom line” often manifests in prioritizing funding and revue generation over traditional 
academic values such as student learning and deference to faculty expertise (Kezar & Gehrke, 
2014; Rhoades, 1996; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Trackman, 2008). The “bottom line” related 
to legal issues, having been under-studied, is not as clear. Evidence in organizational literature 
suggests that the institutional environment is increasingly giving priority to legalistic decision 
criteria over other organizational, interpersonal, and social factors relevant to organizational 
decision making (Bies & Tyler, 1993; Feldman & Levy, 1994; Foote, 1984; McLendon & Hearn, 
2006; Sitkin & Bies, 1994; Turkington, 1986). With heightened concerns over threats of 
litigation and Office for Civil Rights enforcement of universities’ legal obligations, insight into 
the actions and behavior of university decision makers who are actively generating rules, shaping 
norms, and influencing institutional actions as they construct compliance is important to 
understanding universities’ organizational legal environments (Rowan & Miskel, 1999; Scott & 
Davis, 2007; Sitkin & Bies, 1994). Because of “bottom line” pressures and an increasing 
emphasis on legalistic decision criteria, new institutionalism’s premise is that normatively 
defined environments, such as universities, are likely to associate successful compliance 
responses more to perceptions of legitimacy (symbols of compliance), rather than to their 
substantive value (Fligstein, 2001b; Morphew, 2009).     
The study’s framework is designed to help identify mechanisms that enable some 
universities to move beyond minimal legal obligations, shaping not only legal compliance but 
structural elaboration within the field of higher education. Though I expect to find collaboration 
throughout this study, as I have chosen institutions that organized teams of university 
constituents to review and respond to DCL guidance, socio-legal theory suggests that these 
collaborative environments will nevertheless be dominated by certain actors, most likely those 
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actors with the most influence in constructing DCL compliance, or legal counsel. Legal counsel 
is likely to be the ones reading the DCL in detail and advising university leaders on their 
interpretation of the regulation. With risk management concerns increasingly occupying top-
level leadership considerations, I expect to find legalistic decision criteria and concerns over risk 
management to be key contextual factors. Because of this, I anticipate that the interpersonal 
dynamics involved in understanding and negotiating DCL responses will be dominated by legal 
actors invested in protecting the organization from legal liability, rather than other university 
professionals potentially thinking more broadly about the educational opportunities the change in 
law could create.
Conclusion
The literature on law and organizations suggests that new forms of compliance tend to 
originate in large public or highly regulated organizations, and subsequently diffuse across 
organizations (Dobbin, Edelman, Meyer, Scott, & Swindler, 1988; Dobbin & Sutton, 1998; 
Edelman 1990, 1992; Edelman & Petterson, 1999; Edelman, et al., 1999; Sutton & Dobbin, 
1996; Sutton, Dobbin, Meyer, & Scott, 1994). Public universities bear the brunt of increasingly 
copious and complex regulations (Dunham, 2010; Gajda, 2009; Morphew, 2009; Task Force on 
Federal Regulation of Higher Education, 2015). Characterized by network structures, rational 
myths, and institutionalized logics, universities undergo isomorphic change through regulative 
(DCL obligations), normative (developing expectations congruent with the academy’s values), 
and imitative processes (adopting practices from other institutions) (Edelman, 1992; Meyer, 
Ramirez, Frank, & Schofer, 2007; Meyer & Rowan, 1978; Suchman & Edelman, 1991).   
This study’s examination of interpretation (through the understanding of DCL 
compliance issues from different actors’ perspectives), internal negotiation of process (via the 
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development of institutional responses to ambiguous legal directives), and adoption (by the 
actions ultimately taken) resulting from a disruption to the field adds to organizational research 
seeking to better understand the relationship between institutional and socio-legal concepts that 
influence behavior and results in higher education. Because of the diversity in type, goals, 
funding, population served, and other factors differentiating institutions of higher education, one 
university’s response to DCL mandates and Title IX compliance may not be appropriate for 
another institution. It is not the intent of this research to produce a “how to” model for the entire 
field to follow. By analyzing the mechanisms that guide an organization’s response to a 
contentious legal compliance issue, however, this study expands theoretical understanding of 
how institutions address their socio-legal environment. While some environments might offer 
predictability, others may not. Organizational effectiveness necessitates that institutions draw on 
different design and intervention strategies to address a broad range of environments (Berger-
Walliser, 2011; Bess & Dee, 2012; Cameron & Lavine, 2006; Siedel, 2002; Siedel & Haapio, 
2010, 2011). As the Methodology chapter that follows describes, the study was designed to 
investigate processes and mechanisms that enabled universities to enhance opportunity for the 
institution and its students as it addressed DCL compliance obligations. Examining the process 
through which a fragmented organizational field makes sense of ambiguous requirements is 
considered a productive line of research contributing to institutional scholarship (Bess & Dee, 
2012; Powell, 2007; Roth et al., 1994; Sitkin & Bies, 1994). 
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Chapter 3: Methodology
This qualitative study employs a multi-case study strategy to examine the organizational 
space in which university actors were asked to understand and interpret legally ambiguous and 
contentious Title IX compliance obligations. Case studies, widely recognized across 
organizational fields and the social sciences as rigorous research strategies offering rich 
empirical descriptions of a phenomenon within a specific setting, are appropriate for this 
research that attempts to answer how and why questions being asked about a contemporary set of 
events, in an unexplored research area, over which the investigator has little or no control 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Hartley, 2004; Yin, 1994, 2009). Case studies 
are also well suited to the study of practices, such as decision making in response to changes in 
the legal environment, from which the researcher can consider a setting in-depth and in-context 
(Bogdan & Bicklen, 2003; Stake, 1995).
Review of the Problem and Guiding Research Questions
In order to gain a deeper understanding of how university decision makers are responding 
to contentious legal mandates, this study examines institutional decision-making following 2011 
changes to the Department of Education’s administrative guidance on campus sexual violence 
under Title IX. Organizing my research issues around a small number of research questions that 
focus on understanding process (Hartley, 2004; Stake, 1995) the study answers the following 
guiding and sub-questions:
How is institutional policy negotiated around an ambiguous, multi-interest, regulatory 
prompt?
a. How do multiple interests shape understanding of the issue? 
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b. What influences the compliance outcomes chosen? 
c. In what ways are strategies on preventive solutions developed?
d. How is space for innovation, collaboration, and/or proactivity created in 
the decision making process? 
Research Design
A qualitative research design is appropriate to this research that seeks to explore the 
complexities inherent in understanding and responding to post DCL university organizational 
and legal environments. As opposed to a quantitative design that might employ statistical 
analyses to test relationships or examine cause and effect relations, a qualitative design enables 
the researcher to discover meaning behind a phenomenon and gain deep, rich insight into the 
issue being studied (Huberman & Miles, 2002; Merriam, 2002; Patton, 2002; Stake, 1995). 
Qualitative approaches might include phenomenological study (to describe experiences as they 
are lived), ethnographic study (to describe human society and culture), grounded theory study (to 
develop theory that emerges from the data), or historical analysis (to examine the past in order to 
understand the present and anticipate potential future events) (Merriam, 2002). Another common 
type of qualitative research is the case study, where descriptive, intensive analysis of an 
individual or unit takes place. Case study design is relevant when the research is context-based, 
as the individual or unit is selected for study based on its typicality or uniqueness (Merriam, 
2002). The aim of the case study is then to provide analyses of the context and process that 
illuminate the theoretical issue being studied (Patton, 2002). In organizational research, the case 
study is likely to be one or more organizations, or groups or people operating within the 
organization (Hartley, 2004). A case study allows the researcher to not only observe what is 
occurring, but to gain insight into how or why it occurred in such a way (Yin, 2009). 
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Multiple-Case Study Design 
While a single-case study usually examines one setting, a single subject, or one particular 
event, multiple-case studies enable researchers to first examine and report on particular cases 
individually, then compare and contrast the results. The goal of multiple-case study research is to 
use comparisons across cases to develop explanatory theory and contribute to general 
knowledge, which can then be of use to decision makers in the context of their work (Bogdan & 
Biklen, 2007). Although the small n’s of case study research are not intended to represent an 
entire population, the thick descriptions and in-depth analysis generated through a multiple-case 
study design can be used to inform similar cases (Patton, 2002). 
In a seminal book on case study research, Robert Yin (2009) suggests that whenever 
possible, multiple-case designs are preferred over single-case designs. The major analytical 
benefit of a multiple-case study design lies in substantially stronger conclusions arising 
independently from several cases as opposed to from one case alone. Not only do data from 
multiple cases have the potential to fill gaps left by findings from a single case, but data from 
one case may respond better to shortcomings or criticisms of one of the other cases. Each single 
case within the multiple-case study design maintains the same unit of analysis. In my design, the 
unit of analysis was a collective: the university. To collect data about the organization, I 
interviewed individual people serving on each university’s review team examining the 
institution’s post DCL sexual misconduct policies and protocols. Because I was conducting 
research about the organization and not the individuals I interviewed, I was careful to design 
protocol questions that solicited data about how the organization worked and why it was 
proceeding as it was. Parallel information was collected from various data sources, described in 
more detail below, across all three sites within the multiple-case study design. 
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Sampling
Case study research, where the researcher’s obligation is to understand both nuance and 
depth of a particular case, is not sampling research (Patton, 2002; Stake, 1995). Cases are 
selected to understand the phenomenon being studied. Because of this, cases are often pre-
selected. Sometimes, a “typical” case is appropriate to study. Whereas at other times, an unusual 
case helps to illustrate matters better. Stake (1995) qualifies proper case selection criterion as (1) 
cases that will maximize what we can learn, (2) cases that are likely to lead us to understanding 
and assertions, and (3) cases that are easy to get and hospitable to our inquiry.    
Purposeful (also known as purposive) sampling is widely used in qualitative research to 
identify and select information-rich cases to explore the phenomenon of interest (Patton, 2002). 
Participants are selected according to preselected criteria relevant to the research questions. I 
took a multipronged approach to purposeful sampling, as described below, consistent with 
Patton’s (2002) logic of “intensity sampling.” Intensity sampling consists of information-rich 
cases that strongly present the phenomenon of interest. Highly unusual, extreme, or deviant cases 
are not chosen in intensity sampling because their outstanding successes or notable failures 
might distort the manifestation of the phenomenon of interest. 
In my ideal research design, I originally intended to include the field’s most innovative 
and proactive university exemplars of post DCL Title IX practice, in order to explain 
organizational conditions that exemplify excellence. Practically speaking, however, institutional 
characteristics of these exemplars varied considerably. Exemplars spanned institutional 
characteristics from small, private, liberal arts institutions to large, public, research-intensive 
ones. Attempting to hold constant both institutional characteristics and factors identified in the 
literature that influence organizational responses to legal mandates was difficult. Moreover, 
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access to some of the exemplar institutions was unattainable with the time and resources 
available to me. By adopting an intensity sampling instead, I was better able to hold constant 
organizational characteristics and influences, thereby reducing complexity that arises when 
including diverse institutional types (Kezar, 2013b). In the following section, I describe the steps 
I took to determine a sample of sufficient intensity for the study. 
Site and Participant Selection
Three public, 4-year or above, doctorate granting, research universities constitute the 
sample for this study. The three research sites were selected based on a multi-stage investigatory 
and sorting process. I interviewed organizational actors from a range of administrative units at 
each university. Using multiple sources of evidence, including the interviews, I was able gain a 
detailed understanding of the organizational process of how, in the context of legal pressures 
addressing concerns of campus sexual violence, universities are acting to understand their legal 
responsibilities and construct compliance. Given that this study examines forward thinking 
responses to legal compliance, I purposely sought out information-rich cases that illustrated the 
phenomenon of interest intensely, but (as mentioned above) not extremely. 
First, I attempted to find universities with a reputation of carrying out quality work in 
areas referred to in the DCL. These are institutions considered by various individuals, 
professional organizations, and national policy makers to be setting benchmarks. I became aware 
of which universities these might be either through conversations with colleagues working in the 
field, media attention afforded to their innovative practices, or the universities’ involvement with 
professional associations or legislative bodies. From these initial investigations, I created a “short 
list” of potential sites. I then narrowed down the institutions based on ease of access, institutional 
type, and comprehensiveness of their publicly available Title IX information.  
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As set out in the 2011 DCL, university websites are required to have easily identifiable 
information on its Title IX coordinators, information on grievance procedures (including 
measures by the university to ensure prompt and effective resolution of complaints), and a 
widely disseminated notice of non-discrimination (Dear Colleague Letter, 2001). I cross-
referenced the short-list of possible institutions with adherence to these minimal DCL standards. 
Universities that had adopted the requirements provided me with corroborating evidence that it 
was taking positive steps to address DCL and Title IX obligations. Next, I assessed the 
availability of public records. I began reviewing the institution’s sexual misconduct policies, 
response protocols, and community discourse around the issues following the release of the 2011 
DCL. Universities that both established an inter-disciplinary review team to examine its 
institutional actions and made available information from the response process were identified as 
potential research sites. 
Access to study participants at these potential sites proved to be tremendously 
challenging. Members at many desired research sites either failed to respond to my inquiries or 
discouraged me from pursuing such research at their institution. The prevailing climate at the 
time of my site selection was one of uncertainty and confusion around the issues. National and 
local media, as well as government agencies, were highlighting universities’ shortcomings, 
publicly erring and scrutinizing missteps as institutions attempted to address issues of campus 
sexual assault (Baker, 2014a; Bogdanich, 2014a, 2014b; Clark, 2014; Shen & Vitchers, 2014; 
Stratford, 2014; U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Financial & Contracting Oversight, 2014; 
Vendituoli, 2014a, 2014b). It was during this tumultuous time that I emailed a letter of interest to 
potential study participants to gauge participation in the study (Appendix D). After sending 
hundreds of emails, engaging in exchanges with university general counsel, and participating in 
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phone calls with communication specialists to vet my legitimacy, many prospective participants 
acknowledged the importance of this research but would not speak to me on the record because 
of the sensitivity and volatility of the issues. Eventually, sufficient response from members of a 
university’s post DCL-Title-IX-review-team justified my moving forward with a short-listed 
institution as a research site.     
Confidentiality and Anonymity
The contentious environment surrounding the threat of Office for Civil Rights 
investigations and the negative media attention admonishing universities for failing to properly 
address issues of campus sexual violence had university personnel wary of participating in this 
study. Incessant media exposure, unsettled DCL interpretations, growing Office for Civil Rights 
investigations, and intensifying student activism appeared to be contributing to a chilling effect 
on university actors’ willingness to convey their thoughts and opinions on this topic (Kipnis, 
2015a, 2015b; Newman & Sander, 2014; Russell, 2015; Yoffe, 2014). Although the most 
desirable research option would be to disclose both institution and participant identities, 
anonymity is often necessary when a case study is on a controversial subject (Yin, 2009). 
To quell potential participants’ concerns, protect their identity, and promote their full 
disclosure of sensitive issues and non-public information, confidentiality of both informant and 
site were guaranteed. Despite this concession, recruiting participants remained a challenge. At 
one institution, some participants who initially agreed to be interviewed subsequently canceled 
the interview out of concern that the Office for Civil Rights could subpoena the interview 
transcripts and my notes in the event of an Office for Civil Rights audit or investigation. At the 
time of my site selection process, approximately 70 universities were being investigated for 
possible Title IX violations. One year later, that number more than doubled, to 144 (Wilson, 
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2015b) and continues to grow (Mangan, 2016). As 2015 drew to a close, nearly 250 cases had 
been subject to the Department of Education’ stepped up investigations post 2011 DCL 
(Mangan, 2016). The reality of the subpoena contemplated by a prospective participant may have 
been remote, but their concerns were nevertheless genuine. 
To protect the privacy and confidentiality of both the research sites and those who 
participated in the study, I have disguised their true identities throughout my accounts. I created 
fictitious names for both case study institutions and participants. I conveyed identifying 
information broadly, omitting particulars (such as actual job titles) to not reveal details that could 
unwittingly put a participant in an undesirable position and compromise their anonymity. I often 
selected gender-neutral pseudonyms or concealed the gender of select participants in the study’s 
findings and discussions for additional measures of anonymity. I felt this degree of anonymity 
was necessary because of the sensitive nature surrounding crimes of a sexual nature and the 
politicization of the issue inside and outside universities. If participants were to disagree with the 
actions of the university, its leaders, or their colleagues, I did not want anything they discussed to 
jeopardize their professional standing. Because retaliation against faculty and administrators who 
engage in advocacy on controversial issues is not without precedent (Grinberg, 2015), 
maintaining participant anonymity during these tense and tumultuous times was significant in 
establishing a research environment in which participants felt they could openly discuss the 
nuances of the process and its mechanisms without fear of reprisal. 
Institutional Review Board
I obtained formal approval of my research through my home institutional review board 
(IRB). Due to the case study nature of the research and protection of participant identities, my 
study fit within a human subjects research exemption in the Code of Federal Regulations (federal 
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exemption #2, 45 CFR 46.101.(b)). Despite my study being exempt from IRB regulations, I 
maintained best practices that included explaining to participants the voluntary nature of 
partaking in the study, their ability to withdraw from the study at any time, their right to skip 
particular interview questions for any reason, conducting the interview at a location and time of 
their choosing, and honestly and transparently explaining the study and my research motives. I 
audio-recorded each interview and verbally obtained informed consent from participants. Given 
the sensitive subject matter of the study, I was particularly careful to conduct the research with 
the utmost care and thoughtfulness, protecting private and sensitive disclosures - such as 
identities or involvement of third parties referenced in the interview, or personal experiences 
divulged. 
Data Collection
I collected data through multiple sources, including interviews, document reviews, and 
observations. I visited all three research sites (some on more than one occasion), participated in 
formal campus tours, engaged in on-site observations, conducted interviews, participated in 
awareness or prevention programs, analyzed publicly available documents relating to policies 
and practices, and reviewed local, national, and government media coverage of the issues.  
Within the three-institution sample, I interviewed 21 participants in one-on-one semi 
structured interviews. I did not stratify my sample by gender, race, or ethnicity. The majority of 
participants were female (62%). Five participants (23%) were persons of color. Each participant 
had been a member of their respective institution’s Title IX DCL review team. Study participants 
included undergraduate and graduate students (n=4), as well as mid-level administrators (n=16) 
in student affairs, academic affairs, institutional equity, Title IX compliance, conduct, counseling 
services, prevention, athletics, and housing, all important contributors to issues of campus sexual 
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violence (Armstrong et al., 2006; Minow & Einolf, 2009; Miranda, 2013; Moynihan et al., 
2010). A health professional from a community hospital rounded out the list (n=1). Table 1 
summarizes the organizational units represented by study participants. Notably absent among the 
interview contributors were general counsel (all of whom approached for the study declining to 
be interviewed), leaders from Greek Life (who, for the most part, did not have a significant 
presence on the review teams), and faculty (many of whom explained they were too busy to be 
interviewed or referred me to members of the review team they felt were better suited for the 
study). Seventeen interviews were conducted in person and four by videoconference. 
Table 1. Organizational Units Represented by Interview Participants
Organizational Unit Participants Organizational Unit Participants
Ability & Mobility Services 1 Health Services 1
Academic Advising 1 Housing 1
Athletics 1 LGBTQ Office 1
Complaint Process Advising 1 President’s Office 1
Conduct 2 Prevention 3
Counseling 1 Student – Graduate 2
Dean of Students Office 1 Student – Undergraduate 2
Equal Opportunity Office 1 Student Outreach Services 1
n=21
Phase One: Document Review 
I collected data in three stages. First, I reviewed the universities’ websites to obtain key 
documents and insight on the planning, review, and implementation around issues of campus 
sexual violence. This included a review of the history of the issue and past policies at the 
institution, reports on constituent deliberations, media accounts, policy development, incident 
statistics, Title IX investigations or audits, faculty and staff handbooks, student code of conduct, 
safety reports, university mission, and other relevant publicly available documents. All of these 
62
records, documents, and archives provided “a particularly rich source of information” about each 
organization and its attention to the issues (Patton, 2002, p. 293). 
My extensive review of institutional and public documents served a number of purposes. 
Not only did it help me identify important concerns for the phenomenon being studied, but it also 
revealed organizational complexities and varying levels of support and intensity underlying 
campus sexual misconduct efforts. The review also brought me into both time and place of the 
unique cultures, processes, and histories of each research site. Capturing and communicating the 
development and treatment of Title IX, harassment, and sexual misconduct issues on campus, the 
document review and analysis provided me with background knowledge that helped to frame 
subsequent observations and interviews. 
Phase Two: Interviews and Observations 
It is during this second phase of date collection, occurring over an eight-month period 
from fall 2014 to summer 2015, that I conducted interviews and carried out observations at each 
research site. I visited each university to deepen my understanding of its culture and messaging. I 
conducted site observations, joined organized campus tours for prospective applicants and 
parents, investigated programmatic responses designed to comply with the DCL mandate to 
effect campus culture surrounding sexual violence, and participated in awareness programs. 
Genres of this sexual assault, domestic violence, and dating violence programing included 
tabling, expert panel discussions, theater (The Vagina Monologues), and community screening of 
a campus sexual-assault documentary exposé (The Hunting Ground) taking place at various 
points throughout my data collection. It was while I was on campus for each of these visits that I 
conducted the participant interviews. 
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I created a semi-structured interview protocol designed to use across the full range of 
study participants (Appendix E). I constructed the protocol based on principles advocated by 
Hartley (2004), Stake (1995, 2003), Strauss (1987), and Yin (1994, 2009) of asking unbiased 
questions in a non-threatening, open-ended manner according to primary themes identified in the 
literature review. Interview questions fell into one of five categories: (1) the participant’s 
understanding of the DCL and related legal obligations; (2) description of the manner in which 
units/individuals were chosen to participate in the review team and the interactions they had 
throughout the deliberations and decision making process; (3) how sexual misconduct legal and 
compliance concerns were addressed by the institution; (4) the nature of, and the manner in 
which, any innovative strategies addressing campus sexual misconduct materialized; and (5) 
whether and how transforming legal concerns into organizational and social opportunity 
occurred. In limited instances, participants provided me with internal documents that comprised 
part of my document review.
Phase Three: Supplemental Document Analysis 
The third and final phase of data collection has been occurring simultaneously with my 
data analysis and writing during the 2015-2016 academic year. In this phase I have supplemented 
my initial document analysis with further review of publicly available records to provide 
contextual and augmentative data collection. I have also analyzed new sources not previously 
available, such as new campus climate surveys and resolution agreements of Office for Civil 
Rights Title IX investigations (Cantor et al., 2015; McMahon, Steplton, O’Connor, Cusano, 
2015; U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Recent Resolutions, 2015). These 
multiple data sources combine to provide a detailed understanding of the organizational process 
of how, in the context of legal pressures concerning campus sexual violence, universities are 
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acting to understand their legal responsibilities, collaborate between legal and other professionals 
to think broadly about the law, and implement policies that become a source of institutional and 
societal opportunity and advancement. Table 2 provides participant information useful to 
reflecting on their positionality within the organization. Though provided in broad strokes to 
protect their identity, the details are nevertheless important to reflect critically upon the potential 
challenges and influence of these participants in the university’s review process and compliance 
construction.
Data Triangulation
I adopted practices of data triangulation to increase the credibility and trustworthiness of 
the research findings. Triangulation occurs when various sources are used to study the 
phenomenon under investigation. It may occur in the form of data triangulation (using multiple 
data sources), investigator triangulation (employing various evaluators), theory triangulation 
(applying different perspectives to examine the same data set), or methodological triangulation 
(utilizing multiple research methods) (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009). An important strength of case 
study design is the use of data triangulation to provide multiple measures of the same 
phenomenon. Using different sources of evidence in my study, I was able to converge 
information derived from multiple resources to confirm the authenticity of facts and events. I 
cross-referenced information obtained from one source - for example an interview - with another 
source, such as institutional records. Whenever possible, I also evaluated this data against media 
accounts. Often times, I was able to verify the case study data through observations or 
subsequent interviews. Using multiple sources of evidence to collect data to examine the 
phenomenon of interest increased the construct validity of my study (Yin, 2009).  
65
Table 2. Participant Characteristics and Positionality
Participant Generation:
    Millennial
    Gen X
    Baby Boom
Time at U* (years)
<5
5-10
>10
DCL/campus 
sexual assault 
authority and 
experience** 
Broad area of 
expertise
Avi Baby Boom >10 medium education & 
programing
Bruce Baby Boom >10 medium student 
services
Charlotte Baby Boom >10 low student 
services
Derek Gen X <5 high conduct & 
adjudication
Devina Gen X 5-10 high DCL 
Compliance
Dylan Millennial <5 low student 
issues
Etienne Millennial 5-10 medium education & 
programing
Ivy Millennial <5 medium education & 
programing
Jackson Gen X <5 medium student 
services
Jordan Gen X 5-10 medium education & 
programing
Leslie Gen X 5-10 high education & 
programing
Martin Baby Boom >10 medium education & 
programing
Minn Gen X <5 high conduct & 
adjudication
Naveen Millennial <5 medium education & 
programing
Patricia Baby Boom >10 low education & 
programing
Priya Millennial <5 low student 
issues
Quinn Gen X <5 high education & 
programing
Rachel Millennial <5 low student 
issues
Renata Gen X <5 low education & 
programing
Sam Millennial <5 low student 
issues
Vanessa Millennial <5 medium education & 
programing
*U: University
** the DCL/campus sexual assault authority and experience scale is based on my interpretation of a number of 
factors observed, including the participant’s position within the university, extent of their prior sexual assault 
engagement, and perceived influence within the organization   
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Data Management
Qualitative research using multiple data sources creates sizeable amounts of research 
data. I organized audio records - such as voice memos from site observations and interview 
recordings - using Box, a secure, online, cloud storage program. Once interviews were 
transcribed, I began managing and coding transcripts using NVivo 10.2.1 for Mac. NVivo is a 
computer software package designed for qualitative researchers working with rich, text-based 
information requiring deep levels of analysis. I also uploaded documents and records that 
contributed to the evidentiary base of each case study to NVivo. I backed up my transcriptions, 
notes, and documents to both the cloud and to an external hard drive for safekeeping. Part way 
through data analysis using NVivo software, I switched to coding transcripts by hand (the 
reasons for which are detailed below). I found coding by hand to be more beneficial to my 
analysis than the NVivo program, which was not providing an easy user experience. While 
NVivo remained a back-up source for managing document and transcription data, pen, paper, 
binders, basic word processing, and old-fashioned brainpower became the primary tools for my 
data analysis. 
Data Analysis
I analyzed data at different stages of the research project. As previously mentioned, my 
initial analysis of public documentation and university websites preceded participant interviews. 
This enabled me to develop familiarity with each institution’s context and timelines. Pursuant to 
widely accepted data analysis methods of analyzing data simultaneously with data collection, I 
continued to analyze university documents, media accounts, field notes, and interview memos 
over the course of the interview periods (Creswell, 2003; Glesne, 2006). While document 
analysis and field notes from my observations increased the study’s validity by providing 
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multiple data sources and corroborating or dispelling matters that were raised in the interviews, 
they ultimately served as secondary data. Secondary data was not systematically coded for data 
analysis purposes. Rather, such data provided context and validity for each case. My analysis of 
documents and field notes enabled me to reflect deeply on the content and nuances of the 
interview data. I used this secondary data to clarify, confirm, or provide disconfirming evidence 
arising from the primary interview data (Glesne, 2006; Merriam, 2002; Patton, 2002; Saldaña, 
2013). 
Participant interviews served as the study’s primary data. Analysis was done through 
multiple levels of coding. Coding is essentially a cyclical process that links the study’s data to a 
key concept or central idea (Creswell, 2003; Glesne, 2006, Saldaña, 2013). Traits of subjectivity 
and creativity are expected, even encouraged, in qualitative data analysis (Glaser, 1992; Patton, 
2002; Strauss, 1987). There is methodological support for both flexibility in data analysis rules 
and procedures (Glaser, 1992) and calls for more rigid data analysis routines (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998). To maintain the reliability of the research, promote clarity, and ensure transparency, I 
summarize below the coding procedures I employed (Strauss, 1987). 
I drew on grounded theory’s constant comparative method of data analysis to uncover 
patterns and meanings in the data in order to offer an explanation as to how universities are 
addressing Title IX compliance. Grounded theory as a methodological tool is highly supported 
across numerous qualitative research traditions (Creswell, 2003; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glesne, 
2006; Patton & Applebaum, 2003; Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Strauss (1987) credits 
the grounded theory approach as the most common coding form in qualitative research. Although 
I designed the interview protocol deductively by drawing on existing scholarship, theory, and 
frameworks, I analyzed the data inductively. I did so to generate substantive codes arising out of 
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the themes and words from the data itself. Selecting this analytic method to code my data 
supports the ultimate case study goals advocated by numerous qualitative methodology experts, 
namely to uncover patterns and meanings that lead the researcher to develop conclusions, in turn 
advancing theoretical contributions (Bogdan & Bicklen, 2003; Patton, 2002; Patton & 
Applebaum, 2003). 
I adopted three stages of coding to uncover patterns and meaning in the data: open 
coding, axial coding, and selective coding. I initially listened to every interview while 
simultaneously reviewing that participant’s transcript. In this way I was able to both correct any 
transcription errors and draw out major themes from each interview (for example, understanding 
of the issues, compliance, innovation, values). I then uploaded each reviewed transcript to NVivo 
and began open coding to develop first level codes (or what are known in NVivo as ‘nodes’). At 
this level I established coding categories and sub-categories. While making connections between 
them, other issues beyond the immediate phenomena being studied began to emerge. As an 
example, leadership was neither an initial theme included in my interview protocol nor a topic I 
explicitly explored with participants. Yet first level coding categories identifying patterns 
involving innovation, collaboration, and transformation all began to exhibit properties of 
leadership and strategies engaged in by review team leaders that fostered positive outcomes. 
Whereas open coding identified numerous core categories and sub-categories, connecting 
properties across categories and refining the initial open coding categories took place in the 
second level of coding, known as axial coding.
Axial coding enabled me to narrow the information base and lay out properties of each 
category. It was at this stage that I switched to printing and annotating interview transcripts: 
highlighting sections of the interview around the specific categories, writing notes in the 
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margins, reflecting connections in the data. This level of analysis enabled me to achieve what 
Strauss (1987) describes as building up dense texture of relationships around the “axis” of the 
focused on category. I conducted this analysis by hand rather than through NVivo because of  
self-knowledge that I learn, analyze, and increase my understanding of material more effectively 
writing notes by hand, scribbling ideas in margins, and visually recalling information. Coding by 
hand rather than by use of coding software enabled me to be more mindful of the data. A 
growing body of scholarship supports my preference, concluding that conceptual understanding 
of material increases when notes are generated by hand versus on a computer (Duran & 
Frederick, 2013; Holstead, 2015; Mueller & Oppenheimer, 2014). 
The third and final coding technique I used is known as selective coding. At this stage, I 
reviewed the transcripts and related new codes to the core categories beyond what I had done in 
axial coding. Relating all subordinate and sub-categories to the core categories, I intensified the 
interrelationships among them. The data is now used to saturate the core, related categories. It is 
from this final coding stage that a theory grounded in the data begins to emerge as I developed a 
narrative connecting the categories and relationships of the case (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Examples of the actual codes used, and their evolution 
from open to axial to selective, can be found in Appendix F. Starting from the deductive analysis 
of themes that emerged from the literature, Appendix F illustrates how themes such as (1) 
fulfilling legal requirements (compliance) and (2) creating practices that provide institutional 
legitimacy or advantage, developed into an inductive process of data analysis. Through open 
coding I extracted significant concepts from the interviews. For example, the theme of 
‘relationship building’ became a code resulting from data such as “we need to work together 
rather than working against each other” and “the quiet people were encouraged to share what 
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they thought.” Connections between the codes started to become apparent during axial coding, so 
initial open codes such as ‘relationship building,’ ‘heated debate,’ and ‘compromise’ began to 
merge into a category labeled ‘dynamics.’ After axial coding was completed, these categories 
were then related to each other in selective coding, resulting in patterns forming from the data. In 
the case of fulfilling legal requirements, the dominant pattern was that interpersonal dynamics 
were critical to creating and putting into practice forward thinking policies and protocols. The 
inductive pattern of intended and unintended cultural and societal transformations arose from the 
deductive theme of creating practices that provide institutional legitimacy or advantage.
Role of the Researcher
Researchers consciously or unconsciously make continuous decisions about the extent of 
their roles in the research (Stake, 1995). Multiple roles affected the methodological choices I 
made and how I interpreted the study findings. As a former practicing attorney and now a scholar 
of higher education, I have long been interested in university legal environments: the institutional 
negotiation of legal quandaries, how increasing legal pressures affect university organization and 
functioning, and the effects on students, faculty, and the public good. My intellectual proclivity 
is grounded in scholarship on law and organizations that link a growing reliance on legal 
legitimacy and the adoption of legalistic mechanisms in organizational decision making with a 
decreasing concern for other organizational, interpersonal, economic, or socially sensible factors 
relevant to organizational decision making (Bies, 1987; Foote, 1984; Gajda, 2009; Jasanoff, 
1985; McLendon & Hearn, 2006; Meyer, 1983; Olivas, 2005; Sitkin & Bies, 1993, 1994). My 
experiences with the power and legitimacy afforded law, juxtaposed against the undermining of 
justice and fairness when highly formalized legalistic procedures that meet the letter of the law - 
as opposed to meeting the spirit of a law - are adopted, led me to create this study. 
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I constructed this study not only to satisfy my personal curiosity and deepen my 
professional understanding, but also to uncover evidence that might inform the field of higher 
education. In a broad sense, I am exploring the realm of higher education decision making in 
relation to legal influences. Wondering whether legalistic decision criteria infiltrating 
universities (such as strict adherence to formal rules) was being given priority over other factors 
(such as normative values of academe), I struggled with designing a research study that could 
give careful and accurate attention to such a sweeping topic. Focusing on whether the business of 
higher education was being influenced by a concern over risk management and protecting the 
organization rather than an interest in student well-being or upholding values of public service, I 
decided to examine the post DCL Title IX compliance environment because of its national 
significance, timeliness, and understudied organizational implications.  
The teacher in me wanted to inform my audience - higher education scholars and 
practitioners - of information they may not have substantial knowledge of but are affected by, 
given their professional identities. Working under what Sitkin and Bies (1994) describe as a 
rationality paradox, higher education professionals are often pressured to adhere to procedural 
authority embedded in strict formal rules rather than provide adaptive and flexible solutions to 
specific contexts. For example, in the context of Title IX, a faculty member may not be able to 
keep a student’s confidence if the student were to discloses knowledge of sexual harassment or 
misconduct. Rather, the university’s policy may require mandatory disclosure by the faculty 
member, even if this could jeopardize the student’s personal or academic best interests. Was 
adherence to strict rules over case-by-case adaptability happening? The advocate in me wanted 
to present university administration with evidence that it could handle such matters 
compassionately and lawfully. With all of the confusion around Title IX and the DCL, many 
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universities appeared to be adopting overly conservative measures to minimize legal liability. As 
an advocate, I want to advance research that would inform administrators of the power they 
posses to influence legal compliance and shape norms as they select, interpret, and challenge 
laws. While not outwardly encouraging advocacy through this study, I’m aware as a researcher 
that my interpretations of the data act to support and dismiss certain conclusions, thereby 
advocating a particular point of view. As Stake (1995) has expressed, qualitative research is 
laden with values. I act to combat any biases I have brought into the research by taking on the 
additional research role of evaluator, giving careful attention to each case’s merits and 
shortcomings (Stake, 1995).  
Being aware of the personal biases and theoretical predispositions I bring with me as the 
human instrument of data collection, I took measures to ensure I had adequate knowledge and 
training to systematically collect data from numerous sources, examine the complexities and 
nuances that emerged from multiple perspectives, and report both confirming and disconfirming 
evidence in my conclusions (Patton, 2002). However, despite efforts to minimize potential 
shortcomings that could affect the rigor of the research, design and methodological flaws - as 
discussed below - nevertheless occurred.        
Limitations
Any given research design inevitably reflects imperfections. These may be the result of 
resources, capabilities, purposes, or judgment calls, among other considerations (Patton, 2002). 
This research study is no different. The principal limitation concerns what Yin (2009) describes 
as the “completeness” of the data. Although I expended exhaustive effort in collecting relevant 
evidence, some pertinent evidence has remained uncovered. The fact that only a small proportion 
of review team members I approached consented to be interviewed left out many perspectives, 
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potentially alternative perspectives capable of creating rival explanations. With an over-
representation of mid-level student affairs professionals, my findings are largely influenced by 
their experiences and viewpoints. Ideally I wanted near equal representation from legally and 
non-legally trained review team members to address differences in interpretation and 
transmission of information originating from a legal context. I was unable to conduct any 
analyses of such a nested sample because of the characteristics of the ultimate participants. The 
interview participant’s characteristics - such as position within the university, race, and gender - 
all shape their perception of the process, which places constraints on my analysis and 
interpretation of the data. 
Throughout the data collection process I attempted to uncover possible rival explanations 
to determine whether events and actions were what they appeared. The study participants all 
supported the review processes and the collaborative, forward-thinking leadership that enabled 
innovative policy and programming to result. Although I corroborated my findings through data 
triangulation whenever possible by weighing the accuracy of participants’ accounts against their 
credibility, available documentation, and confirming evidence from other participants, those who 
agreed to be interviewed for the study may represent only those who had a positive experience 
on the team. It remains possible that members who had a less satisfactory experience chose not 
to participate in the study. Potential bias of the study participants’ accounts could exist because 
of the self-selecting nature of taking part in the study. I would argue that the findings I present 
are internally valid based on the context and research method I used. The lack of discrepant 
information from informants that runs counter to the findings’ themes, however, does limit the 
completeness of the data. I present some disconfirming evidence from participants in the findings 
chapters in an attempt to uncover rival explanations. Despite a diligent search, however, I found 
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very little discrepant evidence from these participants. Either no substantive rival explanations 
exist, which would increase confidence about the case study’s descriptions, explanations, and 
interpretations, or my analyses were unable to capture them because of the limited participants 
available to interview. The low participation rate across the schools constrains the analyses to 
participants whose experiences could have been biased. 
The study also includes limited perspectives from key stakeholders highly affected by 
issues of campus sexual violence. Some of this is reflective of review team composition itself. 
As mentioned earlier, not all review teams included members with cultural competence in racial 
and cultural diversity or a developed understanding of gender and transgender identity issues, all 
of which add layers of meaning and context to matters inherent in sexual violence. Nor were 
survivors of sexual assault, resident assistants, campus security, athletics, local community 
partners, or leaders from Greek Life represented across the review teams. Although I am 
fortunate to have interviewed participants matching many of these characteristics, their 
perspectives alone are not representative of all members of such groups. With the exception of 
legal counsel, my results may be representative of review team composition at the participating 
institutions. However, these same results lack alternative viewpoints that more individuals from 
underrepresented groups could have contributed. 
Another limitation from my study concerns the lack of observational data from review 
team meetings. At two of the three institutions, the review teams – with some membership 
modifications and less frequent meetings - remained active. Their updated charge was to assess 
and refine, in light of legal and professional developments, their teams’ recently sanctioned 
campus sexual assault policies and protocols. My requests to observe ongoing meetings were 
either denied or ignored. The third institution claimed to be contemplating a similar review 
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process, but did not convene any such group during the period of my data collection. Although 
retroactive observations of the original review team deliberations and decision making was 
impossible, I believe that direct observations of the revised teams, with similar member 
composition and responsibilities, would have provided more complete data explaining the 
phenomenon under investigation and further illuminated interview evidence. Such observations 
might have enhanced the accuracy of the case studies, providing even greater construct validity 
(Yin, 2009). 
Finally, being unable to reveal the identity of participating institutions or discuss key 
aspects of institutional contexts has been limiting. Each of these institutions is doing excellent 
work and the field would benefit from knowing their true identities. To protect confidentiality, I 
am unable to directly refer to, or quote from, actual documents or external commentary (such as 
media accounts). Instead, I have had to take additional safeguards to protect the institutions’ 
identities, even in using publicly available records. These safeguards include omitting certain 
citations and reporting some findings in a generalized way, potentially diminishing the 
authenticity of the data in some readers’ eyes. If readers knew the institution’s true identity, I 
believe they would benefit by having a more complete understanding of each institution and its 
unique context. Applying any of their prior knowledge about the university to the case would add 
to the overall quality of the case study (Yin, 2009). However, because of the chilling effect, 
contention, and insecurity surrounding the sensitive issues being examined, I felt anonymity was 
necessary to ensure access to participants. Many participants confirmed my suspicion by 
revealing that they agreed to participate in the research because of my assurances of anonymity.   
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Conclusion
In qualitative case study, the researcher seeks greater understanding of the unique 
complexities of a case (Stake, 1995). Studying the organizational issue of how legal mandates 
are causing university decision makers to act, this study specifically examines institutional 
response to the Department of Education’s administrative guidance on campus sexual violence 
under Title IX. Three institutions serve as the cases for this multiple-case study design. I selected 
each institution using purposeful sampling to allow for in-depth study. The primary data for 
analysis consisted of twenty-five hours of interview data from participants serving on each 
institution’s review team, which was charged with addressing university policy and protocol in 
light of compliance obligations. I analyzed this data using grounded theory methods to code and 
refine themes identified from the data. I also relied on direct observations of the campus 
environment, review of institutional documents, media reports, lobbying efforts, and 
participation in both institutional and student-led initiatives to triangulate the interview data and 
increase the study’s validity. I explain the themes that arose from the data, and discuss their 
importance, in the chapters that follow.
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Chapter 4 – Organizational Contexts: Research Sites
Institutional theory’s conceptual frame establishes the importance of organizational 
attributes and individual capacity in developing responses to ambiguous legal directives. The 
Department of Education, having refrained from mandating boilerplate solutions across higher 
education for Title IX compliance, recognized the need for local discretion in constructing 
responses. On its face, the Department of Education expected variances in institutional policies 
and procedures to allow for contextual differences between organizations and localities (Dear 
Colleague Letter, 2011).8 Practically, as decisions from Office for Civil Rights Title IX 
investigations become known, deference to local context is markedly absent. With settlement 
agreements imposing noticeable standardization of responses, the importance of contextual 
difference appears to be diminishing (New, 2016b). Yet context and locality are vital factors that 
contribute to university leaders’ comprehension and action in preventing and responding to 
campus sexual violence.
To understand the dynamic process of negotiating institutional policy in response to 
challenging legal mandates, it is necessary to establish the organizational contexts of each school 
in this study. Examining the organizational contexts of universities in response to expanded and 
ambiguous Title IX obligations provides important insight into how decision-making resulting 
from DCL compliance came about. This chapter addresses the organizational contexts of the 
research sites, conveying how each university addressed the DCL and prepared their 
8 Among those contextual matters referenced in the DCL are institutional size, student 
population, and administrative structures.
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organization for change.9 As one of this study’s contributions toward practice, insight from these 
findings will enable university leaders, practitioners, and policy makers to better understand the 
complex characteristics, multiple investments, and diverse considerations that shape substantive 
compliance.
Organizational Characteristics
The scope of administrative sophistication, levels of expertise, and resources available to 
fulfill compliance obligations varies greatly among the range of institutions that comprise 
American higher education (Broad, 2014). This study’s sites – Adhemar College (“Adhemar”), 
The University of Glensborough (“Glensborough”), and Tundell University (“Tundell”)10 offer 
unique and shared institutional characteristics. All three are 4-year or above, large, selective, 
public, doctorate-granting universities with high levels of research activity. Students can choose 
from an array of housing options, including on-campus university residences, off-campus houses 
and apartments, sorority and fraternity housing, or commuting. All are NCAA Division I schools 
with fervently embedded sport cultures and high profile athletic departments. Having strong 
athletic programs, promoting a residential experience, permitting historically all-male social 
clubs, and encouraging experiences with Greek Life are factors associated with the culture and 
incidents of sexual violence on campus (Armstrong et al., 2006; Harvard University, Task Force 
on the Prevention of Sexual Assault, 2016; Minow & Einolf, 2009; Miranda, 2013; Moynihan et 
al., 2010).  
The three participating institutions are comprised of loosely coupled organizational units. 
Consisting principally of decentralized services with departments operating within functional 
9 I purposely disclose minimal institutional details to protect the university’s identity.10 All institution and participant names are aliases; see Confidentiality and Anonymity section in 
Chapter 3 for an explanation of reasons behind this decision.
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silos, the problems, solutions, and actions taken by each department are often only casually 
connected (Manning, Kinzie, & Schuh, 2006; March & Weil, 2005).  All three institutions have 
general counsels on staff. As members of the National Association of College and University 
Attorneys, each school has access to a network of legal information and professional expertise 
provided by this professional association. Each school also values community engagement and 
partnerships, offering students opportunities through curricular engagement and outreach to 
participate in meaningful community activities that contribute to the public good. By holding 
constant institutional characteristics of the participating universities, complexity related to 
divergent institutional type is reduced (Kezar, 2013b). Table 3 provides a summary of the salient 
organizational characteristics and differences among the study’s participating institutions.       
 
Table 3. Salient Organizational Characteristics and Differences Among Participant Institutions
Adhemar Glensborough Tundell
Carnegie Class.* 
Level
4-year or above 4-year or above 4-year or above
Carnegie Class. 
Control
public public public
Carnegie Class. 
Enrollment profile
majority 
undergraduate
high 
undergraduate
majority 
undergraduate
Carnegie Class. 
Research Activity
highest higher highest
Carnegie Class.
Setting
primarily 
residential
primarily 
nonresidential
highly 
residential
Approximate Student 
Population
40,000 30,000 30,000
Intercollegiate Athletics NCAA Division I NCAA Division I NCAA Division I
State System Structure main campus regional campus main campus
General Counsel
(Attorneys)
in house in house in house 
Review Team’s 
Decision-Making Model
co-chairs making ultimate 
decisions based on team’s 
recommendations 
informal, grassroots, 
consensus influenced by 
subject-matter experts 
formal, modified 
consensus by entire team
Post DCL, OCR** 
Title IX Investigation
yes no
(main campus: audit)
yes
* classification
** Office for Civil Rights
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Tundell and Adhemar exhibit characteristics of flagship schools. They are well-known, 
well-financed, research-intensive institutions in their respective states. Glensborough does not 
exhibit these same flagship characteristics within its state’s university system. It is one of the 
multiple, well-regarded, publicly funded local campuses within the state system. It is able to 
design and implement its own sexual misconduct procedures, protocols, programing, education, 
and training. It cannot, however, set policy independently of the other campuses in its system. 
For example, it could not independently approve an affirmative consent standard in sexual 
assault policies. Rather, the state’s flagship school would create policy that would bind the other 
campuses in the system. Once policy exists at the central level, each campus can devise 
strategies and responses designed for its unique setting and population. 
Pre DCL Environment and Initial DCL Response 
Not all of the research sites professed the same values or commitment to issues of 
campus sexual violence prior to the DCL. Adhemar had crafted a national reputation as being a 
leader in prevention efforts. The university’s response protocols were well developed, and 
although not perfect, Adhemar was addressing and contributing to best practices on issues of 
campus sexual misconduct. Tundell’s reputation on such issues was weaker. It operated out of a 
system marred by neglect and missteps. While it had official channels available for students to 
report allegations of sexual violence, complainants report being “stonewalled.” Likened to an 
‘old boys network’ where complaints were “swept under the rug,” a growing student 
constituency at Tundell perceived the university environment as one in which complaints were 
minimized by administrators who “put their heads in the sand” and ignored what was occurring. 
Despite prevention and bystander intervention programs operating on campus, the university 
lacked a cohesive investigatory arm capable of responding, addressing, and adjudicating alleged 
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incidents. Glensborough enjoyed a reputation of being a progressive campus renowned for 
service learning. It’s student body is known to rally behind issues of social justice. The recent 
past has witnessed student activism around issues of diversity, equity, and inclusion as opposed 
to campus sexual violence. 
Once the 2011 DCL administrative guidance was issued, Tundell and Adhemar 
responded with interim sexual assault policies designed to address immediate compliance 
obligations. Glensborough did not issue an interim policy. Its existing student code and 
harassment policies loosely addressed sexual misconduct. Each school gradually made structural 
changes and rolled-out compliance initiatives as their actors developed a greater understanding 
of the institution’s sexual assault and violence prevention protocols in light of emerging DCL 
obligations. The most easily decipherable DCL guidance was tackled first. For example, it was 
clear that interim Title IX coordinators would have to be named. Longer-term impact, such as 
under which unit (general counsel’s office? student conduct? equity office? dean of students?) 
the position would function, as well as the scope of the person’s role and responsibilities, would 
merit further consideration. Tundell, Adhemar, and Glensborough put off such deliberations until 
they had a better understanding of the scope of structural reform, staffing, resources, and 
expertise needed to meet such compliance guidance. The DCL served as a checklist for interim 
decision makers to assess what university protocols were already in place, what additional steps 
were needed to achieve compliance, and what directives required further clarification before 
being acted upon.
Adhemar College 
Adhemar had been active on the national scene around issues of campus sexual violence 
and prevention prior to the DCL. It already carried out an integrated approach addressing a range 
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of issues involved in sexual violence on campus - including early prevention education, 
bystander intervention training, crisis counseling, and medical services. Its sexual misconduct 
policies were included in the student code of conduct. With the largest student population of the 
three research sites, Adhemar had the lowest incidents of sexual assault reported among the three 
schools. Counseling professionals knew that the low reporting figures did not match the number 
of incidents their staff was addressing. When a complaint was filed at Adhemar, it was 
investigated by an administrative unit of student affairs dedicated to all issues of student 
misconduct. Adjudication was conducted through a panel of peers. 
Following the release of the DCL, Adhemar put into place an interim sexual misconduct 
policy. Designed by a core group of the university’s executive leaders, the interim policy 
immediately addressed the more obvious DCL directives. The interim policy adopted the newly 
mandated preponderance of the evidence standard (from the previously existing clear and 
convincing evidentiary burden), created a Title IX coordinator position (which was filled by an 
existing administrator), and shifted the adjudication responsibility from student panel to trained 
conduct professionals. This policy remained in effect until Adhemar had the opportunity to more 
thoroughly review and revise campus-wide sexual misconduct protocols, policies, and 
procedures in light of the DCL guidance. Adhemar has been the recipient of an Office of Civil 
Rights Title IX investigation. Results of the investigation have not yet been released. 
Tundell University 
Prior to the DCL there were few attempts to create a central place at Tundell to address 
student needs around issues of sexual violence. Prevention, education, counseling, and response 
expertise was scattered across divisions. Attempts to build a collaborative network across the 
university had neither provost-level nor presidential support. Participants perceived a lack of 
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resources and attention by the university to address or combat issues of sexual violence.  While 
committed professionals struggled to make inroads with the administration, coordination of 
services and ease of locating relevant services was lacking. Attempting to better coordinate 
Tundell’s programing and services, Etienne, an mid-level administrator in student affairs 
programming and education initiatives, describes the paradox between caring, experienced 
professionals being on campus and the lack of institutional effort connecting students to them: 
A ton of people can care about an issue and [can] even be well-trained and be supportive, 
but if it doesn’t trickle down and it’s not signified to students and they don’t know that 
it’s a safe place and the right place to go, it’s all for naught or it’s not ideal at least. […] 
Systems were not in place in order to help people help students.
Charlotte, a seasoned administrator describes “inappropriate and poor responses to students” by 
Tundell administration dealing with sexual violence matters. She provides the example of a 
student sexually assault while participating in a study abroad program: 
The person who was the dean of students at the time never returned the call to the 
director of the study abroad office, never called back to follow up and provide help and 
support to [the] office let alone that student. I think there were two other instances that I 
was aware of where those types of things happened. It was part of that, it doesn’t mean it 
wasn’t dealt with -I don’t want to say under the table - but it just wasn’t talked about.
The lack of institutional concern and regard for student welfare contributed to a climate of 
mistrust on campus between students and administrators. This mistrust grew into antagonism, 
with “students see[ing] some people in the administration as the enemy.” Shortly after the DCL’s 
release, Tundell students filed a Title IX complaint with the Office of Civil Rights over Tundell’s 
inappropriate and insufficient handling of sexual violence complaints. Tundell, with a similar 
student population as Glensborough, had the highest incidences of student reported sexual 
assault during comparable time frames prior to the institution’s DCL overhauls. 
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University of Glensborough 
Prior to post DCL reform, sexual misconduct fell under the student code of conduct that 
applied to all of the system’s campuses. Each campus could then develop its own enforcement 
and implementation procedures. The system’s Title IX coordination was managed centrally, with 
each campus having a deputy Title IX coordinator. The code’s pre reform wording was weak, 
failing to address specifics necessary to properly investigate and adjudicate allegations of sexual 
misconduct. The code and conduct environments existing at Glensborough soon after the DCL’s 
release were considered disappointing and problematic. Naveen, a director within student affairs 
trained as a hearing officer, started working at Glensborough shortly after the DCL’s release. 
Naveen describes his disbelief with the student code of conduct in effect at that time:  
I remember looking through the code and thinking, there’s not any good, there’s terrible 
language to address sexual misconduct. There needs to be language that is explicit. If 
we’re going to talk about penetration, we need to know exactly what that is, ‘cause we 
need to adjudicate based on what happened, and what we can ascertain in the hearing, 
and in the packet, and none of that is here. It’s just about these esoteric terms of 
harassment and prevention of educational sort of pursuit. And that’s fine and everything, 
but there’s no specific, sort of, there’s nothing addressed in the code about exactly what 
that looks like and that was problematic to me. 
In addition to the code’s shortcomings, conduct operations at Glensborough were also found 
wanting. Both conduct processes and sanctioning was carried out informally. Naveen recounts an 
example illustrating this closed-door approach: 
There was a time when the person who was doing conduct in my first year was 
adjudicating some sexual misconduct and what I found really odd was that she was just 
adjudicating it like inner-office, like she was just like having an interview with the 
complainant, an interview with the accused and then like - and it was very backwards to 
me. When I first got here, I just thought, that’s not right, you cannot do it that way. […] 
She seemed reluctant to levy a really sort of heavy sort of sanction. And I said, I just 
don’t understand why we would allow anybody to remain part of a community or invite 
that person back in after a finite period of suspension. […] Given the Lisak11 numbers, 
11 David Lisak is a clinical psychologist and retired psychology professor from the University of 
Massachusetts Boston who has devoted his professional life to studying the causes and 
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given what we know about sort of recidivism […] if you find somebody responsible, then 
just get rid of them. And I was sort of surprised that she was reluctant to do that. […]
I thought we were a little backwards.
Derek, who joined Glensborough’s student conduct division nearly 2 years after the DCL 
release, provides additional insight into Glensborough’s environment before the university’s 
policies and protocols were revamped post DCL: 
Our conduct practices were very much pre DCL, kind of an old [school] discipline where 
you could bring the student in and all authority rests with one figure and that person does 
all the work on it and makes a final decision, and so it wasn’t really fair. […] Prior to my 
arrival, the people who did discipline weren’t really strong advocates for the office or 
strong advocates for their role, for the voice of this work. There were a lot of folks who 
did a great job building relationships and they were very likeable people but weren’t able 
to go out and articulate to faculty and staff and students why this office had to be 
recognized on the campus as the expert in this area.
Derek’s strategic hiring during the post DCL period in which the university grappled with its 
compliance obligations signaled a shift for the university and created momentum for the 
development of improved practices. Glensborough had similar incidences of reported sexual 
assault as Adhemar, though Adhemar has a larger student body. Glensborough is the only school 
of the three that had not been investigated by the Office of Civil Rights for a post DCL Title IX 
complaint, although its system’s flagship school was the subject of a proactive audit by the 
Office for Civil Rights. Audits differ from investigations in that they are not initiated based on 
formal Title IX complaints, but rather on statistical data or anecdotal reports of possible 
violations of student’s rights.
The Glensborough DCL review process is markedly different from Adhemar’s and 
Tundell’s, most notably because of the regional campus/central campus dynamic. Glensborough, 
a strong regional campus advocate of Title IX issues, influenced the central campus decision-
consequences of interpersonal violence. His research supports a relatively small minority of men 
being responsible for most campus sexual assaults (Lisak & Miller, 2002).
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makers setting policy for the state system schools. Adhemar and Tundell, by contrast, made 
decisions independently from other campuses within their state’s structure. Following the release 
of the DCL, student affairs professionals at Glensborough with knowledge and experience 
around issues of sexual assault informally joined forces to advance knowledge, prevention, and 
response around issues of campus sexual assault. They had neither a formal charge nor 
institutional resources to support them. Rather, they were a grass roots committee formed by 
concerned campus professionals who secured state funding to develop and launch prevention 
initiatives. Student affairs professionals at Glensborough were used to managing their matters 
with significant independence. As one director characterized: 
Prior to the DCL, any student affairs work, unless it was a lawsuit that was imminent, 
general counsel just didn’t have the time to pay much mind to what was going on in 
student affairs. You’re left to doing a lot on your own.     
This dynamic changed post DCL with general counsel shifting focus to address the system’s 
growing compliance obligations. 
As central campus decision makers began to explore university compliance with the 
DCL, Glensborough’s informal committee surfaced as the go-to experts. Over time it was 
officially sanctioned and served as a model for system wide programmatic reform. 
Glensborough’s response processes were gaining traction as being state-of-the-art. Invited by 
both the White House and professional governing organizations to inform its policy 
development, Glensborough was earning a reputation as a leader in the field of conduct practices.  
The politics and bureaucracy of the state system were such that system-wide DCL review was 
messy, however. Multiple central committees were formed to address different compliance 
issues raised through the DCL, VAWA, and the Campus SaVE Act. Select members from 
Glensborough’s committee were invited to sit on more centralized review teams. A new 
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organizational structure was created to coordinate compliance, programing, education, student 
wellbeing, and academic research on sexual assault prevention, response, and support services. 
During this time of review and re-organization, the system’s inaugural sexual misconduct policy 
was being written behind closed doors by senior administrators and legal counsel. The majority 
of the research participants for this study were not members of this closed group. Rather, they 
were members of the review team advancing Glensborough’s compliance, prevention, and 
educational practices – practices considered influential to the field in this developing area. 
Post DCL Review Teams
Following the release of the DCL, all three institutions reacted by assembling small, 
closed groups of senior administrators to make immediate changes in response to the DCL. 
Tundell and Adhemar quickly crafted interim sexual violence policies designed to ensure each 
university was complying with new Title IX obligations, such as the changing adjudication 
standard of evidence. Although Glensborough did not release an interim policy, it had also 
assembled select executive leaders, behind closed doors, who “hadn’t yet understood what … 
goals they were trying to reach.” The lack of transparency and exclusive decision-making across 
all three institutions did not sit well with campus constituents. A participant from Tundell 
describes the administration “put[ting] together a new system without a lot of community input” 
contributing to growing discontent. As one director shared: “It [the new policy] just kind of 
appeared. […] It was ‘here’s the Dear Colleague Letter’ and then – boom – here’s a new interim 
policy and nobody really knew what went into crafting that.” That the policies were intended to 
be provisional was not made clear. This participant provides insight into the perception and 
fallout at Tundell at the time: 
I don’t think that was clear to people [that it was designed to be an interim policy]. Now 
that may very well have been the case, but I don’t recall thinking “oh this is the interim 
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policy.” And I know that others around, students and other staff, faculty, did not perceive 
it as that. […] The outcry that came from not having had much community input was also 
a variable in deciding to put the task force together.  
As public discontent of institutional responses grew, campus leaders created review 
teams to assess current institutional practices in light of emerging DCL obligations. Each school 
organized their Title IX review teams differently. With broad charges to make recommendations 
about existing policy, procedures, protocols and propose improvements, team members largely 
viewed the opportunity for change brought about by the DCL as a chance to think innovatively 
about new policy interventions. Leslie summarizes the outlook of a majority of study participants 
across the three institutions as one in which review team members “had pretty free reins [to] 
think imaginatively about […] policy interventions that might be offered as a new opportunity in 
this change.” The shared impression of review team members across the three institutions was 
that they felt empowered to “innovate around the Dear Colleague Letter guidance to not just 
check the box to achieve compliance but actually do some novel thinking.” Most viewed DCL 
guidance under Title IX as “the floor not the ceiling,” creating favorable conditions to exceed 
minimal DCL compliance to “figure out how to do this [reform] in the best possible way for 
students.”   
Membership 
Cross-departmental representation from professionals possessing subject-matter expertise 
characterized review team membership. Membership was attained in one of three ways - either 
appointed by the president, hand-picked by the chairs, or included at the individual’s request by 
virtue of professional reputation and proximity to the issues. As one member characterized the 
mix: “[w]hoever selected the group was, I believe, very strategic in picking personalities, styles, 
and dispositions that would lend itself to being a group that saw that they were collaborating and 
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doing their best to make things happen.” Representation tended to span faculty, staff, and 
students.12 None of the committees had the same mix of people or know-how. Some relied more 
heavily on legal expertise, while student-centered professionals dominated the composition of 
others. Certain offices such as legal counsel, psychological services, and violence prevention 
were represented on all review teams. Units such as housing, athletics, academic advising, 
women’s center, LGBTQ center, institutional equity, and student health existed on some teams 
but not others. One team had an external community member who was not affiliated with the 
university, whereas another had a forensic nurse from a community hospital the university 
partnered with. One of the universities brought in external legal consultants. None had 
representation from Greek Life governing bodies. 
Organizational Structure  
The organizational structure of each review team varied considerably. One team was co-
chaired by long serving senior university administrators representing both student affairs and 
legal affairs, creating, in the words of one participant, a “powerful balancing effect between legal 
compliance and educational mission and student experiences.” Final authority rested with these 
co-chairs, whose decisions were informed by the legwork and deliberations of the larger sub-
team. By contrast, a gender-equity and coalition-building expert with little experience in higher 
education chaired another team. This chair relied on a system of modified consensus to move 
decisions forward, ensuring that each member of the committee was at least partially in 
agreement with the team’s ultimate recommendations. Where a member did not agree with a 
final submission, a written dissent of alternative positions was provided for the university’s 
president to consider. The third team underwent changes as the university’s review model 
12 Students did not initially serve on Glensborough’s informal committee, but were invited to 
join when a review team was formally charged over two years after the DCL release.
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developed. Initially, the team was co-chaired by the director of the women’s center and the 
director of counseling services. The lead conduct administrator subsequently became chair of a 
revised and reconstituted team charged with reviewing a more complex mix of Title IX, DCL, 
Clery, VAWA, and Campus SaVE policies, practices, and protocols. 
Transparency 
All three teams spent considerable time meeting with campus constituents. This served a 
double purpose of both seeking input and perspectives from different groups and populations, as 
well as informing them of the review team’s progress and direction. Glensborough’s review team 
met regularly with members of the student government to share information with them and bring 
student feedback to the team. The review team initially lacked student representation, however, 
raising questions about the institutional commitment to include students in the negotiation and 
creation of solutions. Whether student check-ins were substantive or symbolic in capturing broad 
constituent viewpoints is debatable. Even with the review team’s eventual decision to invite 
students to formally join the review team, one study participant acknowledged the team’s student 
representative rarely showed up to meetings. Outreach to students during the post DCL reform 
period, especially to populations in the university community who may be more vulnerable to 
gender violence (which increases the risk of sexual violence), or represent non-conventional 
needs, appears weak. Communication was also wanting, with no formal means to keep the 
university community informed. 
Glensborough appears to have managed the post DCL reform process by relying on a 
small team of people that carefully managed and controlled information. Although on the surface 
this is consistent with crisis management theory (Davis-Blake, 2016), study data suggests that in 
Glensborough’s case, such actions may have been the result of poor leadership and inexperience 
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with the compliance terrain rather than a conscious crisis management response strategy. Devina, 
Glensborough’s deputy Title IX coordinator, describes a concern that community buy-in would 
slow down implementing the revisions:
When that’s done [revisions to the policy], we’re not going to roll it out for a buy-in, 
approval by nobody. Sometimes a policy is what it is based on what the regs say we must 
do. It’s not going to get, we’re not going to be asking for a review by faculty council, 
staff council. Like with our policy when I got here, our operating procedures, I had legal 
counsel review them, but I wasn’t seeking buy-in, it’s how we’re going to do the job.  
And that Title IX framework will tell the campus, here’s how we’re doing the job, people 
don’t get a vote, they don’t get a say cause it [approval] will never happen.
This participant’s viewpoint reveals a dogmatic mindset underlying the organizational dynamics 
at play in Glensborough’s DCL oversight and review.    
Tundell, by contrast, operated from a completely different model. Perhaps because 
Tundell was undergoing a significant crisis and public relations debacle resulting from the Office 
for Civil Rights complaint and activist attention to long-standing institutional shortcomings, the 
review team demonstrated tremendous transparency to re-establish trust. Four students were 
invited to sit on the review team, representing varied interests and constituent groups, including 
aggrieved complainants. Review team meetings were open to anyone who wanted to attend. 
Initially, because of the media spotlight, many spectators did attend, including aggrieved 
students, members of the media, lawyers for complainant and accused students, and members of 
the public. The review team made used of social media to communicate the team’s progress and 
direction, sharing information widely across numerous platforms, and soliciting feedback along 
the way. 
With Glensborough’s model lying at the closed end of the spectrum and Tundell’s at the 
open end, Adhemar’s lay in the middle. A working group from the team conducted numerous 
town-hall style information sessions and smaller meetings to reach hundreds of constituent 
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groups across campus. It brought feedback from these meetings to the review team, who 
incorporated community feedback into its agenda and outcomes. Although review team meetings 
were closed to the public, the constituent meetings occurred at numerous times during the team’s 
review cycle to inform the work at different times. Information was widely shared with the 
university community, including vetting policy drafts and sample language. This level of 
transparency fostered community buy-in of the process as the team made numerous, scheduled, 
and publicized meetings to ensure that “every single student across campus is at least aware of 
this policy and what it means.” Adhemar supported a “community owned student conduct 
process […] developed and reviewed by students, staff, and faculty on a regular basis.” Its 
institutional traditions and community values supported vetting its ideas and progress with the 
extended university community, with stakeholders and focus groups informing the review team 
of revisions that should be made and sections that should be kept. As Leslie describes:  
It was a process. I believe well over 30 groups were approached to vet this out, staff and 
faculty across campus […] amongst focus groups and presentations about the policy and 
the changes that were drafted up for it and so through that, we received a lot of feedback 
in terms of, from the university as a whole, what this meant to them and what changes 
should be done.
This elaborate community vetting brought ideas back to the committee from multiethnic student 
groups, disability groups, black student union, and survivor groups, among others, to examine 
barriers and potential unintended consequences inherent in the proposed reforms. The committee 
gave merit to all of this feedback, despite, as Leslie states, concerns about incorporating input 
from hundreds of members: 
At a certain point, we started to get a little bit worried about the volume of content that 
we were receiving from our community but then as it turns out, it did start to tend to fall 
into sort of general areas and so we were able to do some really good kind of content 
analysis about a lot of the feedback that we were receiving, making sure that we were 
paying attention to not just general trends but also sort of outlier information where sort 
of specific points of concern that may not be in the general thread of conversation did get 
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special attention as well, that wasn’t just dismissed, but in fact was treated as potentially 
novel insight that we needed to also pay attention to.
Adhemar’s structured and deliberate strategies for community feedback created multiple venues 
for every member of the community to make their voice heard. 
Resource Investment 
All of the review teams took longer than anticipated to revise the institution’s relevant 
policies and make recommendations for future action. Glensborough’s initial incursion into the 
shifting post DCL landscape was grass roots and self-selected. Concerned professionals met once 
a month at the end of a workday to enhance their knowledge and understanding of how emerging 
issues affected students and practice. It was not until 2014 that concerted efforts were made “to 
bring the university in line with Title IX and DCL” obligations. Staff invested substantial amount 
of time and energy “to get [the university] to compliance before OCR realized we weren’t there.” 
Perceptions among participants were that the university’s financial investment to support the 
organizational infrastructure was weak. Glensborough provides an example of a poorly resourced 
effort largely held together by the determination and investment of committed personnel.
Evidence from Adhemar suggests that it took a more supportive stance creating an 
environment in which the review team was given the human resources, time, and institutional 
backing needed to reform the policy. Rachel provides insight into the university’s long-term 
commitment to the review team’s ongoing process: 
The university learned a lot from this knowing that they need to, and they also learned 
that this is going to be an extensive process, it’s not going to be a two-three month 
turnaround. This was almost two years and for a committee to meet that long is almost 
unheard of. Usually they’re about a year or so. And so it’s something that for a university 
the size of [Adhemar] to take their time creating policy, it’s hard especially for the 
president and the provost that need to report to their stakeholders and everyone’s 
questioning them – why isn’t the university moving quicker? Well, this is why. So it’s 
one of those things where you need to balance out the getting voice and consensus from 
across campus to create a policy as quickly as we can. And it’s hard.
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An experienced director within a division of student affairs reveals that review team members 
also did a considerable amount of reading and homework to prepare for their meetings and 
accomplish their goals. Members spent time outside of the meetings “thinking about the 
language and what it meant, what it suggested.” Minn wraps up the overwhelmingly positive 
institutional support team members felt by describing the privileged position a well-resourced 
university is in to free up senior staff for long periods of time to address this one (albeit complex) 
issue:
There were the resources and the support that, the infrastructure was there to begin with.  
On top of that, we had enough infrastructure where we were able to be specialized 
enough that we could really focus on the issue.  So for example, [Leslie] and I as 
directors of our respective units had staff members that were doing the day to day work 
with students which allowed us to focus on higher level policy issues and a lot of folks 
around the country don’t have that, they’re in the trenches with students every day, they 
don’t have the resources to hire the staff that we did and so we were able to put our heads 
together months before, anticipating what was coming and then as soon as it was released 
being able to respond and have a structure set up to start working and being responsive to 
the guidance.
Adhemar was well-resourced and well-staffed prior to the DCL. Once the directive was issued, it 
committed top personnel to addressing the guidance in a way that worked with their community 
values. 
Tundell had the longest policy assessment process and the most people involved on the 
review teams of the three institutions. The team started with short meetings at first, ramping up 
their commitment to full day meetings throughout the summer to complete their charge over the 
span of a few months, in time to introduce the revised policy at the beginning of the fall 
semester. That semester turned out to be a year later. Review team members felt supported by the 
university, which was investing copious amounts of time, money, and people to address the issue 
fully. As one participant describes, however, “moving a huge ship like [Tundell] in a particular 
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direction is an arduous process.” Being involved in such a demanding process, opined another, 
should produce more than a revised policy, but instill confidence within the university and create 
stronger professional relationships:
I think you have to be able to identify why you are charging a task force and if you’re 
going to spend the time and ultimately the man hours and subsequently the money on a 
large task force […] like the one at [Tundell], I think the ramifications at least and the 
aims need to be wider than just generating a new policy. The personnel piece, I loved our 
task force process, I think we were slow moving and that is one critique that I would have 
loved to have seen changed, but I think the result of us being slow moving is we got it 
absolutely right for our community as a result. I think in large part that was due to the 
personnel and I think the best achievement that I can say that the task force had was, it 
created friendships and it created a group of people who believed in each other and 
believed in their ability to create change. And I think you can see that in terms of how 
many people lasted the distance with the task force. I mean I think we were initially told 
this would take a summer, one summer and we would be done. I think we very quickly 
realized that it was not going to be one summer but I think for 22-25-30 people to last 18 
months with such an intense, emotionally charged issue and the intensity of the media 
presence around it particularly at the start, is incredibly impressive and I think a 
testament to our ability to get the right people on that task force.     
Variety among the three institutions’ organizational contexts provides evidence that universities 
can organize differently to achieve beneficial results. Members of the universities’ sexual 
violence review teams expressed an overwhelming commitment to “doing it well” as opposed to 
“doing it fast”. The “it” of policy reform and DCL compliance evolved as collaborators began to 
understand and address the emerging issues.  
Getting It Right
It is important moving forward to characterize what is meant by “success” in the policy 
revision context. There is no prevailing definition of what successfully addressing the DCL 
guidance and Title IX compliance looks like for universities. At one end of the spectrum, 
successful DCL compliance responses could entail managing the university’s regulatory 
obligations and reducing its legal risks. Practically speaking, this could take on the form of 
complying with minimal DCL requirements to avoid potential Title IX claims and lawsuits from 
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aggrieved students. At the other end of the spectrum, compliance responses could establish 
innovative and substantive solutions that protect students and create improvements for the 
institution and society while moving beyond merely managing regulatory obligations and legal 
risks. When the under secretary of education categorizes universities’ responses to DCL 
compliance and issues of campus sexual assault as “a national experiment,” it begs the question 
as to whether there even is an ideal notion of “success,” or if universities are working that out as 
they give meaning to the law through their constructions of compliance. While the head of the 
Office for Civil Rights has advised that “[t]here is tons of wiggle room” to reach the standards 
the department is aiming for (Wilson, 2015a), the American Council on Education’s impression 
differs, arguing that universities are “hamstrung by uncertainty,” with the “fear of vague federal 
mandates [limiting their] efforts … to try different approaches and consider different things” to 
successfully comply with the Department of Education’s DCL guidance (New, 2016b). `
To move a university beyond minimal compliance, the organization and its practitioners 
must increase their capacities and take action to improve responses to campus sexual 
misconduct. The Association for Student Conduct Administrators (2014) has characterized the 
nature of such actions as developing a more sophisticated understanding of basic Title IX and 
DCL legal requirements, exploring student-centered practices, challenging rape myths, and using 
trauma-informed approaches to conduct culturally competent investigations and provide multiple 
resolution options. Combining this professional association’s guidance with the significant 
public policy objectives of the DCL to confront campus sexual harassment and violence, 
promptly and equitably address its effects, and prevent its recurrence (Dear Colleague Letter, 
2011), the current study considers another component of “success” as involving a level of social 
responsibility in serving the larger public interest of eradicating gender based violence. Success, 
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for the purposes of this study, is equated with moving beyond minimal compliance in order for 
the university to advance innovative and substantive solutions that create improvements for the 
institution and society, while managing regulatory obligations and legal risks.
Conclusion
Initially charged with vague goals of reviewing current policies in relation to DCL and 
suggesting areas of improvement, team members were soon consumed by the process of making 
sense of the university’s changing legal, cultural, and educational environments. As in most 
organizations, these participants worked in groups to arrive at solutions. This chapter outlined 
different structural processes adopted by each university to coordinate their group’s review. Each 
university in this study adopted the format of review teams to make sense of, and respond to, the 
DCL. Norms governing the modes of organizational problem solving, coupled with members’ 
levels of commitment, motivation, conflict, and trust, contributed to the actions the team chose 
and the institution adopted. Team cultures reflecting deeply held beliefs and identities developed. 
Leadership and collaboration, presented in the subsequent two chapters, emerged as dominant 
themes that enabled team members across the institutions to overcome tension, ambiguity, 
dissent, and pressure to think broadly about the boundary spanning impact of the law on the 
university. As a result, the review teams were able to arrive at policy reform that moved the 
institution beyond minimal compliance, developing socially and institutionally desirable 
outcomes as they shaped cultural norms that influenced institutional actions. 
Interpersonal dynamics raised by participants are an important and recurring theme 
influencing successes achieved by the review teams. That effective leadership emerged as an 
important element in producing successful results, for example, is not new. However, in the 
construction of compliance, there is little research from which to draw conclusions about the 
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types of leadership that lead to beneficial results – beneficial for the institution, for the review 
team members, for the students they serve, for society at large. The following chapter focuses on 
the various levels of leadership exhibited throughout the process by multiple people that 
contributed to the teams’ successful outcomes.
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Chapter 5: Institutional Actors as Leaders in the Review and Negotiation Process
Institutionalism, concerned with the process through which organizational norms and 
routines become authoritative guidelines determining social behavior within organizations, 
theorizes that interpersonal structures are critical components in understanding patterns of 
behavior within organizations (Scott, 2004; Selznick, 1957). Organizational, institutional, 
educational, and legal scholars all recognize that multiple forms of vision, control, and advocacy 
are necessary for an organization to achieve success (Berger-Walliser, 2011; Bess & Dee, 2012; 
Cameron & Lavine, 2006; Siedel, 2002; Siedel & Haapio, 2010, 2011). Success, in the case of 
the participating universities’ review teams, involved enhancing opportunity for the institution 
and its students as the review teams took into account multiple considerations of importance to 
the organization and society in its review and construction of responses.
With a sudden jolt or crisis collectively impacting organizations within a field, leaders are 
called upon to suggest justifiable responses aligned with normative values. Such leaders must 
have a vision to create something new, and frame the strategic moves required to achieve the 
vision (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 2001b; Giddens, 1984). In the case of the DCL as the catalyst 
for change, an interesting dynamic arises as to whose interests affect the organization’s response. 
As Edelman (2016) points out, compliance professionals are emerging from increasingly diverse 
organizational units interpreting and reframing information between institutional actors and the 
organizational field. Negotiating with powerful actors and diverse constituents, these compliance 
professionals interpret the cultural environment and shape the norms that influence institutional 
actions. This research draws on institutional theory and socio-legal frameworks to examine 
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leadership that emerged from the universities’ DCL compliance review context. Would lawyers, 
conduct adjudicators, compliance officers, prevention specialists, student affairs advocates, or a 
combination of individuals, take responsibility over the issue and frame it as a matter requiring 
their interpretation of organizational reality? This chapter examines the role of institutional 
actors as leaders in the universities’ review and policy negotiation processes. In doing so, we see 
that multiple layers of leadership influenced the universities’ responses to the DCL review 
process, each constructing meaning through their own symbolic lens (Edelman, 2006; Kezar, 
2001; Weick, 1995).
Review team members provided crucial leadership expertise in multiple places to 
contribute to the success of the institution’s protocol, policy, and programming review process. 
Leadership did not occur only at the top. It was demonstrated on multiple levels, supporting 
traditionally held assumptions that collective leadership plays a key role in advancing change on 
campus (Higher Education Research Institute, 1996; Kezar, 2001, 2013a; Komives & Wagner, 
2012). Study participants often cited the different roles played by various members as 
particularly impacting the teams’ successes. Four leadership categories emerged from this 
study’s institutional review teams as having a special impact in the review process. Three of 
these draw parallels with leadership categories identified by Cameron and Lavine (2006) of 
enablers that contribute to achieving extraordinary success in organizations. The first leadership 
category to emerge from the data is that of “idea champion,” someone who creates enthusiasm in 
others and inspires the team. Those who fill this role take extraordinary interest in the success of 
the cause, guiding the team toward an energized future state. They serve as the glue that holds 
the team and the vision together. The second category of leader is the “facilitator.” Facilitators 
provide leadership through support and encouragement, especially of other’s ideas. The third 
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category is that of the “doer.” Doers are those active members who bring together people and 
resources to produce results.13 Multiple individuals are required to fulfill these roles, with some 
of them performing more than one function. Organizational scholarship suggests that multiple 
leadership positions are required for organizational change to occur, with each leadership role 
affecting the project’s success (Cameron & Lavine, 2006; Kezar, 2001). In addition to these 
three leadership categories derived from Cameron and Lavine (2006)’s research, this study 
provides insight into an additional category, that of “dissenter.” Studies support the necessity of 
divergent thinking to increase alternative conceptions of the issues and avoid premature 
convergence of ideas (Chen & Lawson, 2001; Leana, 1985). By stimulating discussion and the 
search for alternative information, dissenters expand options the group considers that might 
otherwise have gone unnoticed (Cameron, 1984; Nemeth, Brown, & Rogers, 2001; Thompson, 
2008).  The categories are not mutually exclusive, with members assuming different roles, 
sometimes simultaneously. As findings from the study begin to form a clear picture of the 
research puzzle, leadership emerged as an important influence affecting team dynamics and the 
successes each team achieved.
 Idea Champions
Idea champions develop connections among concepts and individuals, creating synergy 
and enthusiasm that provide momentum for the initiative (Cameron & Lavine, 2006; Eckel, 
Green, Hill, & Mallon, 1999). Accounts from all three institutions credit one or more members 
as exceptional idea champions who “set the tone” for the policy discourse, driving the team 
through the review process toward its end goals. All teams started the review process with 
“apprehensions,” “tensions,” and team members “butting heads.” With members initially 
13 Cameron and Lavine (2006) classify the three leadership categories as idea champions, 
sponsors, and orchestrators. 
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treading lightly to “figure out if you could be candid, what you’re going to say, what you’re not 
going to say, how political is it,” idea champions at each institution built bridges, drawing out the 
expertise and importance of each member sitting at the table. Idea champions challenged 
members “to really think deeply about our mindset, our attitudes, our biases and stereotypes.” In 
doing so, they maintained an environment that was “less political [than other campus issues] and 
more centered on the objective, more centered on a shared commitment to coming up with the 
best possible product.” Idea champions provided big picture thinking, often acting as liaisons 
between the review teams and the institutions 
At Adhemar, the idea champions are credited with creating “a positive nudge” to 
motivate team members, providing the group with “ultimate direction on some really knotty 
points.” One team member perceived direction and motivation from a fellow member, who had 
no explicit leadership role on the team, as follows: 
A continuous sort of pressure […] that’s just a pressure saying, “you can do more here, I 
trust you, I believe in you that you can do more here, but I need to push you a little bit to 
get you to move.” […]  They push and you do get better even if it’s uncomfortable, even 
if that being pushed is not pleasant at the time.
Adhemar’s idea champions are also credited with including and educating members on the 
periphery who had joined the team because of positional authority in the organization, but who 
did not possess the same level of knowledge about misconduct or harassment policies, or the 
day-to-day experiences and services the university offered, as other team members. Rachel 
provides insight on how the co-chairs’ leadership elevated the team’s understanding of issues 
while ensuring momentum:      
Some of the committee members, especially the faculty representatives, individuals that 
were not part of the day to day on this, these were the staff that were outside of student 
life, really didn’t understand a lot of the inner workings of this policy and so through this 
came a lot of education, a lot of training just amongst each other. […] [The co-chairs] 
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really made sure that we were moving along and so if it wasn’t for them, yeah, I mean it 
would have been just a mess.
Additional insight on the co-chairs’ role as idea champions came from the athletics 
representative who credits them with creating an environment of trust and inclusion. Their 
leadership provided a sense of empowerment and co-creation of the outcome that he had not 
experienced on previous teams or committees: 
It was one of the best experiences I’ve had with that large a group with such a diverse 
background - and I have been in a variety of those pieces. And this time I really felt that, 
[the co-chairs], that co-leadership set the tone. […] Sometimes I’m invited and it’s clear 
that they just want someone from athletics there. This group made it very clear that the 
input and the valuation of what was being considered, they made it clear that we were in 
it together, but most importantly, when we talk about it and when it went public, it was 
clear to anyone that would listen that athletics was part of the solution and part of the 
engineering and designing of the program and quite frankly, it was a critical piece to the 
puzzle in terms of getting our group to trust the process. And so this group was very clear 
about our role in the design of the policy as opposed to just imposing a policy and having 
no input from one of the targeted groups.
Though none of the participants used the term “idea champion” to identify individuals on the 
team exhibiting this category’s defining characteristics, the reflections highlighted above are 
indicative of the important role idea champions had on the unity and success of the team. Most 
characteristics supportive of such principles were directed at Adhemar’s co-chairs. Other idea 
champions existed as well, both as individual members of the team or as part of a sub-group 
whose leadership and influence transcended leadership categories. Adhemar’s core planning 
group, whose contributions are elaborated upon in the “doer” subsection that follows, especially 
spanned such boundaries.  
Idea champions at Glensborough came from two self-appointed mentors determined to 
advance the university’s protocols and initiatives aimed at combating sexual assault on campus. 
The first idea champion was one of the review team’s original co-chairs who built up and guided 
the team before DCL compliance urgency set in. As such, the foundation she laid, her personal 
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commitment to the cause, and the depth of her expertise provided “immediate legitimacy” as the 
university scrambled to understand and coordinate DCL obligations with the university’s 
existing initiatives. The second idea champion was hired post DCL. At this time, the university 
was not in compliance with its Title IX legal obligations. An experienced conduct specialist, this 
new hire swiftly filled an organizational need to address outdated sexual misconduct policy and 
revamp university procedures. Serving an important role bridging the divide between the 
university’s senior leadership and those already involved in sexual assault prevention and 
response practice, this idea champion elevated the expectations and delivery of what good Title 
IX practice could be. 
Glensborough presents a model of “grassroots” leadership, where a concerned group of 
student affairs professionals joined together to share knowledge and resources, advancing social 
change on issues of interpersonal, gender, and sexual violence. More formal “grasstops” support 
was visible through hiring and resource allocation decisions necessary to address Title IX 
compliance protocols and shortcomings. Of the Glensborough participants interviewed, these 
idea champions were overwhelmingly regarded as “assets,” “experts,” “intentional” about the 
work, “supportive” of colleagues and students, “connected,” and “respected.” Each contributed 
leadership traits that not only advanced transformative practices at Glensborough, but also 
systematically impacted the larger university system, as well as contributing to professional 
association policy development of best practices. 
Almost unanimously, members of Tundell’s review team attribute the team’s energy and 
success to its chair. Described as doing “a phenomenal job of helping to move the [review team] 
along and helping to keep everyone together and coherent,” Tundell’s idea champion was 
recognized by members as “driving the task force.” Most people interviewed could not “speak 
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highly enough” of her commitment and leadership. Participants also mentioned the fact that she 
“had the president’s ear,” which helped them to know that what the team regarded as important 
would be made known to the university’s top leader. In Tundell’s case, their idea champion also 
filled the shoes of facilitator, an important leadership role that served a different but necessary 
purpose: ensuring cohesion among members and creating a climate where every member felt 
their voice was important to the discussions.   
Facilitators
The actual, concrete acts enabling the review teams to achieve success were brought 
about by leadership exhibited at many levels. Just as idea champions provided the motivation 
and support necessary to move the team forward, facilitators negotiated personalities, nurtured 
relationships, fostered communication, and resolved conflicts in productive ways that enabled 
the teams to achieve success in carrying out their charge. Participants from Tundell often 
invoked the term “facilitator” when describing the “trusted,” “guns a-blazing,” well-regarded 
leader doing “a fantastic job of creating a climate that everyone’s voice mattered.” In Tundell’s 
case, the idea champion and principle facilitator were one and the same. Being “committed to the 
process not just the end point,” the facilitator  “took all these people that were coming from very 
different perspectives and we became a group.” Participants describe having “started pretty 
fractured at the beginning and pulling in different ways and people not understanding other 
people’s viewpoints and people wanting very different things.” Ultimately, through the 
facilitator’s efforts, team members “established rapport” and built “relationships of trust” that 
made “bringing so many people together to decide on something, [which] is always a 
challenging environment” one in which everyone’s voice was heard as difficult decisions were 
considered.
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Tundell’s facilitator, adapting to the team needs, introduced into the process a decision 
making model of modified consensus that team members lauded as being a key tool in their 
team’s success. Describing the model and its impact, one member exalted: 
We made a decision that we wanted [decision making] to be based on consensus as a 
group, we didn’t want to do majority wins, that we had five [a five out of five in 
agreement with the issue] if you love it, three if you can live with it, one if you hate it.  
And in any decision if there was a one, we stopped what we were doing, we didn’t move 
forward and we kept working until we got everybody at least at threes. And I think that 
that meant we didn’t lose anybody along the way and there wasn’t a point ever at which a 
decision got made over someone’s very strong objection and then they just fell out of the 
conversation.  And I think that was just really so crucial to the success of the group and it 
really was driven by the members of the group as policy came out of the members of the 
group.
Another member credits this modified consensus model as a crucial reason team members felt 
heard and were able to achieve the revised policy they produced. This member recounts:
We had such a well-functioning group of people and by well-functioning I don’t mean 
that people just were quiet about things they disagreed with or didn’t speak their piece, 
what I mean by well-functioning was, people brought their issues forward and we worked 
with them until we got to a place, it wasn’t a forced consensus thing, we worked with 
issues, whatever the issue was until we kind of found something that felt right for us as a 
group.  And so my perception of the decisions that we made was that they were 
challenging decisions and sometimes it took us a lot of work to get to a decision but I 
wouldn’t have had it any other way.  It wasn’t so burdensome that it was impossible or it 
was not worth the effort.  I really think the product that we got is better because of the 
process that we used.
The success of the modified consensus model and open communication it fostered was 
overwhelmingly attributed to the facilitator’s leadership. The facilitator set a “very respectful 
tone and […] collegial tone” where participants “never felt shut down” and developed such trust 
that they could “say anything I wanted to in there [the meetings]” because the facilitator made 
“sure everyone was heard.” In addition to decision making based on consensus, the facilitator 
held “temperature checks” at each meeting to ensure team members were doing well both with 
the weightiness of the issues being debated and the direction the team was taking. The 
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relationships she nurtured, for example by “start[ing] every group meeting with a go-round of 
our name and where we were coming from and then some funny thing like, the favorite thing 
about summer or most exciting trip you’re going to take this summer, or whatever" broke down 
barriers that improved the team’s interpersonal dynamics.
  Numerous participants attributed the facilitator’s leadership to the success of the 
consensual decision making model and her ability to bring team members together. Repeatedly, 
members extoled high praise on the facilitator, repeating a sense of awe in her ability to bring the 
group together: “I can’t say enough about how her leadership was just so fantastic.” A common 
theme raised by participants was how the facilitator “humanized us to each other so that we 
started seeing each other as individuals not just as the roles that we were coming into the rooms 
with.” Another member describes the facilitator’s group skills as “amazing,” adding “she would 
listen and when dissension would come, she would let the dissension play out.” Supporting this 
view, another participant compares the facilitator to a marriage counselor: “we would still fight 
but we would work out those fights, the fights wouldn’t be something that would shut the 
process down.” This participant adds “there was always a sense that people were being taken 
seriously, not matter what they said and nobody was pooh-poohed which was really beautiful.” 
Participants repeatedly and vehemently attributed much of the team’s success to the important 
facilitation role provided by this leader. 
Facilitation at Adhemar was spread out among a greater number of members, drawn from 
both the idea champion and doer subgroups. The co-chairs were praised with “balanc[ing] voices 
and making sure all voices were heard.” Some participants spoke of the difficulty speaking up 
when senior administrators seemed to be dominating discussions. “Finding the right balance of 
voices and making sure all voices were heard was an important role for [the co-chairs] and I 
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thought they did it well,” keeping egos and power dynamics in check. As one participant 
observed: 
There’s a lot of egos involved, a lot of heavy hitters on campus that have a lot of stake in 
what the policy is. [… We had a] rough start where everyone’s trying to assess 
everyone’s skills and abilities and what they bring to the table and what their inclinations 
are and what they want to get out of the policy or out of their membership on the 
committee. […] The co-chairs […] made sure that we were moving along […] ironed 
[that] out. […]. If it wasn’t for them, yeah, I mean it would have been just a mess.
Although the co-chairs were commended by team members for defusing power dynamics 
and drawing out all members in dialogue, two members of the “doer” subgroup provided crucial 
leadership around the team’s many “very robust discussions” by supporting and encouraging 
consideration of educational approaches that would be appropriate for the university to offer 
within the confines of DCL guidance. Adhemar’s unique model of having a small core planning 
team (the doers) who guided the substantive prevention, education, and resource support work 
that needed to be done, the advisory committee who provided input on merits and shortcomings 
from their suggestions, and the co-chairs who arrived at the final decision, had the potential of 
facilitators existing at each level. No facilitators emerged from the middle (advisory) level. 
Rather, they were book-ended by the ultimate decision makers (co-chairs) and individuals who 
worked on a daily basis with aspects of Title IX and its impact on students (doers). 
Findings from Glensborough offer an alternative scenario for facilitators. Two members 
whose day-to-day involvement with Title IX was more on the periphery fulfilled the role of 
facilitators. One was an external participant who joined the team as a forensic medical specialist. 
Her position as external liaison appears to have provided a neutral perspective in an internal 
environment otherwise enmeshed in the political jockeying of a “good old boy system.” As 
facilitator, this external member provided leadership to the team through her science-based 
training of the neurologic and physiologic effects of trauma and what resources might be 
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supportive and responsive to such needs. Her demeanor, delivery, and leadership fostered the 
development of a “very cohesive, collaborative effort between myself and the counseling center 
[at Glensborough] for follow-up of these patients after we see them for a medical forensic 
exam.” By educating the review team members on “the national protocol on the medical forensic 
examination of sexual assault patients, which they had never even knew existed” this member 
facilitated the adoption of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Glensborough and 
the local hospital to better address allegations of sexual misconduct and the needs of students 
who experience acts of sexual violence. MOUs to build partnerships between universities and 
law enforcement agencies, hospitals, medical personnel, student advocates, and other core 
contributors in effectively responding and preventing campus sexual assault are increasingly 
recommended as important elements of standard practice (National Sexual Violence Resource 
Center, 2016; Not Alone, n.d.; Ohio Attorney General, n.d.; White House Task Force, 2015). 
Glensborough’s team welcomed this facilitator’s encouragement of scientifically-based evidence 
in trauma care, incorporating her input into their practice by revising the protocols they use with 
students who have been assaulted and increasing trauma-informed training not only to 
Glensborough staff, but also expanding this partnership to other campuses and into the 
community at large.
Glensborough’s second facilitator on the review team self-selected to participate due to 
his interest in advancing social justice issues on campus through improved personal interactions. 
His support of the review team and its contributions was primarily evident through his 
encouragement of fellow members’ personal and professional devotion to accomplishing “a lot 
of really excellent work, sort of equipping different units across the division with tools to be 
more effective and sort of just having these conversations and creating the right spaces.” This 
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facilitator’s orientation that “social justice needs to be […] tightly woven into this narrative” 
highlighted a fresh attitude not evident from other, more seasoned review team members. Not 
wielding a powerful position on campus, this facilitator’s leadership was subtle, utilizing 
positivity and energy for the issues “to be of service.”     
A common thread among Glensborough’s facilitators was their seemingly strong 
relationship developed with one of the idea champions. Both expressed accolades for this idea 
champion’s skills and leadership in moving issues of campus sexual assault forward and 
overhauling outdated practices. Both seemed to work well with the idea champion, an 
observation further supported by their subsequent involvement on projects together beyond the 
review team. United through a shared concern for students, professional expertise, and 
commitment for this work, Glensborough’s main facilitators stood out more than others on the 
review team as collaborating across units on issues of sexual assault awareness and prevention. 
Both appeared to be open to “very forward thinking, progressive” movement away from the 
“entrenched” status quo. Both also spoke of the DCL as an important catalyst for needed change. 
As one of the facilitators articulated:
I found the Dear Colleague Letter to be invigorating and refreshing and it’s nice to have 
some guidance at all, quite honestly it’s nice to have somebody say, yeah absolutely, 
you’re not doing this well enough and you need to do it better and here’s some general 
criteria. And I know that the addenda that have come through, sure we can be confused 
about the specifics but in the end I think that just having a spirit of wanting to do it really 
well and care for everybody involved at the highest level possible is a nice place to start.  
I think that good things come from that.
Each used their position on the review team to push for reform and be a “mouthpiece” for the 
“important conversations to have.” They also expressed confidence in Glensborough’s 
willingness to “stare down the issue” and invest financial resources and personnel time to 
develop meaningful responses to DCL while promoting actions that exceeded minimum 
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compliance obligations, developing a national reputation as emerging leaders in campus sexual 
assault awareness and prevention work.        
Doers
Each team credits an important component of their success to a core working group 
within the larger review team that initiated what work needed to be done. At Adhemar, this took 
the form of three practitioners whose day-to-day work involved sexual assault response and 
prevention matters, as well as a university general counsel who worked closely with legal issues 
arising from issues of student affairs. The core planning team engaged in an extensive process 
outside of the larger review team. Their work included thinking through what a revised process 
would entail, conducting structured and deliberate meetings with constituents to ensure the 
policy changes would be community owned, and creating a viable first interim draft that would 
then be vetted with the larger group. Self-described as the “boots-on-the-ground” team, members 
of the larger group saw the core planning team as hard working soldiers “whose job it was to, 
okay so how is this really going to look, how is it going to be written, how would we do it?” 
Multiple review team members who were not a part of the doer subgroup commented on how 
efficiently this format worked. One noted “you can’t work with 15 people in a committee. Small 
work group, bringing it back, discussing an opportunity for input. I thought that worked really 
well and could be applied in other situations.” One member of the core work team describes the 
process as follows:   
I thought it was an incredible structure, a sounding board, so basically we had this group 
of worker bees which was the four of us on the core planning team and we sort of did, 
well - we did all the work - but then it came up to the advisory board which then said, no, 
yes, could you change this, this doesn’t make sense, and they did that from their unique 
perspectives [of police, housing, law, faculty…] 
Another reinforces this model’s effectiveness, adding:
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I’m convinced that the model, this was a very complicated, it was a very complex, 
complicated dance and I think that the results will lend itself to saying if we have to do 
something similar, let’s use this formula again. I really think that it’s going to have a 
major impact on how we approach things coming up.
One member of Adhemar’s doer subgroup added that the group’s success could partially be 
attributed to members’ familiarity with each other and the trust they had built up working 
together on prior projects. By contrast, another member of the subgroup felt renewed trust-
building was necessary because of the shift in responsibilities and “learning each other’s 
particular lenses” that was important to the process. Both of these participants also expressed that 
their prior knowledge of DCL expectations, acquired through their professional involvement in 
issues of campus sexual misconduct, was crucial to enabling a quick and successful start to the 
review process. Simply stated:
We knew it [DCL] was coming and so we were just ready before it had been released; we 
were ready for exactly what was coming and were prepared to approach it in a 
collaborative, interdisciplinary manner with the right folk on campus.
     
Glensborough’s complicated organizational structure meant that a core planning team did 
not formally materialize until a few years after the DCL was released. The “doer” that helped to 
establish Glensborough’s official core planning team was also one of the review team’s idea 
champions. This person provided leadership at many levels – idea champion, doer, and later head 
of the core planning team – and appeared to take on a large portion of the review team’s concrete 
work in reforming student misconduct responses and programing, as well as less tangible 
advocacy and networking work. This involvement establishing a presence by promoting the 
team’s contributions appears to have been necessary for the regional Glensborough review team 
to wield sufficient power to influence system-wide decision makers. As a doer, this member 
produced tangible products for policy and protocol restructuring. His influence as a national 
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advocate and success with programing reform at Glensborough generated enough good will for 
him to carry sway within the university’s larger system-wide policy review. 
The only university in the study to hire outside legal consultants to help with the reform 
process, Tundell’s consultant team proved to be the doers that brought people and resources 
together to achieve the desired community driven policy revision. Perceived by team members as 
providing support to the team, addressing public relations for the university, and offering insight 
on what other universities had done in response to DCL, the consultants “were really the main 
people [doers], they were literally writing our edits while we talked about stuff in the meeting, 
making it pretty and sending it back to us.” Another adds that in addition to drafting the language 
debated by review team members, the “consultants would present ideas, and members of the task 
force would debate whether they had merit, and how within the framework of Title IX […] we 
could shift some idea to suit our university better.” The consultants’ multipronged role as doers 
included providing both broad thinking on issues to guide the review team, as well as specific 
information and resources to help them meet their charge. As one member summarized, “the 
outside consultants were a key part of providing the framework, providing information, 
providing resources and explanations and examples of what other universities had done and 
where they had been successful and where they hadn’t been successful.” 
While at first perceived as “coming in to […] do their own work and then get out,” the 
tone and acceptance toward the consultants changed as they worked with the team and earned 
their trust. As the chair described:
We sat the consultants […] on the outside of the circle. They’re not voting members of 
this [review team]. They earned the group’s trust by really saying, here’s what we heard 
you say, is this right? And then we would strike it and they would take it back and they 
weren’t pulling fast ones on us. They would come back with a new copy or we’d put the 
copy up on the screen and edit it together. It was arduous. But no, people didn’t instantly 
accept them. I think by the end everyone did, they may not have agreed with them, but 
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they accepted them and that was not instantaneous, eyes were very suspicious at the 
beginning.
Elaborating on the extent of their role, the chair added:
It [working with the consultants] didn’t ever feel limiting, it felt way more like, we would 
ask them to go collect all the definitions that you can from schools that have gotten a 
little ahead on this, what can we choose from? Is there anything out there that we should 
know about that we should be considering? And they played like the harvesting role for 
us more than anything, but they didn’t ever say, I can’t think of a single time they said 
that [the task force’s vision of the needed reform] wouldn’t work.
Whether providing leadership by gathering information for the team to review, fine tuning the 
language of the ideas discussed in the meetings, or informing the team of practices they had seen 
at other universities, the consultants’ role as doers was highly regarded by team members as 
being a resource that enabled them to achieve a successful review and revision of Tundell’s 
sexual misconduct policy and practices.  
Dissenters
Dissenters increase the likelihood that “groupthink” will not dominate the review process. 
Groupthink is a way of thinking that arises in cohesive group interactions when “members’ 
striving for unanimity overrides their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of 
action” (Janis, 1982, p. 9). Groupthink reduces the team’s openness to discrepant or unsettling 
information and the ability to detect errors in judgment, all of which can lead to the group 
pursuing inappropriate courses of action so as to not disturb team cohesiveness. To avoid 
groupthink, discrepant information must be introduced (Bess & Dee, 2012; Janis, 1982; Weick, 
1993). 
Although many participants expressed a level of opposition with some element of the 
review process, at least one participant from each review team exhibited observable 
characteristics of dissention. The strongest dissenting voice at Adhemar came from Avi, an 
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experienced director practicing in student affairs for over 30 years. The director approached her 
work from a community perspective, prioritizing the specific needs of the community under her 
charge. While she supported a complainant receiving services and accommodations from the 
university, she was equally concerned with accused students’ rights and treatment. Trumping 
both of those needs, her primary concern was for the safety of the campus community. She was 
happy to see that the DCL pushed universities to investigate alleged incidents of sexual violence 
even if the students involved did not want to proceed. Citing the importance of investigating all 
allegations to ensure perpetrators did not continue to provide a threat to other students, she 
pushed “to have cases reported because we wanted the police to know about trends and we cared 
about the individual, and also the entire community.” Recalling a pre DCL incident in 2010, Avi 
recounts: 
I remember being in a meeting, I don’t remember exactly the numbers [of alleged 
incidences of sexual assault], the number 70 sticks in my mind, and maybe ten of them 
had been reported only. I remember getting a little agitated, what the hell happened to the 
rest of them?  
The others, most likely because of confidentiality and respecting the desire of the complainant 
not to proceed, were never pursued. Such actions disturbed this participant, who felt the 
community’s needs were not adequately protected when possible acts of violence failed to be 
investigated. 
Organizationally, Avi describes a pre DCL structure at Adhemar where “everybody was 
in their own world.” Administrators did not share information outside of their units: “Things 
weren’t reported. Police were not told. […] there was no investigation if the survivor didn’t want 
it.” Once an incident was identified, “we wouldn’t always necessarily know if a case was 
reported to the dean of students’ office, it was like going into a black hole” with decentralized 
departments working independently and ultimately “acced[ing] to the wishes of the survivor” in 
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moving forward with an investigation or not. Post DCL, although she’s happy universities were 
reminded of their obligation to report incidents and investigations are taken more seriously, she 
perceives Adhemar’s organizational structure as rigid and legally focused. “Now we find 
ourselves in conflict with them [Title IX coordinator’s office] because we find that they’re a little 
more legalistic than we might choose to be and less aware of the nuances of a residential 
community.” She describes Adhemar’s post DCL structure as “a dualistic line of yes or no, right 
or wrong” without the consideration of “human judgment that has to be applied in each and 
every [case].”
I characterize this participant’s contributions as dissenting because Avi provides 
disconfirming evidence of the apparently smoothly operating, cohesive organization. While she 
supports the university’s process of negotiating post DCL policy and speaks highly of the 
resources it has put in place, she describes shortcomings in human relations and services. Her 
own dealings with the Title IX office have been “tense” and “strange,” having experienced those 
working there as “pretty immovable,” where rigid rules overrode compassion toward the parties. 
“We sometimes find ourselves with a difference of opinion regarding the immediacy of action 
given the different nature of working with people,” her with a “student personnel point of view 
where no two students [are] alike, each student must be treated as an individual,” and her 
perception of the Title IX office that human judgment has been removed in favor of strict 
policies that must be followed. In her opinion, this orientation leads to the Title IX office’s  
tendency to proceed on the basis of everything being “just black and white.” She finds many of 
the prevention and healthy relationship programs insufficient, noting they “need a fresh look,”  
students “don’t find a whole lot of value in [them],” and “mandatory” participation cannot be 
enforced. Finally, she is one of the few participants who expressed a lack of measures in place to 
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assist male students involved in sexual violence allegations. While many participants asserted a 
need for due process and fair treatment of both parties, this director was in the minority voicing 
her concerns of the impact post DCL changes were having on accused students. “I have seen 
young men absolutely wrecked by what is happening. […] I still don’t know that we have 
enough safe gaps for the young men and, generally talking, perpetrators and that, I really don’t.” 
While no participants spoke directly about this dissenter’s conformity with team norms, her 
views suggest discrepant information may have been introduced to the group, which may have 
reduced the tendency for the review team to engage in groupthink. 
While Adhemar’s dissenter exhibited some elements of antagonism toward the 
organizational status quo, Glensborough’s dissenter showed signs of outright hostility toward the 
university’s established “old boys club.” A director at Glensborough, Patricia also had almost 
three decades of student affairs experience serving a vulnerable student population. She 
describes Glensborough’s pre DCL culture as one where campus leaders knew acts of sexual 
violence were occurring, but were turning a blind eye to it: “We knew of this but we never did 
anything about it.” She witnessed voices being silenced, commenting that staff was told “you 
don’t discuss this.” Patricia spoke of systemic issues of gender and power in the university 
system that dictated “either you become a good company girl and keep your job or you fight the 
fight and you make a decision which way you’re going to do it.” Her fight was to put an end to 
“regurgitating the party line.” As she describes, nothing would change until the administrative 
culture of protecting those in power and avoiding responsibility changed:
No matter what this committee does, until administration changes, until the complexion 
of administration changes […] until you start getting away from your good old boy 
system, until you start getting away from your yes men, whatever you say, yes, until you 
get somebody who might say, can we go a little bit further on this one, maybe we should 
be a little bit more upfront and discuss this, not something that’s going to give us a bunch 
of PR. […] The only PR you’re going to get is when someone does something great. […] 
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We won’t put [negative happenings] out there. They will keep it quiet. They’ll do 
everything to keep it quiet.
Because of the regional campuses’ freedom to develop procedures that address the needs of their 
student population, this participant felt the review team was nevertheless able to make significant 
inroads in Glensborough’s efforts to address issues of sexual violence and promote justice. Her 
role as dissenter did not ingratiate her with the higher system level Title IX reform leaders. 
However, at a campus level, she has been able to open up conversations and advocate for her 
underserved population. In her words “it took bitching - big time” to make inroads because “you 
guys [senior administration] don’t get it.” While there was evidence during her interview that 
this director had been a nonconformist during her administrative career, stirring the pot to “fight 
the fight,” she also vocalized her experience that women’s voices on campus were still not being 
heard. Despite inroads the review team was having advancing the visibility of Title IX issues and 
improvements in response protocols, Patricia spoke of the long road still ahead, the lack of 
adequate resources being invested in programming, and a culture of silencing staff by keeping 
communication down. Her examples provide evidence of successful, localized campus 
programming and support for students. However, her insight also situates such advances within a 
larger, fragmented system struggling to move the university into Title IX compliance. 
Tundell’s review team appears to have been kept in check by a vocal social justice 
advocate who, through twenty years of professional experience, has been actively working to 
raise awareness around gender based violence on campus. Having heard rumblings about the 
idea of a Title IX/DCL review team, this participant sought out the university president to 
“[make] clear that I wanted to be a part of the conversation.” After being appointed to the team, 
the participant intentionally kept issues of gender stereotyping at the forefront of the group’s 
attention so that the team would not fall into female complainant, male perpetrator binary 
119
thinking. “I think there was an attention to that [sex stereotyping] mostly cause I wouldn’t let 
anyone forget about it.” A number of team members independently corroborate the non-
conforming additions brought to the table by this participant. Ivy commended him for “hear[ing] 
and bring[ing] back into the room” concerns from historically excluded student groups. Priya 
recalled his important role in calling review team members to task to ensure revisions to the 
policy language were gender neutral and accommodating. Charlotte described “some reality [he] 
brought back [to the team] to help us understand” issues of gender violence beyond the cursory 
‘he said/she said’ narrative of unreciprocated, drunken sexual encounters. Charlotte characterized 
his contributions as very focused on, and vocal about, the needs and circumstances of non-
traditional students, saying: 
[He brought] a perspective that we really needed to hear. There was never the sense of, 
“oh no here goes [this participant] again, let him finish and then we’ll get back to the real 
stuff.”  It was okay, we need to hear what [he] has to say and given committees, I find 
that pretty remarkable. 
The team chairperson also recognized the importance of this participant’s non-conforming 
vantage point:
[He’s] an amazing advocate for folks from all sorts of backgrounds. Now this was all on 
[his] back but [he], I think, very happily helped make sure the conversation included 
folks of marginalized identities and helped us put in the gender space talk about same sex 
relationships or trans-identified folks, so this wasn’t sort of pigeonholed as some kind of 
women’s or heterosexual issue, so at that level that was fantastic.   
When the team did not agree with his contributions and he felt compelled that this point of view 
be heard, he wrote dissenting opinions on those particular decision points, addressing why he 
was not in agreement with the majority. These dissentions were provided to the president for 
consideration when the team submitted the revised policy for review.
Other review team members did not always appreciate this participant’s view, however, 
and the manner in which he presented it. Bruce spoke of the participant being “overly protective” 
120
and “overly assertive” of marginalized identities to the point where  “he would get into conflicts 
periodically with people.” Despite these tensions, Bruce recognized that this participant: 
Played a very important role and had we not had him there, probably the whole issue of 
[gender nonconformity], I mean it would have been taken into consideration, but 
probably not nearly as much. So I think even though he had to frequently wave his flag so 
hard that the pole broke, I think it was an important move for him to be there. Initially, I 
was annoyed by it and then later I realized that that was his role, like I was playing my 
role, he was playing his role.  
Like the dissenters from Adhemar and Glensborough, Tundell’s dissenter brought 
alternative ways of thinking to the team’s attention. These dissenting views created new mental 
maps for the team to consider. Not only were these view points incorporated into the teams’ 
current interactions, but the nonconforming opinions impacted behavioral patterns that team 
members will bring with them to future interactions. The leadership role played by the dissenters 
is an important one, providing alternative ways of thinking about policies and services in 
organizational structures designed to take into account the needs of traditional students, which do 
not necessarily encompass solutions for people with non-traditional needs (Bess & Dee, 2012; 
Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences Congress, 2016; Shankar, 2016). Data from 
these dissenters also provides evidence that any institutional member can be a change agent 
capable of contributing to organizational transformation on campus (Kezar, 2001).   
Conclusion
Leadership in organizations is often perceived as originating from the top and permeating 
the organization through a leader’s distinct leadership style (such as transformational, 
transactional, autocratic, servant). But leadership is complex and multifaceted, interacting with 
and influencing the organization in many ways (Andre & Christopher, 2005; Burke, 2006; 
Cameron & Lavine, 2006; Kamler, 2009; Tiina, 2005). The information presented in this chapter 
provides evidence of important and distinct leadership within the university review teams at four 
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different levels. Each one - idea champion, facilitator, doer, and dissenter - is fundamental to the 
development of innovative ideas and problem solving that move change forward in universities 
(Kezar, 2014). Multiple leaders playing multiple roles is one element identified in the literature 
as helping to move an organization from successful performance to spectacular performance 
(Cameron & Lavine, 2006). Participants from many of this study’s leadership categories worked 
across different levels, directing an array of skills toward separate goals. Whether the processes 
undertaken by these three institutions represent spectacular performance is too early to know. 
Time will tell whether these institutions’ revised policies will stand up to legal challenges from 
disgruntled parties, compliance demands from the Office for Civil Rights, and public opinion. A 
larger sample from the field would be necessary to see how they compare to processes 
undertaken at other universities. However, as the findings from this research begin to inform the 
study’s research questions, the importance of leadership emerges as a critical feature in the 
dynamic process of negotiating institutional policy and constructing compliance. 
The leadership roles played by the idea champions, facilitators, doers, and dissenters 
differed in their intent and objectives. This chapter established that certain leaders across 
multiple organizational positions played vital roles in the review team’s success. The following 
chapter addresses a second interpersonal dynamic to emerge from the research data, that of 
collaboration. Organizational scholars have frequently identified collaboration as an important 
element in producing positive benefits for both the organization and for social gain (Berger-
Walliser, 2011; Cameron & Lavine, 2006; Cameron & McNaughtan, 2014; Siedel, 2002; Siedel 
& Haapio, 2010, 2011). As Chapter 6 conveys, these leaders depended on collaboration in their 
efforts to successfully fulfill the team’s charge. How they fostered collaboration among members 
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with divergent interests, and reached agreement on an outcome, is presented in the following 
chapter.
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Chapter 6 – Leveraging Collaboration to Enhance Opportunity
The ability to engage others in collective action and induce participants to cooperate is an 
essential component in establishing, sustaining, and challenging order in organizational life 
(Fligstein, 2001b; Meyer & Rowan, 2006). Institutional actors are often responsible for helping 
groups decide what their interests and identities are, and engaging in negotiations across groups. 
It is the social skill of critical actors to induce cooperation that allows groups to work (Fligstein, 
2001b). Skilled strategic actors provide the cultural frames that motivate others, producing, 
reproducing, and transforming systems of meaning within organizational fields (Fligstein, 2001b; 
Giddens, 1984). When actors engage in cooperative and non-hierarchical relationships negotiated 
in an ongoing communicative process with multi-directional communication flows, adoption of 
new practices and norms is strengthened (Lawrence et al., 2002). The level of involvement of the 
collaborators, manifested by deep interactions and information exchange between participants, as 
well as the entrenchment of multiple interests and parties, are characteristics that lead to the 
highest potential for new practices and norms to diffuse beyond the boundaries of the 
collaboration (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Flynn, n.d.; Lawrence et al., 2002).    
The proactive law framework complements institutional theory’s contention that 
collaboration among institutional actors is instrumental in establishing new norms, 
understandings, and practice designed to produce innovative results. A fundamental assertion of 
proactive practice is that collaboration between lawyers and subject-matter experts in addressing 
legal issues affecting the organization serves to strengthen interpersonal relationships, promote 
ethical behavior, resolve problems, foster sustainability, and advance constructive outcomes 
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benefiting the organization and society (Berger-Walliser, 2011). Decision-making in this model 
requires the ability to develop new ideas and concepts from the contributions of diverse 
institutional actors with subject-matter expertise. Early cross-professional collaboration and 
understanding, especially between legal professionals and professionals from other disciplines, is 
encouraged to reach common goals and avoid problems (Berger-Walliser; 2011; Siedel & 
Haapio, 2011). Collaboration, as conceived by proactive law scholars, promotes creative 
thinking, problem-solving, desirable results, and sustainable relationships (Berger-Walliser; 
2011; Siedel & Haapio, 2010, 2011). Although the current study set out to examine the nature of 
legal and non-legal professionals’ cooperation in this review process, the results represent the 
perspectives of the universities’ non-legal (and predominantly student affairs) review team 
members, as lawyers involved in these teams declined to be interviewed.       
Decision-making and policy negotiation processes in higher education often include a 
wide range of constituents drawing on specialties and expertise reaching across the institution. 
Institutional actors, especially decision makers, managers, and leaders, must continually balance 
numerous constituent interests and induce cooperation among them. Where work groups 
facilitate efficient cross-departmental interactions, the overall quality of organizational decisions 
can be improved. Conversely, poorly functioning groups can delay decisions and hinder new 
ways of thinking (Bess & Dee, 2012; Fligstein, 2001b). Tapping into critical issues through 
multiple forms of vision, practice, control, advocacy, expertise, and collaboration are important 
components for organizational success (Berger-Walliser; 2011; Cameron & Lavine, 2006; Siedel 
& Haapio, 2011; Taylor & Varner, 2009). In addition to these foundational elements, emerging 
research on the stumbling blocks universities face addressing issues of campus sexual assault 
also recognize the importance of creating structures that consider a range of nontraditional needs 
125
and ensuring that those making policy decisions have expertise in sexual assault issues (Shankar, 
2016). 
Where multiple interpretations of organizational reality exist, leaders are likely to 
encounter conflict. Bess and Dee (2012) emphasize the need for leaders to understand a problem 
through different frames in order to facilitate collaborative approaches to decision making that 
do not marginalize different points of view. Research suggests mixing people with different 
perspectives, experiences, and expertise to work together on teams produces more innovative 
results (Bess & Dee, 2012; Davidson, 2011). Creating the conditions for interaction and 
collaboration that foster innovation requires organizational investment (Kim, 2012). This chapter 
examines whether and how participants experienced collaboration as members of the review 
team. As the study’s theoretical framework has established, cross-professional collaboration is 
considered a key component to the team achieving desired objectives. Collaboration is regarded 
as helping to promote creative thinking, problem-solving, desirable results, and sustainable 
relationships that enable the organization to reach its goals while creating benefits for itself, 
individuals, and society at large (Berger-Walliser; 2011; Cameron & Lavine, 2006; Siedel & 
Haapio, 2011).
Building Trust
Composition of review teams varied by institutions, with no two universities relying on 
the same configuration for its post DCL review and decision making process. As described 
earlier in Chapter 4, Organizational Contexts: Research Sites, a variety of student affairs 
professionals, faculty, students, lawyers, consultants, and community members were called upon 
to serve on the review teams because of their connection to, or expertise in, issues related to 
sexual assault and university functioning. Small clusters of members had prior experience 
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working together at their university. For the most part, however, the teams brought together 
members across campus and from the community who had no prior professional relationship. To 
make progress in their efforts to review and revise campus policies and protocols addressing 
sexual violence, members needed to find common ground and develop trust in each other. Idea 
champions promoted shared visions for the team amid initially tense and conflict-ridden 
environments beset by uncertainty, mistrust, disagreement, adversarial positioning, and public 
scrutiny of their actions. Given the power and politics of having “a lot of egos involved, a lot of 
heavy hitters on campus that have a lot of stake in what the policy is and what it could be,” this 
was not an easy feat. The layers of complexity involved in the review and revision process 
unfolded to the teams as they delved deeper into their charge. One director’s perception 
illustrates these tensions: 
There’s so many considerations [in managing campus sexual violence issues and process] 
that I think it takes really a team of bright and dedicated people. […] It takes people that 
are talented, committed, bright, can think through and around very complicated issues, 
legally complicated, socially complicated, politically complicated, legislatively 
complicated. I can’t think of a single, simple thing surrounding campus sexual assault.  
Developing trust within the team to work through these complexities was very important. As one 
participant observed, this did not involve elaborate trust building experiences, such as going “to a 
high ropes course […], but there was a lot of trust building.” Rather, trust building was 
accomplished by bringing team members together frequently (often off-campus), allowing 
members to share their values and commitment to the issues, “learning each other’s particular 
lenses,” humanizing participants by speaking of interests and families, communicating 
information openly, exhibiting flexibility in the process, and establishing a collective goal 
backed by the team.  
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All three teams spoke of rough starts working together at the beginning of the process. 
Members recalled initially butting heads, with clashes over “what does this mean and how can 
we apply this to certain situations” frequent in the early meetings. Most concur they “eventually 
became comfortable with each other” after “assess[ing] everyone’s skills and abilities and what 
they bring to the table and what their inclinations are and what they want to get out of the policy 
or out of their membership on the committee.” One participant describes Adhemar’s process as 
becoming more collaborative once time pressures kicked in and the role individual contributors 
could make took shape: 
It became collaborative in knowing that, okay we’re on a timeline here, we need to work 
together rather than working against each other and it wasn’t really that we worked 
against each other in any kind of way, it was just misunderstandings and 
miscommunication and really in sharing that we were given everything, all the 
information possible so that we can make, or create a policy that makes sense. And so 
that collaboration was between student life office staff, as well as faculty, the faculty, I 
think they played a pivotal role in terms of the language and revising the language and 
then the students, they’ve obviously been coming back to that and making sure that it 
wasn’t too much into legalese, I guess you could say, and so that’s where we really saw 
collaboration.
A different participant from Adhemar expressed that once the rough start was behind them, and 
the team saw evidence of their revision and decision making process working - the doers 
producing drafts and running them by constituents, incorporating and vetting feedback, the larger 
team providing input reflected in draft revisions – the team “built that sort of collaboration or 
commitment to being people who trusted each other, we didn’t worry about it [the formula that 
we had created] after that.” Overwhelmingly, participants spoke of turbulent beginnings and 
initial political jockeying that gave way to teams eventually becoming “comfortable with each 
other.”    
Tundell in particular had large trust and collaboration hurdles to overcome. Many 
participants from Tundell spoke of experiencing a toxic, dysfunctional climate at the team’s first 
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few meetings. The university’s actions had been in the spotlight before the team convened. In the 
court of public opinion, Tundell was being dragged through the mud for inadequate institutional 
responses to numerous sexual assault allegations. Once the review team was charged and began 
convening, meetings were open to the public in an attempt at establishing transparency moving 
forward. Student activists attended the meetings in protest, lawyers attended with an eye toward 
bolstering their clients’ cases, and journalists noted every word uttered. Review team members 
reported feeling guarded and mindful of their words. As one participant recounts: 
Those first few meetings, having the media there, I know I was very mindful about what I 
was going to say and when I was going to say something or not say something. I felt like 
you had to be even conscious of your non-verbals in a way that felt pressured, I felt some 
pressure around that.
Another concurs, adding that members often did not truly express their opinions during these 
early meetings:
If you’re not used to hav[ing] the camera that’s kind of peering over your shoulder or 
knowing that a journalist is writing every single word or could be writing every single 
word that you’re sharing, over time I think it just became a part of this is going to be what 
we’re going to have to deal with. Do I think people were very mindful that everything 
being shared has the potential to be absorbed by the media? Oh yeah, I think we were all 
very aware. And then sometimes you kind of parse your words very carefully and then on 
occasion, when you take a break between topics or restroom break, whatever that might 
be for yourself, you might pull someone aside and say, okay so I just wanted to share, this 
is really what I wanted to say, but I just don’t want it to be voiced in such a way that the 
media is going to grab ahold of it so we found different ways to be able to make sure that 
things that needed to be said were said.
These “different ways” to communicate included long breaks where members could talk to each 
other more freely. Even though journalists, protesters, and students’ lawyers would also be in the 
breakout spaces, pockets of private conversations could nevertheless take place. Numerous 
participants cite the breaks, especially those spent sharing a meal, as important opportunities to 
build trust and communicate their insight and feelings about the issues raised in the meetings.
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Getting together with a few members of the review team, often the next day or shortly 
thereafter, to deconstruct the all-team meeting and check in on one another also proved to be an 
important method through which team members build trust and enhanced communication. One 
participant provides insight on the emotional, intellectual, and physical toll the all-team meetings 
took and the significance of meeting informally in smaller groups afterward to come down from 
them:
To be able to, even the day after, to have coffee with someone, so [the review team] 
meeting is starting at nine, we don’t get done until four, we have lunch, and my brain is 
just about to explode, just about to explode. You’ve heard a billion and a half words 
today and my head’s going to explode. It’s not that I particularly struggled with anything, 
it was just a lot, it was a long time to keep your attention as close to 100 as you can. To 
be able to go with one or two people and have coffee the next day, just think, what did 
you hear?, what did YOU hear?, cause I know what I heard. I think I know what I heard, 
did you hear this too? And to be able to check in with one another. And at lunch for a few 
moments every now and again, you’d hear people going, I hope I didn’t hurt your 
feelings, or thank you so much for your support of my position. So we had a few 
moments where we could kind of be human with one another. I think too one of the 
things that professionals don’t do in this business well enough is take care of themselves 
and really take, so you need a break from that intense group work and we’d break into 
our smaller groups and have our pat on the back and cry moments and that kind of thing.  
    
Because the meetings were long and intense and the scrutiny was high, breaks provided a safer 
environment in which to communicate and let one’s guard down. As another participant 
explains:
A lot happened during the breaks, a lot of conversation happened during those 
refreshment breaks and I think a lot of that conversation, some of it was related to the 
policy but some of it was just people getting to know each other. And I think the 
development of the personal relationships that happened had everything to do with the 
work being more collegial.
To some members, the breaks were strategic opportunities to address a select few and advance 
certain issues, whether that be checking in on their wellbeing or forming alliances on certain 
issues. Others did not consciously recognize the importance of the breaks at the time, but did 
anticipate them:
130
So much stuff happened on the breaks because we would be in the spotlight and 
everybody would be “being” and then the spotlight would go away and you go, “can you 
believe, omg, do you believe they said that, what are we going to do about that?” And 
then we would […] come back, but then we would reengage in a way that made it work 
well. It’s funny, I hadn’t thought about that, I looked forward to the breaks because the 
breaks were where I could say what I really thought and I did look forward to the breaks 
a lot.
Breaks were repeatedly upheld as important catalysts for discussion and building trust among 
Tundell’s team members. 
This crystallizing of relationships and establishing trust among the team members took 
time. Most Tundell participants speak of the rough start lasting approximately three meetings. 
They attribute this turbulence to the negative campus climate existing around these issues at the 
time, the shutting down of student voices in the meetings as powerful administrators attempted to 
control the conversation, the presence of certain decision makers on the team vested in past 
policies and reluctant to move forward in a different direction, and an unclear vision of the 
team’s end product. Initially charged with reviewing policy and protocols to expose deficiencies 
and suggest improvements, many team members felt their broad charge provided an opportunity 
to do more, to actually draft the revisions and transform existing policy and programming. After 
a particularly brutal third meeting, the committee was derailed. As the chair recounts:
The first two meetings went very smoothly, it was a lot of background work, a lot of 
what’s kind of happening at the federal level, what’s happening on campus, and where do 
we need to go and sort of like mapping the terrain for folks and everybody played so 
nicely and everybody was a just good meeting responder. And then I think it was literally 
like the third meeting was when the gloves came off and I think I had an agenda where 
we were going to start actually exploring this very specific thing and get to some 
answers. And everybody just pushed back and I think it was supposed to be a 6-hour 
meeting and it was a day-long meeting and I don’t think we got much past welcomes and 
introductions before everybody said, “yeah I don’t trust this process, I don’t believe the 
university is actually going to listen to what we have to say, I’m not sure my 
contributions are going to be meaningful in this space because I don’t feel empowered.”  
And we just heard that.  
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In this meeting, Tundell’s idea champion and facilitator let the anger and disagreement play out 
for part of the meeting, then connected the team back by voicing the concerns she heard and 
focusing on members’ shared values and goals. 
I think at one point after the first big gush of that [the discord at the third meeting] and it 
seemed to subside and I thought, okay that’s very meaningful and we need to move and 
do something to address all of that, and for now let’s look back at our agendas, see where 
we can go and figure this out, and it just felt like we can’t do anything on the agenda, we 
need to keep going down this path and see what people need to keep saying to us and so 
we did. We spent the whole meeting letting people say what I’m concerned about, what I 
don’t trust, what I need to feel I can contribute. And so before we could get to the 
expertise we needed to build this feeling of safety, security, value for every individual 
member of that [team].
A turning point came in the fourth meeting. Strategizing on how to move the team 
forward, it was at this meeting that the idea champion introduced the process of modified 
consensus (discussed in chapter 5). This tool provided a means to connect team members’ 
individual input in the team’s revisions and reform. Decisions would not be made unilaterally, 
but rather as a collective unit with all voices supported and heard. 
Once all that spilled out [the feelings of mistrust voiced at the third meeting], we came 
back the following meeting and said, okay here’s the deal. We’ll do this by consensus. 
And we will not append anyone’s name to a decision that somebody doesn’t vote for. So 
if we don’t get to consensus and we have to go yes, no, dissent, affirm kinds of decisions, 
we’ll mark that in our recommendations and you can write a dissenting opinion much like 
in a supreme court and attach that to the document.
Members recognized the fourth meeting and decision making by consensus as a defining 
moment that gave power to all team members and shifted the climate from one of hostility to one 
of working together with renewed confidence in the revision process. 
This example helps to illustrate one of the challenges Tundell’s facilitator overcame in 
building trust: reestablishing that everyone’s voice be heard in the meetings. From turbulent and 
mistrustful beginnings, she created an environment where all members, regardless of their 
institutional position or positional authority, felt their opinion was important to the deliberations. 
132
The facilitator managed the resentment, anger, emotions, pain, and numerous factions in the 
room by establishing a tone of civility “even when we were in vehement disagreement.” 
Overwhelmingly, participants from all three institutions expressed that each team member had 
the opportunity to contribute to the team’s process and be heard. They did not perceive any one 
group as carrying more clout than another. This is an especially surprising finding given the 
convergence of two of the study’s guiding frameworks. First, that compliance professionals, 
especially lawyers, who carry the responsibility of interpreting and diffusing law throughout the 
organization have inherent authority in organizational influence (Daane, 1985; Edelman, 2016; 
Edelman et al., 2011; Edelman et al., 1999; Munn, 1998; Sitkin & Bies, 1994). Second, that 
legalistic decision criteria often takes priority over other organizational, interpersonal, and social 
factors relevant to organizational decision making (Bies & Tyler, 1993; Feldman & Levy, 1994; 
Foote, 1984; McLendon & Hearn, 2006; Sitkin & Bies, 1994; Turkington, 1986). These 
participants’ experiences contradict those assertions. This study’s participants, none of whom 
represented the universities’ legal interests and most of whom were not legally trained, perceived 
themselves as legitimate decision makers influencing university policy. Members with less 
positional authority, such as students and junior administrators, expressed feeling respected and 
validated as contributors to the process. The team members’ perceptions of cross-professional 
collaboration and understanding with lawyers, both in-house general counsel and external 
consultants, proved to be an essential element in reaching common goals and avoiding problems.
Relationship Between Lawyers and Subject-Matter Experts
Participants almost unilaterally extolled the importance of legal counsel in the protocol 
and policy revision process. “Having the experts at the table in terms of what we needed to do 
legally was helpful.” Participants expressed that legal counsel, for the most part, provided 
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necessary information to the team on what post DCL legal standards were understood to be. 
Lawyers neither dominated conversations nor attempted to steer team members in particular 
directions. At some points, they had the strongest voice in the conversation, while other times 
they sat back and listened. Members qualify the few times lawyers were more dominant at the 
meetings as being important in those moments. One participant from Adhemar frames it as 
follows:   
There was, again, really a need for legal compliance to have a strong voice at the table 
but I would not say that it was an overwhelming voice and certainly I felt as someone 
who was bringing the expertise of working with survivors of sexual assault and that voice 
was respected at the table in that my contributions did really shape a lot of the final 
choices of our interim policy and of our final policy.
Adhemar’s most vocal dissenter, who expressed that her own personal dealings with post DCL 
complaints felt more legalistic and rigid than before the revisions, did not experience any power 
imbalances or legalistic behavior from lawyers on the review team.  
I think everybody’s very well aware that legal counsel was in the room and that was 
important and their voice mattered in the conversation. […] I think we worked so well 
with general counsel that they’re pretty used to us pushing back on them and I do 
remember some pretty robust active discussions [especially around] what is the right 
thing to do versus what would least expose the university to any risk? […] I didn’t feel 
that we were being told by the lawyers what we needed to do. The lawyers in the room 
did not dominate the meetings, they were one of the voices at the table.
This collaborative, interdisciplinary relationship between lawyers, subject-matter experts, 
faculty, students, and other campus constituents exemplifies the shift in legal thinking at the 
center of the proactive law framework: That to move beyond minimal compliance and transform 
legal issues into organizational and social opportunity, dialogue between legal and non-legal 
professionals from across the organization must be enhanced. General counsel’s role proved to 
be a vital component in Adhemar’s development of creative solutions within legally appropriate 
boundaries. Participants’ accounts of collaboration between general counsel and members with 
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subject-matter expertise, working together to innovatively examine a multiplicity of issues 
implicated in campus sexual assault, provide evidence of Adhemar’s interdisciplinary decision 
making model underlying the team’s ability to achieve organizational goals while creating 
benefits for itself, students, the campus community, and society at large. 
The relationship with lawyers on Tundell’s review team was structurally different than at 
Adhemar. Similarly to Adhemar, there were legally trained members, not practicing as lawyers 
or representing the university in legal matters, on the review teams. Rather, these professionals 
merited a place at the review team table because of their non-legal professional role at the 
university, for example as senior administrators in equity, diversity, or student affairs divisions. 
Tundell had representation from its general counsel’s office on the review team. It also had 
outside legal consultants. Tundell was the only one of the three participating institutions to hire 
legal consultants to provide the review team with information and advice collected from their 
expertise in developing policies nationwide with universities in response to post DCL 
compliance requirements. Tundell hired the legal consultants before the review team had formed. 
The consultants had an opportunity to meet with campus constituents to understand campus 
issues and concerns before the work of the review team began, conducting focus groups and 
public discussions. They brought this information to the review team, which provided a starting 
point for the review team to understand what constituents felt was broken, what had gone wrong 
with previous policy, and how the university might move forward. There was also some 
speculation among members that the consultants were hired to control the negative media frenzy 
over institutional missteps and Office for Civil Rights Title IX complaints. 
Tundell’s review team chair had initially hoped the consultants would lead the team. She 
realized, however, within the first few meetings “it became clear that wasn’t going to be what the 
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group would accept, [… it] was clear that I needed to run the meetings.” Initially team members 
did not trust the consultants. Possibly as a result of the media spotlight or constituent mistrust 
that university interests were being prioritized over student interests, the member from the 
general counsel’s office maintained a low profile on the team. Often the chair, consultants, and 
general counsel met separately to make sense of the legal ambiguities raised in order to bring a 
more considered understanding of the legal issues to the team. As the chair describes: 
If they [the lawyers on the review team] didn’t agree about what kind of things we could 
agree to in the room, there was no meeting to be had. If your lawyers aren’t at least on the 
same page going into a room, then we can’t get anywhere as a [review team] ‘cause we 
can’t establish what I call the playing field. We don’t know where our boundaries are if 
we’re all saying, “but the feds say this, but our state policy says this and where are we?”  
So we started having some pre-game meetings basically with the policy side of the house 
and this kind of became real transparent to the task force because we started cleaning up 
our shop a little bit because the rest of the task force would just have to sit back if we 
didn’t all agree on what the playing field or prescribed structure we’re operating within 
was. And so we would have these small policy group meetings every other week or so 
where we’d say, okay we’re coming up on the need to talk about hearings and then we’d 
have to say, “what does the federal government say about hearings, what does our state 
policy say about hearings, how do we frame this for the task force so it’s 
understandable,” because the last thing the non-lawyer facilitator wants to be is the 
person standing in front of the room going, “I don’t know, can somebody just tell us,” 
which is where I found myself once or twice. And I found that they won’t just tell you in 
a meeting because there are lots of varying opinions on that, so we started falling into 
alignment with this sort of like, okay let’s talk before the meeting, are there any issues 
that we need to make sure we fully understand, is there any opinion we need to get from 
somebody else, do we need to think this through, and then we could bring it to the 
[review team] and then we would know what we were trying to do. But that was how I 
think we balanced the legal opinion piece. I got them [the lawyers] to a space, but we got 
to a space where they would at least fight this out beforehand. And then we would have 
some kind of robust discussion about what we [the review team] were trying to do.
The consultants largely framed the legal parameters for the team’s consideration. Members 
report not feeling constrained by those boundaries. As one member recalls:
I think it allowed the whole committee to get educated as we went along so the attorneys 
really did a good job of saying, here’s where we are and here’s where this has to be. We 
sort of had a push and pull balance between here’s what we would like ideally as a 
committee from our various backgrounds, what we think are best for students, on one 
hand, and what we have to do legally. And those weren’t necessarily always in 
136
opposition, as much as possible we found places where those things worked or we 
figured out within the bounds of the law how much we could move to a place where we 
could do not only what was legally required but go beyond that to serve students best.  
And so that balance was just so important moving forward. As I said, I think it also 
helped that diversity of different folks around the table to get on the same page because at 
the end of the day, it wasn’t like we were saying, we can have apples or oranges, it was 
sort of like, okay we’re going to have apples, we have Fuji and we have Gala. And so the 
boundaries were smaller so within that, the decisions that we had to make weren’t infinite 
and we were able to say, okay here’s what we have to do, how can we gild this a little bit 
to make it better?
This perspective was similarly held throughout the team. As another member relates:
In terms of the lawyers in the room, I think they provided legal advice when we were 
perhaps going down a route that we weren’t allowed to go down per the law but I think it 
very much came back to the setup at the start which was, here are the parameters that we 
have around each issue, you can decide between 1-2-3 or anywhere between 1-2-3, but 
you can’t really go beyond that in any direction and I think the [review team] and the 
attorneys on the [review team] did a really great job of not necessarily prescribing this is 
what you need to do and instead said, well look this is what the federal law says we need 
to do and we can think about how we might want to do that from a structural standpoint, 
but this is what we have to do.
Members felt that the consultants held no greater power than anyone else on the team. Rather, 
they provided a range of allowable options. Another team member added this perspective: 
[The consultants were] more of that voice like, you can’t do that or we have to do this, or 
we’re not sure about those people making a decision play around this right now or let’s 
get some more information for you so that you can be fully informed. So they were more 
of the people, other than the chair, who were kind of saying, here’s what you can and 
can’t do. Like we hear you and understand your values and what you’re trying to get to 
and here’s the limits of that.
Having the consultant’s legal expertise and familiarity with policy developments from the higher 
education field provided a “tremendous opportunity to mine all of that expertise for solutions.” 
Solutions, according to Tundell participants, that helped move the group beyond merely 
considering minimal DCL compliance obligations toward a much-needed “truth and 
reconciliation” process for its campus. By “digging into layers of […] hard, complicated issues,” 
the review team produced a revised policy through a process that structurally met many of the 
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conditions identified in this study’s conceptual framework as necessary to producing innovative 
and transformative results. Conditions evident in Tundell’s post DCL revision process included 
input from a wide inclusion of partners (McGlynn, Westmarland, & Godden, 2012) who are 
knowledgeable about, and maintain an investment in, addressing campus sexual misconduct 
(Shankar, 2016; Taylor & Varner, 2009) and are key players in the development process 
(Wandersman, Duffy, Flaspohler, Noonan, Lubell, Stillman, & Saul 2008). In addition, the team 
functioned in an environment that sought clarity on the issues, shared information throughout the 
process, promoted transparency among members and campus stakeholders, and maintained 
flexibility as it considered options (Koss, et al., 2014; McGlynn et al., 2012; Siedel, 2002; Siedel 
& Haapio, 2010, 2011;Wandersman et al, 2008). 
 Glensborough’s experiences with legal counsel was more removed. Initially, the 
university’s general counsel did not have a representative on the review team. As the team’s idea 
champion explains:
Prior to the DCL, any student affairs work, unless it was a lawsuit that was imminent, 
general counsel just didn’t have the time to pay much mind to what was going on in 
student affairs. […] This [Title IX and DCL compliance] isn’t their expertise. You’re left 
to doing a lot on your own.  
Until structural changes began to materialize as university leaders took steps to address DCL 
compliance obligations, Glensborough’s review team worked largely independently from 
university legal counsel. Even when this structural change led to the appointment of a general 
counsel at the flagship campus to coordinate all the compliance initiatives across the system, this 
designated leader had little expertise in such matters. Trusting in the progress and expertise of 
Glensborough’s review team, their idea champion conveys that this newly appointed head was 
“relatively hands-off,” accepting that “you understand this better than I do, you have the support 
of [other campus leaders].” Glensborough’s idea champion worked on expanding this 
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professional rapport with the general counsel heading the reform efforts. Similar to accounts 
from Tundell, the greatest inroads in building this relationship occurred during breaks or outside 
of meetings when the conversation could revolve around personal stories, such as children or 
holidays. Letting their guards down, these professionals - coming from very different 
perspectives - could then try to take another look at one of the reform issues and talk it through, 
reconsidering options. This approach took time and was described as “exhausting”. However, it 
also materialized in structural transformations, leaving Glensborough’s idea champion to reflect: 
“No one’s really given up on the idea, or given up on the practice, of trying to be sure this is 
done the right way.”  
Once a local general counsel was appointed to the review team, this representative 
reportedly “wouldn’t go to the meetings, he kept sending law fellows.” Moreover, he reportedly 
did not read the team’s documents in advance and was taken aback by all of the proposed 
changes - endorsed by team members and vetted with faculty, staff, and students - once a vote 
before faculty council for ratification was being called. The review team’s idea champion and 
doer, who had been hired to bring Glensborough within DCL compliance and was making 
inroads locally and at a broader system level reforming policies, revamping protocols, re-
envisioning training and response practices, and improving delivery of services, recalls the 
general counsel team members telling him “this over-professionalization of your field is totally 
unnecessary.” This left the idea champion feeling that “our attorneys just don’t get student 
affairs.” 
Fast forward through two years of intense work across the system’s campuses to better 
address issues of sexual assault and understand the scope of obligations universities have to 
address as a result of intensifying regulatory oversight (Clery, VAWA, Campus SaVE, FERPA), 
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the relationship between general counsel and student affairs has changed. Legal counsel “quickly 
had to shift when [top university leaders were] telling all the counsel, “this [current efforts 
addressing the issues] isn’t going anywhere” Since then, Glensborough’s general counsel and the 
review team idea champion have forged a better relationship. Reportedly, the same general 
counsel member is “now sort of singing our praises, saying all you guys are the experts on this, 
you ought to go on a consulting tour.” Part of this successful turn around may be due to the 
review team’s idea champion and doer’s commitment to analyzing and communicating 
developing compliance and conduct issues through a legal lens in addition to the educational 
process generally favored in student affairs practice. He recognizes the importance of being able 
to “speak the lawyer’s language” and conveying an understanding other institutional pressures at 
play, such as media and communications, expenditure realities, and board of trustee concerns. 
From a pre DCL culture of legal counsel not being terribly involved in student affairs matters to 
a greater post DCL presence, evidence from Glensborough’s study participants points to general 
counsel being only peripherally involved in the organizational transformations that have taken 
place. Instead, the compliance professionals with greater subject-matter expertise, national 
presence, and drive to move the university forward to exceed compliance minimums appear to 
have been more dominant contributors to post DCL institutional policy and programming 
reform.                
Conclusion
Universities frequently function under a collaborative decision making model among 
faculty, administrators, students, even external stakeholders (Bess & Dee, 2012). Findings 
presented in this chapter add to our understanding of cross-departmental collaboration among 
legal and non-legal professionals that promote boundary spanning institutional governance. From 
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a legal catalyst applying pressure on universities to reexamine their sexual violence policies and 
protocols, the three participating institutions in this study demonstrate that thoughtful 
examination of the issues and contemplation of actions the university could take crosses 
traditionally held legal and student affairs silos. Collaborations between competent legal counsel 
and professionals with subject-matter expertise across the organization developed forward 
thinking solutions taking a broader range of considerations into account. The expertise and 
judgment of scholars and practitioners engaged in multiple dimensions of campus sexual 
violence provide not only a clearer understanding of the scope of factors involved, but insight 
into the usefulness and shortcomings of the university’s existing policies and practices, as well as 
their alignment with institutional values and agreement with national standards.   
Collaborations across the three universities occurred both strategically and organically. 
Strategically, critical personnel were chosen as members of the DCL compliance review teams. 
Leaders on the team were deliberate about building trust and establishing shared goals. 
Organically, relationships developed between certain members. As team members discerned 
their colleagues’ motivations and moved through areas of agreement and disagreement, alliances 
took shape. Although trust was slow to develop among most factions, the pressure to produce 
solutions that responded to their particular campus’ needs propelled them forward. Surprisingly, 
participants from non-legal backgrounds report feeling that the institutional interest of 
minimizing future legal problems and risks for the university did not take priority over 
developing strategies and solutions that considered students’ interests or campus safety. Lawyers 
were not perceived to have a stronger voice or greater power on the team than non-lawyer 
members. By supporting a wide range of expertise - from conduct to counseling, prevention to 
health services - these three universities promoted an advanced understanding of issues involved 
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in addressing and combating campus sexual assault beyond a legalistic compliance perspective, 
improving how their university understands and responds to issues of campus sexual violence. 
Balancing diverse concerns underlying the multiple issues implicated in campus sexual 
violence is complicated. It involves more than having an updated code, some investigators, and 
resources to provide to students. While conflicting values and interests often seem to be pitted 
against each other - with institutional concern over risk management, as opposed to student 
interests, dominating public discourse for example (Baker, 2014a; Baker, 2014b; Kingkade, 
2014, 2015; New, 2016b; Newman & Sander, 2014; Russell, 2015; U.S. Senate Subcommittee 
on Financial & Contracting Oversight, 2014; Yoffe, 2014) - I did not find evidence of this 
tension from the study participants. Rather, the teams’ interdisciplinary collaborations – with 
high levels of partner involvement and institutional embeddedness - provide evidence of a 
process that moved each institution beyond minimal DCL compliance toward advancing 
desirable institutional and societal outcomes. The change that results within the boundaries of the 
collaboration, however, does not always diffuse beyond that. The following chapter examines 
specific changes advanced by the review teams, the diffusion of these practices, and the intended 
and unintended positive effects that have resulted from universities’ post DCL efforts to address 
and combat campus sexual violence.  
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Chapter 7 – Driving Institutional Change
In addition to explaining the relationship of actors as leaders in advancing organizational 
innovation and the use of collaboration through interpersonal interactions to realize institutional 
and societal interests while constructing compliance, institutional theory articulates a framework 
for understanding how organizational actions drive field transformation. The main form of 
organizational change considered in institutional theory is that of isomorphic convergence 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Greenwood et al., 2002; Levy, 2006; Scott, 2001). With successful 
deliberations resulting in innovative practices, other institutions begin to examine practices they 
perceive as legitimate. New norms diffuse when these practices are adopted by other 
organizations within the field. Transformation within fields is accelerated when a form of crisis, 
such as the DCL, begins to break down the current order, or arrangements, within the field 
(Fligstein, 2001b). 
The focus of this research study was to examine the dynamic processes undertaken by 
three universities, through its institutional actors, to interpret and respond to a manner of crisis 
presented in the form of contentious compliance obligations. Beyond simply responding to 
minimal DCL requirements, the intent of the study was to understand how these three 
universities used the legal catalysts and subsequent review to advance forward-thinking results to 
enhance opportunity for the institution and its students. The review teams’ actions and responses 
contributed to change occurring on campus.  The policy and protocol review processes in 
response to the DCL were the means, or methods, that enabled the review teams to achieve 
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innovative results. The results were the ends, or outcomes, of these processes. Although this was 
a study that examined ‘means’ rather than analyzing ‘ends’, specific results that the review teams 
achieved are presented in this chapter in order to comprehend their significance in exceeding 
compliance requirements and driving change. 
The review teams’ creative, collaborative, skillful negotiation processes have produced 
policies and practices associated with local and institutional structural elaboration. This chapter 
highlights a selection of innovative outcomes resulting from the review teams’ deliberations and 
policy negotiation further to the DCL, discussing both intended and unintended benefits arising 
from these outcomes. While the national conversation continues to emphasize what universities 
are getting wrong, raising issues of goal displacement, mission drift, and appropriateness of 
universities fulfilling this quasi-criminal justice, investigative, and judicial role (Kelderman, 
2014; Kingkade, 2016; Koss, et al., 2014; New, 2016a, 2016b; Vendituoli, 2014b; Wilson, 
2014a, 2015a, 2015b; Yoffe, 2014), evidence from this study supports that forward-thinking 
university responses, undertaken by actors operating within them, not only shape norms as they 
construct the meaning of DCL compliance, but contribute a public benefit, fulfilling some of the 
DCL’s public policy objectives.
Embracing Specialized Practices Informed by Non-Traditional Sources: Glensborough’s 
Trauma-Informed, Forensic Investigation Techniques 
Evidence corroborating contemplation of issues beyond basic compliance to enhance 
opportunity for the institution and its students is found throughout the three universities in 
different areas. Glensborough, for example, significantly raised standards of practice by 
instigating specialized and widespread training of student affairs personnel in interview and 
investigation techniques. Revised DCL investigation practice at Glensborough focused on 
innovative, research-based methods incorporating an understanding of the neurobiology of 
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trauma with forensic investigation techniques. Drawing from an ever-increasing body of 
knowledge from cognitive science, Glensborough partnered with forensic medical practitioners 
to advance proactive, culturally competent, trauma-informed methods to inform university 
practices. 
Priding itself on being “heavily focused on the quality of the investigation,” 
Glensborough has invested in training both conduct personnel and senior administrators in 
student affairs “in the very best investigative techniques” to improve methods of forensic 
interviewing. Glensborough has adopted aspects of highly specialized methods, initially designed 
to prepare CIA and FBI personnel in interview and interrogation techniques, incorporating them 
into a higher education setting. For example, improving their understanding of behavioral 
analysis, reading body language, and awareness of words used in the interview, has enabled them 
to better recognize features of sexual perpetrators. By integrating such practices into the 
university environment, Glensborough is seeking to brake away from outdated, one dimensional 
training and practice methods, such as the typical rational interview method colloquially dubbed 
‘just the facts, Ma’am,’ in which a description of the suspect, the time frame of the events, and 
other factual pieces of information are pieced together. Rather, the methods Glensborough has 
adopted incorporate a broader three dimensional technique in which the level of fear a person 
experienced, their perception of danger, social media activity, and sensory details associated with 
the event (such as sounds and smells), are all collected as evidence to form part of the 
investigatory package. Because traumatic events can diminish and distort cognitive memory, this 
emerging method stresses the importance of collecting physiological evidence stored in the 
brainstem in addition to physical and testimonial evidence, with specialized interview techniques 
needed to properly retrieve and report such evidence (Campbell, 2014; Strand, 2012).  These 
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science-based and trauma-informed practices in which the harmed student’s welfare is at the 
center of the investigation have been recognized by the United States government as best 
practice in the multi-level investigatory practices of campus police and sexual assault educators, 
practitioners, and community partners involved in the complexity of issues impacting the sexual 
assault of college-age students (Busch-Armendariz, Sulley, & Hill, 2016; Not Alone, 2016). 
Such practices have recently been adopted as the focus of an innovative training curriculum by 
the National Center for Campus Public Safety, a new organizational association for Title IX 
officers and university administrators established by the U.S. Department of Justice in 
partnership with an external campus-safety consulting firm (Brown, 2016). 
In elevating their standard of practice to be informed of, integrate, and disseminate 
forensic interview techniques supporting the scientifically proven neurobiology of trauma, 
members of Glensborough’s review team have consciously challenged and shattered long held 
rape myths as they expand their organizational protocols and processes addressing campus 
sexual assault. As Derek relates, Glensborough’s new approach incorporates emerging thinking 
in higher education on the growing importance of threat assessment and mental health 
considerations:
There are old school student development practices that would have talked to women 
about going out, party-safe tactics, drink smart, walk with friends, that sort of stuff. In 
this work, you just can’t approach student conduct Title IX investigations from that 
traditional student affairs background. So we’ve had to create our own expertise from 
other areas and from multiple discipline areas. We could spend a lot of time talking about 
how the world of mental health is influencing our work now and so we’re spending a lot 
of time learning about threat assessment and risk analysis and we apply that when we’re 
talking about whether or not we have an ongoing risk with the respondent.  
By integrating threat assessment of alleged perpetrators, assessing their danger to complainants 
and the community, and conducting trauma informed interviews, Derek relates that new facts are 
discovered in the investigation phase that would have been missed in pre DCL “old school 
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student development practices.” In order to advance its compliance actions beyond minimal DCL 
standards, Glensborough has adopted multidisciplinary and specialized practices informed by 
non-traditional sources (such as behavioral consultation and the neurobiology of trauma) to 
inform their sexual violence investigation and hearing protocols. Research from the University of 
Texas Austin’s Institute of Domestic Violence & Sexual Assault describes such an approach as 
replacing tradition with science (Busch-Armendariz et al., 2016). While to some this may seem 
like an obvious direction in which to proceed, participants spoke of such advances being on the 
cutting-edge. In fact, many universities continue to engage in “old school” mentalities and 
investigations, creating a chilling effect around allegations of sexual violence. Cases of students 
feeling stonewalled by their university’s responses, hampered in moving forward through the 
school’s Title IX channels, blamed for their behavior preceding the incident (e.g. style of dress, 
alcohol consumed), even receiving threats that proceeding with filing a complaint would 
jeopardize their standing at the university, continue. Recent high profile examples of such action 
can be seen from incidences coming to light at Baylor University (Kelderman & Wilson, 2016), 
Brigham Young University (Healy, 2016; Vertuno, 2016), and Stanford University (Kadnavy, 
2016). 
Expanding Student Agency and Institutional Accountability: Adhemar’s Adoption of an 
Advisory Panel, Resolution by Agreement, and Systematic Evaluations
Adhemar’s most noteworthy contributions to innovative practice center around students’ 
involvement in the process, resolution, and follow-up of sexual violence investigations and 
hearings. Prior to the DCL, investigation of an alleged incident of sexual violence did not 
generally move forward unless the harmed student wanted to move forward. Adhemar felt it was 
being true to its student-centered values by empowering students to take the lead on whether to 
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file a complaint or otherwise proceed through university channels. The release of the 2011 DCL 
raised doubt as to the proper way to address this issue. Guidance from the DCL stipulated that:
Regardless of whether a harassed student, his or her parent, or a third party files a 
complaint under the school’s grievance procedures or otherwise requests action on the 
student’s behalf, a school that knows, or reasonably should know, about possible 
harassment must promptly investigate to determine what occurred and then take 
appropriate steps to resolve the situation. 
Adhemar’s review team describes the post DCL understanding of this aspect of the guidance as 
one in which universities narrowly interpreted the DCL as requiring universities to move forward 
investigating all incidents, regardless of harmed students’ desires to proceed, citing the 
protection of the campus community at all costs, reflecting “a real swing far into the world of 
compliance over more nuanced readings [of the DCL].” Adhemar’s review team felt the DCL 
“likely allowed for campuses to balance survivor interest and needs and rights with campus 
safety.” In an effort to balance its student-centered values and institutional compliance 
obligations, Adhemar’s review team carefully debated the issue and possible actions it could 
take. As Leslie explains: 
We wanted to have there be a mechanism, an approach, so that when we were taking 
action that was not aligned with the desires of the student who was harmed, that we were 
at minimum being very deliberative about that choice, that it was not a knee-jerk reaction, 
that we had a conscious and conscientiousness deliberation as an institution about what 
kinds of harms or risks that action might take place upon the survivor and whether those 
harms or risks were outweighed by the need to address potential community safety 
concerns.  
The team recommended a new organizational structure to evaluate such cases. An advisory panel 
would be created, convening whenever such decisions had to be made. The panel would review 
the situation with the Title IX coordinator and recommend appropriate next steps in balancing 
Adhemar’s student-centered values (such as the harmed student’s interests, needs, and rights in 
their request for anonymity or desire to not move forward lodging a complaint) with due process 
concerns and issues of campus safety. The panel would recommend whether the process needed 
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to move forward despite the student’s wishes and suggest appropriate measures for the Title IX 
coordinator to consider. Ultimately, the decision to proceed rested with the Title IX coordinator. 
Leslie elaborates on why creating such a panel moved Adhemar beyond minimal DCL 
compliance toward a more proactive and accountable consideration of the issues: 
I think certainly our [advisory] panel provides institutional advantage in that that very 
difficult decision about whether or not to move forward with an investigation even in the 
absence of survivor desire is a really fraught one and I think that it is good that there is an 
institutional record of the kinds of deliberations that we undergo prior to making that 
decision, that it’s not one that’s taken lightly and that we really are focusing pretty 
strongly on what the student’s experience is going to be were we to move forward with 
that decision and what other kinds of efforts outside of the investigation can the 
institution do, so really holding ourselves accountable for all the pieces of the Dear 
Colleague Letter, not just the investigations but what other kinds of interventions, what 
other kinds of climate-based actions can we be taking to address this issue, even the 
absence of not being able to follow through with an investigation, I think that that is 
really helpful as well.
Adhemar’s early adoption of an advisory panel model to examine and account for the reasons 
underlying difficult institutional decisions may be one of the isomorphic processes being adopted 
by other universities. As Minn explains:
The [advisory] panel that we created [… is] a really novel way to pause and reflect on 
what we’re hearing from a survivor. That’s something that Leslie and I dreamed up and 
then vetted with the group, and everybody we’ve ever talked to liked it and I think I now 
understand that other schools are copying that and so I’m personally really proud of that.  
I know that that was my idea and Leslie’s idea and if other people are doing it, I think 
that’s great, I think we did it because we thought it would work for our students and I 
continue to think it’s a good model. Like I said, I’m really proud of that.   
Adhemar’s innovative practices also extent to its involvement of complainant and 
respondent students in the sanctioning process. Whereas prior to the DCL conduct personnel 
determined sanctioning, the review team recommended that complainants, respondents, and 
other affected parties collaborate, through the university’s conduct resolution division, on the 
final sanctions. Though the student voice is not a determinative one, it has “real weight,” an 
unusual element in determining sanctions. Leslie regards this uncommon practice as one “which 
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speaks to our commitment to an educational approach that has worked.” Driven to be “a part of 
that leading voice” on best practices, Adhemar is seeking to expand research informed practices 
around sanctioning “to create a body of practice around this issue [… that] will compel us as a 
field to get better at addressing this work.”
In addition to increased agency having input determining sanctions in their own case, 
students are also being asked “to share information about their experience with the process and 
their experience with the outcome.” Adhemar requests this feedback after final resolution of all 
formal university processes to accomplish a number of goals. First, the university is interested in 
gaining a deeper understanding of students’ experiences and perceptions of the process. This 
insight is then used to bolster university responses and expand available interventions in support 
of maintaining educational approaches within the compliance guidance. Finally, the university is 
adopting structured and deliberate methods to expand research informed practices arising out of 
an actual body of sexual misconduct cases, which was lacking prior to the DCL because of the 
limited number of cases reported and facility addressing crimes of a sexual nature. 
Building in methods of evaluating policy and process to determine their effectiveness for 
students are also proactive initiatives Adhemar has introduced further to the review team’s 
deliberations and recommendations. The first layer of evaluation built into the revised sexual 
misconduct policy was for the Title IX office to produce an annual report to the community 
concerning the university’s efforts to address campus sexual violence. While the Clery Act 
mandates that universities share information in an annual security report on campus crimes and 
outline policies and procedures relevant to support students involved in acts of sexual violence 
(Clery Center for Security on Campus, 2016), DCL requirements do not. Once a university has 
adopted and published a Title IX policy and complaint procedure, it can let the policy sit idly 
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until an event (such as an external Office for Civil Rights investigation, or internal review) 
brings attention back to it. The DCL recommends that universities review its policies and 
procedures to ensure they adequately address Title IX obligations, but offers no guidance on the 
timeframe or method to do so. External analysts recommend “periodic” or annual reviews to 
ensure the policies continue to encompass all of the necessary changes in law (Atkins, 2013; 
Smith & Gomez, 2013). Adhemar’s review team incorporated an annual review clause in its 
revised policy to assess the policy’s effectiveness and reflect on lessons learned through its 
actual application. Martin describes Adhemar’s commitment to annually review the policy as 
“mak[ing] sure that it [the revised policy] is not a one shot deal, that it’s part of the fabric of 
what it means to be in this community.” This evaluation tool has helped Adhemar determine 
which parts of the policy are meeting student needs and which parts may be failing. The reports 
generated are expected to advance difficult dialogues with the campus community and inform 
higher education practice. Leslie characterizes the climate leading up to the release of the first 
annual report: 
I expect there will be quite a bit of scrutiny as there is for pretty much anything around 
this issue these days. And we’ll get tough questions, there will be challenges to some of 
the information that’s presented. And for me, anyway, all of that is to the good. It’s okay 
for us to be having vigorous dialogue about difficult issues, that’s kind of like what we’re 
supposed to be here to do.
Engaging the campus community in such ongoing conversations around sexual violence is one of 
the necessary elements in achieving substantial and sustainable change in eradicating campus 
sexual violence (Solovay, 2015).
Rebuilding Community Trust by Prioritizing the Process: Tundell’s Commitment to 
Accountability
Akin to successes achieved at Adhemar and Glensborough, Tundell’s review team also 
advanced innovative and expansive policy and programming on its campus as a result of the 
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review team’s extensive review process. Multiple review team members spoke of the team 
uniting around shared values of social justice and “fairly quickly as a group settling on a model 
supporting justice.” Tundell had been the subject of a contentious Title IX complaint, played out 
under the spotlight of national media attention and an outspoken and strengthening student 
activist movement. Research participants describe the culture leading up to the review team 
being charged as “punitive, ” “unsympathetic to survivors,” “antagonistic,” and “provocative.” 
While the DCL might have been the official instigator to examine the university’s sexual 
violence policies and practices, numerous participants perceived the media attention and the Title 
IX complaints as the true catalysts prompting the university to take action in addressing issues 
related to campus sexual assault.
As a result of the contentious environment, Tundell’s leadership felt a need to restore 
trust with constituents, proving that it was not rhetoric when it espoused having students’ best 
interests at heart. To rebuild confidence in the administration, Tundell’s executive leaders and 
chair of the review team took explicit steps to commit to a transparent, community-driven DCL 
review process, fulfilling the university’s longstanding tradition of student involvement in co-
creating policy. Vanessa, an administrator in student affairs, elaborates on student’s 
participation:
At our campus, students are very central, both because it is a campus for students - we’re 
educating students - but our students are central because they also, we allow them to have 
a significant footprint into these types of decisions. You also will note that there were 
several students that were on the committee and I don’t see, at least in my experience, 
task forces that are comprised with that many students on them as well.
Vanessa provides additional insight into the administration’s motivation to advance 
transparency:
I think there were so many stakeholders that had voiced a displeasure with the interim 
policy. […] There was a very small group of people who got together to write a policy 
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that would help us get in compliance with the DC letter they put together. But there was a 
feeling that it wasn’t transparent. It didn’t have enough voice, enough input, enough buy-
in from the campus. People felt alienated, I think, by it. So we went through a year of 
[Office for Civil Rights] complaints, [Department of Justice] visits, and hearing our 
students say: “I don’t even know where this came from, what’s going on?” Okay, so we 
almost went into kind of the opposite extreme. So we start with small committee trying to 
do this work in which students were really upset about it, and our community was really 
upset about, ended up at least having some amount of displeasure and to this we have to 
be able, I think the reaction was, we have to be able to demonstrate we are getting 
widespread input and opinion and be able to make our work as transparent as possible 
because our community, the way things work at [Tundell], people want to know. And so 
either they’re going to know because we share it with them or they’re going to know 
because they’re going to file their Freedom of Information request, records requests, and 
then it makes it sometimes not look like, makes it look like we’re trying to hide stuff and 
so we wanted, we kind of shifted the pendulum and said, alright we’re going to make it as 
open and transparent as possible.  I don’t know that that would necessarily be the model 
for every single kind of major policy or need to be in compliance with regulations, I don’t 
know that that’s the case that that model would work for everything that we do on our 
campus, but it definitely fit the bill for this scenario.
The process became as important as the outcome. The fact that the review team developed one of 
the earlier affirmative consent models coming out of a large, public, flagship university14 or 
instigated a strong investigator model to allow time for fact gathering at the front end of any 
potential charge15 or influenced the creation of a resource office to help students navigate the 
system of complex processes and find solutions that fit their needs, can all be interpreted as 
successful outcomes generated by the review team. But it is in the way they were achieved that 
Tundell’s team made the greatest contributions to meeting the university’s compliance 
obligations while advancing institutional values and desirable social outcomes. 
14 before either California or New York had passed their affirmative consent state laws (in 2014 
and 2015 respectively); although private colleges such as Antioch College and Grinnell College 
had such models in place since 1993 and 2012 respectively (All Things Considered, 2014; 
Wilson, 2014b).15 under state law, once a charge is brought, students have the right to bring lawyers into the 
process, changing the educational and equity environment, as in many cases complainants could 
not afford a lawyer whereas respondents could.
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Tundell recognized that it had both a sexual violence problem on campus and mistrust of 
it effectively and fairly addressing such misconduct when it occurred. In response to the DCL, 
Title IX complaints, and negative fallout, it invested extensive resources to address constituent 
concerns and rebuild trust. The university developed a new website devoted to sexual assault 
issues on campus, as many schools were doing. Whereas research into universities’ sexual 
assault policies and the content of its websites offering information on those policies, resources, 
prevention, and processes has found universities falling short of compliance obligations and 
proposed guidelines (Lund & Thomas, 2015; Schwartz, McMahon, & Broadnax, 2015; Streng & 
Kamimura, 2015), Tundell provided clear and specific information aimed at student audiences 
that met suggested best practices set forth in the White House Task Force’s recommendations 
(Not Alone, 2015). In addition to the website serving as a primary source of information for 
students, faculty, and staff, initial conversations informing the review team’s work were held 
across the university to engage in dialogue on campus climate and ways to improve climate and 
violence issues. Community meetings, open forums, updated blogs from administrators, and 
online suggestion venues to provide input were some of the ways Tundell enabled a range of 
constituents to participate and remain engaged in the review team’s actions. As Quinn 
articulated, “it’s not just a legal issue, it’s also a human rights issue, it’s also a social justice 
issue, it’s also a communications issue,” requiring the review team to have sufficient breadth and 
expertise to understand and address multiple components of the issue. The review team felt that 
despite such complexity, it could still frame the issue “and give it to the community for input and 
resolution.” Quinn elaborates on this community-driven approach:
I really think that the lesson of the task force for me was, you can take a thorny and an 
emerging and highly contentious legal issue and still give it to community members to 
solve.  You just have to be clear about the structure and be clear about what the 
parameters are. And so for me, I’ve been saying quite publicly, we turned over a problem 
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for our community to solve and said, help: What should the university do? You think it 
through and tell us. And that worked.
This method, according to participants, preserves the “unique characters and spirits” of each 
institution “to make sure our universities don’t become McDonald’s franchises,” in other words, 
every university applying the same “cookie-cutter” policy and education initiatives despite vastly 
different populations and needs. 
One of the characteristics of Tundell’s review team was that its participants regarded 
weaving principles of social justice into compliance responses as complementing their charge, 
rather than being in conflict with it. A number of participants attributed the review team’s ability 
to be creative in its style and regain the community’s trust as it constructed compliance to a 
merging of inter-connected factors. As Quinn conveys:
[We had a] unique confluence of having an engaged community, activists on campus, 
resources and time to do it, a [president] who was willing to charge a task force, [… 
getting] ahead of everybody a little bit, [and being given space and time to] establish our 
culture on our own. And who knows how that chemistry all worked. I think we had kind 
of a unique confluence of things that led us to say, we’re going to do it. […] Everybody 
thinks their campus is a great place and I think we’re a great place, and I think we had the 
right people in the room to do it and the time and space and resource allocations to really 
do it right.
Review team members spoke of the review process having integrity. There wasn’t an imposition 
by any one person or group as to how things should go. The process was open for everyone to 
see. This level of transparency and accountability, coupled with the commitment of the review 
team members to regard the DCL and Title IX “as the floor, not the ceiling,” enabled Tundell to 
deliver substantive solutions as it transformed attitudes and impacted campus culture in its 
construction of compliance.
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Organizational Transformation
As institutions begin to disseminate their novel practices, many advances are mimicked 
by other institutions and become more mainstream. Some universities, such as the ones in this 
study, are engaging in innovation and experimentation to stimulate substantive change. Among 
the widespread changes occurring throughout universities, there is evidence that new compliance 
positions are being created, new educational programs are being rolled out for students, staff, and 
faculty, web sites are being redesigned, surveys are being administered, parents are being invited 
to informational webinars, high-level administrators are sending memos to university 
communities detailing commitments to the effort, student codes of conduct and being rewritten, 
new hotlines for reporting sexual misconduct are being created, and procedures for the 
investigation and adjudication of reported incidents are being redesigned (Armstrong, 2016). 
Transformation in organizational approaches advancing the DCL’s public policy 
objectives of confronting campus sexual harassment and violence, promptly and equitably 
addressing its effects, and preventing its recurrence (Dear Colleague Letter, 2011) can be seen 
through this study’s three institutions in a number of areas. Participants from each university 
spoke of the review team’s considerations of due process and, despite student-centered policies 
that recognize disparities facing harmed students, maintaining a fair and impartial process for all 
students involved. The teams purposely consulted with a broad range of constituents and drew on 
expansive expertise across campus to increase their understanding of diverse constituent needs, 
and have those needs reflected more than ever in the new policies, programming, and services 
available. Examples of this include attention by members to the vulnerabilities inherent to certain 
student populations, such as increased levels of sexual violence experienced by members of the 
LGBTQ community or unique barriers faced by students with disabilities. Where representatives 
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of certain groups could not be at the table (with participants noting absences in the room from 
Latinx,16 African American, and Native students, for example, as well as leadership from Greek 
Life), committee members were intentional about reaching out to these constituent groups 
outside of the review team meetings. 
Participants attributed the support of top university leaders as an influence in the 
organization’s transformation. Whereas pre DCL university presidents, chancellors, and provosts 
were often silent on the issue, delegating its handling to student affairs for example, support from 
this level of university leadership was more visible post DCL. Each institution’s leader publicly 
supported the review team’s efforts. One of the institutions had a president leave and another 
begin during the review team’s tenure. Throughout the transition institutional support remained 
high, as one participant observed:
I felt like that at least one of the unique things that I’ve seen here was that both the 
leaving [president] and the one that was coming in were both very outspoken and very 
public in sharing their support of this work and their commitment to this work, which I 
think gave the committee that much more faith that what they were doing was going to be 
meaningful. I think it also gave our campus community a sense that this isn’t just a 
pocket issue for one entity. If the [president] is speaking about it, it really is something 
big. So we talked a lot about that top down leadership and I felt like that voice was 
definitely present.
Infusing personnel and financial resources to support the review team and fund conduct, 
prevention, education, investigation, counseling, and compliance initiatives was also regarded as 
a welcome and necessary signal of each university taking issues of campus sexual assault 
seriously. Both the public top down support and increases in resources signaled shifts in 
institutional commitment to addressing and reducing campus sexual violence. Although 
participants spoke of a more measured investment in investigation and conduct work over 
16 in order to escape implicit gender binaries and include all possible gender and sexual 
identities, the term ‘Latinx’ is gaining legitimacy in academic use (Logue, 2015; Scharron-del 
Rio & Aja, 2015).
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prevention and education, they nevertheless bore witness to shifts taking place in institutional 
thinking because of the changed post DCL compliance landscape. One of the biggest shifts 
participants spoke of was the shift in culture concerning attitudes: Attitudes surrounding 
acceptable behavior, rape myths, accountability of groups not always held responsible for its 
systemic contributions to the problem (primarily perceived as athletics and fraternities), and 
institutional accountability of its legal – and ethical – obligations to “do better.” These shifts are 
the result not only of the review teams’ efforts to increase communication and awareness on 
campus around issues of sexual violence, but of external environmental forces affecting 
universities, including increased activism and media attention of issues.   
Cultural Shifts
Positive cultural shifts were seen occurring at all three institutions. Participants 
overwhelmingly noted the increase in campus discussions about issues of sexual violence that 
had not been occurring prior to the DCL. A senior advisor in academic affairs at Tundell relayed 
that pre DCL, “this [sexual violence] was not talked about at all, that a young woman would not 
talk about it and certainly not to a faculty member, a male faculty member.” This administrator 
later observed the campus now sees “faculty being sensitive to it and being aware of it.” Though 
this sensitivity and awareness sometimes falls short, and changing attitudes takes time, as she 
explains by way of this example:
I had a colleague who, last year, was working with a young woman whose female 
professor said: “Well I have lots of students deal with bad stuff, why couldn’t you take 
your exam?” This was a kid who was just assaulted. This was coming from a woman. But 
I think again on a cultural societal level even if it’s just the campus community culture 
and individually you don’t - Rome was not built in a day - as they say. […] Societal and 
cultural change happens slowly, and I do believe it is happening. 
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Despite cases such as this exemplifying a lack of understanding of the effects of violence and 
trauma on students, she nonetheless communicates that the environment has undergone 
significant change, with increased conversations affecting a growing awareness: 
We hear from faculty all the time and when I first started in this office, you very rarely 
heard from faculty, you only heard from the absolute jackasses about stupid stuff once in 
a while. I hear from faculty all the time, “I’m really worried about this student in my 
class.” It’s that ripple effect that I think is really important, that sense of awareness.   
A review team colleague confirms this shift, adding that the team has tried to “challenge our 
population to think beyond just the female survivor, male aggressor.” Providing insight into one 
of the hidden benefits of team membership, the establishment of a network of experts across 
campus that colleagues can turn to, Jackson expresses confidence in the post DCL transformation 
occurring on campus:  
I had a call from a faculty member the other day, he was like, I have a student, this is her 
situation, what can I tell her? I like that the faculty and staff are reaching out and kind of 
going, “I’m not sure what to do but I hear you’re the guy who can help me.” And even a 
few people that I’ve talked to, they’re sure like, “Oh thank God, someone is here to deal 
with this.” It’s not because they want to get rid of it, it’s because they were maybe feeling 
stuck before, but now they know who to go to and […] with the team if I don’t have the 
answer I know other people they can go to and kind of go, “Here’s sort of the 
constellation for this issue, what can we do? and who can I refer this person to? or how 
can we get that support for the faculty member, for that student, for whatever the 
situation is?” So that’s how it’s advanced things I think.
Evidence of conversations across disciplines and divisions has also increased, as one conduct 
professional from Glensborough explains:
The med school is just now starting to ask more questions about what we do. They’ve 
had a couple of cases come up that they needed help on. And so the professional schools, 
and traditionally on this campus have been stand-alone entities, their own little castles, 
and it’s been this compliance stuff that’s opened their doors up and so again, it’s part of 
that whirlwind but whereas all these associate deans and assistant deans would never 
have talked to student affairs before, you know the central student affairs office here, now 
they’re all calling my office saying, we need your help.  
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Even fraternities, perhaps in an attempt to improve their reputation and ensure their survival, 
have reached out to campus officials to be part of the solution. While some fraternities have 
resisted the move toward being allies, participants spoke of changes in attitude from fraternities 
as being a remarkable transformation resulting from the policy revisions and reform. 
As the College and University Professional Association for Human Resources has 
advocated to its members, the entire campus community must be involved in ongoing 
conversations about sexual violence to advance cultural transformations. 
In order to facilitate culture change on campus, institutions must go above and beyond 
the minimum requirements of VAWA, Title IX and Clery Act laws. We must fully 
engage our entire campus communities in ongoing conversations around sexual violence. 
The topic can no longer be viewed as taboo, but must instead be exposed and explored. 
Only by weaving dialogue and training into the fabric of our institutions can we create 
real, lasting change, uniting students, faculty and staff in the campaign to eradicate sexual 
violence on college campuses. (Solovay, 2015)
Study findings support such discussions occurring in new circles and increasing in breadth and 
depth across campus. Participants also viewed the rise in sexual misconduct complaints and 
requests for services as evidence of the universities having established a post DCL culture where 
people felt comfortable coming forward. At these progressive campuses, there has been a shift in 
accepting evidence from the neurobiology of trauma and integrating it into response protocols, as 
well as examining and taking more seriously the links to cultural contributors of “rape culture,” 
such as excessive drinking and partying. But participants still speak of having a long way to go. 
Some reference the all-powerful athletic culture as a barrier to truly eradicating sexual violence, 
with the athletic program’s image and revenue generation trumping sexual assault concerns. 
Others cite the lack of a national conversation occurring around “the equity and equality of 
women and men and the LGBT community, and it all play[ing] together.” Conversations of 
healthy sexuality and healthy relationships are considered deficient. Models of healthy 
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relationships are missing in the conversation, with current conversations focusing on “the bad 
stuff, not the good stuff.” Despite these reservations, that increased awareness and discussion has 
occurred on campus since the DCL’s release is evident. Seeping beyond university campuses, 
such attention appears to be provoking public discourse and creating a societal benefit.
Public Good 
Results from this study provide evidence that university understanding and shaping of 
DCL compliance is contributing to societal gains beyond campus. Numerous participants spoke 
of campuses normalizing sexual violence conversations and increasing awareness, 
understanding, commitment, and action around the issues as transformations that are reaching a 
new generation of students. Once these students graduate, this exposure will transcend into their 
own relationships and expectations in the workplace. Discussing the policy’s effects on students, 
participants noted students’ increasing awareness around issues of consent, and that this 
understanding is a “lifelong skill” students will carry with them beyond campus. As one 
participant explained:
We are training folks and expecting folks to behave differently, identify perpetrative 
behavior before it happens, do bystander intervention work, change the culture so that we 
don’t have a culture of violence, and if you move those folks through that sort of intense 
training system that we’re building on our campus and then they go out in the rest of the 
world, I expect them to be employers who take sexual harassment seriously, people who 
don’t hurt kids, people who will step in as an active bystander when bad things happen, 
and I think that permeable barrier between people who have that expectation on campus 
and then go out into the rest of society will infiltrate the rest of the world and create more 
of a culture of prevention and higher expectations for us all as humans and so that’s what 
I am happy about, people will leave here and then be employers who don’t tolerate sexual 
harassment on any level in the workplace, support their kids in being healthy, non-
bullying kids.
It is not only the students’ exposure to previously “taboo” conversations that is creating a public 
benefit. Media coverage of student activism has “moved the dial” to opening up positive 
conversations for “advocates on both sides of [the issue].” Participants relayed stories of their 
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experiences with supporters of harmed students and responding students who had changed their 
thinking around the “mistreatment of women, of partners, whoever it may be” as “something that 
we should not be doing, period.” The shift in institutional culture from focusing on legally 
compliant measures to developing an awareness of underlying contributing factors and taking 
measures to address them, has also impacted the public-at-large’s conceptions about what a safe 
campus experience entails. Some participants remain doubtful, however, that changes in attitude 
and the breakdown of barriers occurring on campus has transcended into society. Others recount 
positive experiences with third party affiliates that have a connection with the university or with 
students. Talk of sexual violence issues has infiltrated these entities, for example businesses 
where students undergo internships, which are affected by the universities’ new policies. The 
entities’ interactions with the university have extended this circle of awareness outside campus. 
Review team members speak of this exposure spreading, creating ripples that serve to normalize 
the conversation around sexual assault and raise the bar concerning sexual equality.        
Perhaps a tipping point has been reached. Bruce describes an analogy of falling dominoes 
to illustrate: 
It [the problem of campus sexual assault] is really in a place now where it’s very hard to 
deny and I think more and more people are getting, feeling comfortable with saying yes, 
we have that problem too and not feeling like they’re out there and carrying the banner all 
by themselves. So yeah, it feels, I mean we’ve got a long way to go, we definitely have a 
long way to go. But it feels, I think when I was talking about the universities falling and 
then military it just had that sense of here go the dominoes. It’s been set up for a long 
time, those dominoes have been in place, people have been fighting to get those 
dominoes to fall, they haven’t fallen, and then all of a sudden they all start to fall. And 
when they all start to fall, I mean having been alive as long as I have now I’ve seen it 
happen a few other times where you’re just like wow, that’s the tipping point and now 
it’s going and I think we’ve passed the tipping point as a culture. So we still have a lot to 
go but I think we’re, unless something dramatic happens […] culturally to take the focus 
off, I would see it just taking it nationally and hopefully being an issue that we have a lot 
more control over ten years from now than we do now.
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Arguably, one of the greatest public benefits these findings support is that people previously 
impervious to the notion that sexual assault is occurring on university campuses can no longer 
deny the existence of crimes of a sexual nature. While there is plenty of debate in the public 
discourse as to the best means to address it, one thing is clear: the transformations that have 
occurred on campus as a result of the DCL and related regulations, the review team’s work, 
student activism, and public pressure have “peeled back a layer of immunity in this generation.” 
Given that public controversy still exists on the topic, “maybe they don’t like that.”  
Conclusion
Although public discourse around the DCL has often been negative, suggesting that 
universities are mishandling their treatment of sexual violence cases and should not be 
addressing crimes of a sexual nature in the first place, we see through the discussion in this 
chapter that a number of positive changes contributing to both organizational advancement and 
the public good have resulted from university efforts to comply with DCL obligations. This 
chapter provides empirical evidence that law can be used as a positive force within organizations 
to shape desirable social and institutional outcomes. By examining the intended and unintended 
benefits originating in a legal, cultural, and social issue of critical importance to campus life, a 
better understanding has emerged of universities’ abilities to shape (through their actors) the 
construction of lawful responses that advance transformative institutional and social change. 
Some of the compliance actions observed in this study have become institutionalized by way of 
organizational mimicry and normative practice. These include an increased focus on trauma 
informed practices, creating new student advocate positions, entering into formal agreements 
with community partners to better address students’ needs and extend services, and adopting 
affirmative consent standards, among others.  
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Universities’ post DCL efforts to address and combat campus sexual violence have 
positively contributed not only to educational practice, but to the promotion of public good.
While this chapter provides helpful insight into ways university actors were able to use the law 
as a positive force within organizations to shape not only compliance and institutional goals, but 
also desirable social and institutional outcomes, the case study nature of this research does not 
generate field-level conclusions. However, the participants’ descriptions of the expansive 
thinking and novel concepts the teams developed indicate positive transformations have been 
occurring in this contentious area. These important developments are vital to advancing our 
understanding of how universities can construct legal responses that both comply with complex 
laws and regulations affecting institutional life, while also advancing institutional interests, 
educational mission, and public good (Edelman, 1990, 1992, 2007; Edelman et al., 2010; Meyer, 
Ramirez, Frank, & Schofer, 2007; Meyer & Rowan, 1978). With the heavily regulated higher 
education environment showing no signs of subsiding, universities are likely to be thrust into 
new and developing roles as their legal obligations shift. The means emanating from this study – 
of fostering effective leadership, developing collaborative environments, and transforming 
challenges into opportunities for the organization – provide insight that can help university 
leaders guide their institution through the legal, social, educational, and cultural implications 
inherent in compliance responses. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion and Implications
There is a dynamic process that takes place in the construction of universities’ sexual 
harassment and violence policies. Because of the relative newness of interpreting and responding 
to the 2011 DCL as I conceptualized this study, scarce research was available to inform higher 
education scholars and practitioners of that process. Five years after its release, research is 
emerging to inform our understanding of many of the major components underlying issues of 
campus sexual assault. For the most part, this wave of research updates and expands upon issues 
previously studied, reexamined from a contemporary post DCL context. This updated research 
addresses understanding the causes of sexual violence (Franklin, Bouffard, & Pratt, 2012), 
identifying risk factors (Gidycz, McNamara, & Edwards, 2012; Gilmore, Lewis, & George, 
2015; Jordan, 2014; Pryor & Hughes, 2013), exploring the consequences of trauma on students 
(Chang et al., 2015; Jordan et al., 2014; Mason & Lodrick, 2013), evaluating prevention options 
(Buchholz, 2015; Henriksen, Mattick, & Fisher, 2016; Katz & Moore, 2013; Thomas-Card & 
Eichele, 2016), examining organizational response through an analysis of information available 
on university websites (Englander, McCoy, & Sherman, 2016; Lund & Thomas, 2015), and 
surveying campus climate and incident rates (Cantor et. al, 2015; Krebs et al., 2016; McMahon 
et al., 2015). 
There are few studies in this recent research surge that address the organizational 
dynamics and behavior underlying university responses to compliance obligations. Emergent 
studies suggest researchers are undertaking analyses of the development and implementation of 
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university policies and protocols (Shankar, 2016), investigating the alignment of proactive and 
reactive policies addressing prevention (Field, 2016), evaluating symbolic versus substantive 
compliance efforts (Badke, Porter, Garrick, Armstrong, Levitsky, 2016), and scrutinizing 
patterns of policy and programming response (Armstrong & Levitsky).17 While this developing 
body of research indicates increased scholarly attention to the topic, empirical research of the 
process universities undertake and the mechanisms relied on as its actors negotiate policy and 
construct compliance remains wanting. The purpose of this research study was to examine the 
dynamic processes undertaken by three universities in their review and negotiation of policy and 
programming, resulting from contentious and ambiguous compliance requirements, as they 
advanced forward-thinking responses that enhanced opportunity for the institution and its 
students. The institutions participating in this study did more than check DCL compliance boxes. 
Each developed a holistic approach, questioning current models and seeking answers on the best 
ways to develop thoughtful, nuanced policies to better respond to, and prevent, sexual assault. 
This study was premised on circumstances in which an outside legal force, the 2011 
DCL, affected the organization, and those in it, creating opposition in the university’s legal 
culture and environment. While the DCL proved to be an important catalyst for examining and 
revising university policies and protocols, this study’s findings reveal that it was not only the 
DCL that caused the universities to take action. Rather, many participants regarded the negative 
media attention their university was receiving as a more pressing incentive driving university 
actions. Influencing developing compliance standards and mediating the laws’ effects on their 
organizational interests, these three universities took additional measures beyond minimal 
17 Preliminary results from the Shankar, Field, Badke et al., and Armstrong & Levitsky studies 
have been, or are scheduled to be, presented at professional conferences. The studies have yet to 
be published. 
166
compliance to align policies, procedures, and programming with institutional values while 
addressing legal obligations. Although all three participant institutions relied on committee 
structures to examine and respond to DCL obligations and challenges, each instituted different 
decision making models. From Tundell’s modified consensus, to Adhemar’s co-chairs having the 
final say based on team recommendations, to Glensborough’s multi-layered, hierarchical, system 
structure, all study participants felt that their voices were heard as they made substantive 
contributions to the process. Leadership flourished at many levels, indicating the importance of 
change agents involved in different aspects of the review and reform process. Dissenting voices, 
for example, provided alternative perspectives on issues and helped diffuse power dynamics. 
Collaboration among subject-matter experts led to the universities’ consideration of a number of 
important issues contemplated by the legislation. To reduce incidents of sexual violence, for 
example, underlying issues affecting campus culture were reconsidered in new ways. Deeply 
held misogynistic attitudes, often found in privileged sub-cultures such as athletics and 
fraternities, were increasingly scrutinized. Diffusion of such considerations can be seen in the 
recent condemnations of Harvard’s Final Clubs (Fahs, 2016) and the University of Michigan’s 
fraternity party culture (Jesse, 2015). Other organizational shifts are evident in the proliferation 
of new titles and offices, negotiation of roles, reconciliation of power and politics, and variations 
in shared governance.
Shaping Institutional Actions 
Findings from this study support institutional theory’s understanding of the internal 
negotiation of process and strategy to explain organizational adaptation in uncertain 
environments, and its contention that organizations are shaped as much by their cultural 
environments as by rational calculations and technical imperatives (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; 
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Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Rowan & Miskel, 1999; Scott & Davis, 2007; Selznick, 1949, 1957, 
1996; Sitkin & Bies, 1994; Suchman & Edelman, 1996). Having to comply with the DCL 
provides the technical imperative in this case. We see from Tundell and Adhemar that university 
leaders’ first rational response was to convene a small team of experts behind closed doors to 
make the changes in response to the new regulations. Glensborough’s pattern mimics this 
reaction as well. Glensborough’s interview participants were not privy to the details of these 
initial meetings. However their accounts of Glensborough’s response provide insight into the 
university’s delayed start and disjointed efforts initially addressing the DCL. 
The cultural environments at each university demanded that more in-depth, transparent 
actions materialize. Adhemar’s culture was driven by a history of community owned conduct 
processes developed and reviewed by students, staff, and faculty. Adhemar’s community would 
not tolerate “fiat changes.” Motivated by community values and national leadership advancing 
an in-depth understanding of campus sexual assault, Adhemar responded to its cultural 
environment by entering into an extended community vetting and dialogue process. This enabled 
institutional leaders to co-create with campus constituents innovative policies and practices that 
upheld community values of fairness, due process, empowerment, student choice, and an 
educational focus while meeting the university’s legal obligations. Tundell found itself in a 
hostile environment with its constituents not trusting that the institution had student interests at 
heart as it crafted a DCL response. Motivated by an Office for Civil Rights Title IX complaint 
and mistrust of the university’s ability to equitably, impartially, and effectively respond to 
incidents of sexual violence, Tundell’s climate created a pressure that galvanized leaders into 
listening and responding to student concerns. Glensborough’s idea champions played powerful 
roles in shaping the cultural norms that influenced Glensborough’s institutional actions of 
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moving beyond minimal DCL compliance to invest in resources and personnel needed to 
increase the university’s competence. In doing so, the new direction these leaders took created a 
national presence as leading experts in adopting trauma informed practices.
With laws and guidance that regulate educational environments often ambiguous, as was 
the case with the DCL, universities are afforded wide latitude to construct responses to the law in 
ways that address conflicting pressures, environmental demands, and self-interest. Through a 
collaborative decision making approach involving expertise cultivated throughout the university, 
and significant input from students and community members, the university review teams 
strategically shaped institutional responses to broad DCL mandates. Teams upheld values of 
public good by fostering substantive solutions that delivered on the DCL’s public policy goals of 
reducing incidents of sexual violence, preventing its recurrence, and promptly and equitably 
addressing its effects. Review team members’ actions shaped not only legal compliance, but 
have resulted in imitation, emulation, and structural elaboration within the field of higher 
education. 
Adhemar, a frontrunner in establishing a full time confidential advocate for students 
experiencing sexual violence in the university community, provides a good example of such 
institutional isomorphism. Given the widely recognized reality that reporting rates of campus 
sexual assault do not correlate to the prevalence of the crime, confidential advocates are 
recognized as fulfilling an important role providing emotional support, assistance with 
navigating academic responsibilities, access to appropriate medical care, explaining reporting 
options, and connecting students with counseling and crisis intervention services. This 
confidential advocate model, distinct from the roles of university investigator or process advisor, 
is considered an emerging best practice and has been spreading throughout the field (Association 
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of Title IX Administrators, 2015).18 Basing good practice on research informed decisions, such 
as evidence supporting that students who work with a confidential advocate experience less 
negative outcomes, distress, self-blame, guilt, depression, and are more likely to seek additional 
medical, legal, or counseling assistance (Campbell, 2006, as cited in Association of Title IX 
Administrators, 2015; Wasco et al., 1999, as cited in Association of Title IX Administrators), 
professional associations advocate universities adapt such a model “because it is the right thing 
to do” (Association of Title IX Administrators, 2015). Two pieces of pending legislation may 
also make it the legally required ‘thing to do’. The Survivor Outreach and Support on Campus 
Act (S.O.S. Campus Act) would require universities appoint a confidential, independent 
advocate to assist and represent the interests of students who have experienced sexual assault, 
even if student interests conflicted with those of the university. The Campus Accountability and 
Safety Act (CASA) would extend the services to cases of alleged sexual harassment, domestic 
violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking. 
Findings from this study also advance the socio-legal framework that organizations create 
symbolic structures articulating compliance through legitimate forms of legal rhetoric and due 
process. All three universities immediately appointed a Title IX coordinator, for example, 
symbolically complying with one of the more clearly defined DCL mandates. However, 
developing the scope of their role, understanding their responsibilities in relation to existing job 
requirements, eliminating potential conflicts of interest, deciding in which division the position 
should be based, even determining what interests they represent (institutional or student?) all 
took time to develop. 
18 Examples of this emerging model can be found at Berkley, UC Santa Barbara, UC Santa Cruz, 
and the University of Colorado Boulder, among others.
170
All three participating universities in the study created new organizational structures to 
address DCL rhetoric. Whether in the form of an advisory panel to provide guidance to the Title 
IX coordinator on contentious matters (Adhemar), a coordinating office to unify university 
education, prevention, and response initiatives (Glensborough), or a student complaint office 
where a process advisor could assist students with reporting options and procedures (Tundell), 
each university has responded differently to substantively impact the students it serves. It is too 
early to determine which of the many measures these universities have developed may become 
expected compliance standards. Although the principles behind some, such as Glensborough’s 
trauma-informed sexual assault investigation approach, have subsequently been advanced 
through new training curricula for university administrators and police officers, providing 
evidence of proactive organizational responses shaping the compliance framework (Brown, 
2016; Busch-Armendariz et al., 2016; Not Alone, 2016). In addition to new training and 
investigation strategies, there is evidence of new organizational structures taking shape across 
the field.19 Resource-strapped universities that cannot offer such range of services have been 
encouraged to develop MOUs with local community advocacy organizations (Association of 
Title IX Administrators, 2015; White House Task Force, 2015), a course of action embraced 
early on at Glensborough. Based on socio-legal application of organizationally constructed 
symbols of compliance, these emerging institutional actions are likely to be regarded by courts as 
possible standards as they interpret emerging Title IX compliance litigation.  
From these examples, we can see how organizational responses shape the construction of 
compliance. Although the DCL only mandated that universities appoint a Title IX coordinator to 
19 see, among others, Harvard University’s Office for Sexual and Gender-Based Dispute 
Resolution; Ohio State University’s Office of University Compliance and Integrity; Penn State’s 
Title IX Office; and the University of California Santa Cruz’s CARE Office.
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manage campus sexual violence efforts, all three of the participant universities hired additional 
compliance professionals. From investigators to process advocates, confidential advisors to 
prevention specialists, the realm of diverse individuals within and around organizations 
addressing and managing compliance is growing. These organizational actors have each 
“captured” an aspect of compliance, shaping it to fit the institution’s goals. Their shaping of that 
process – investigation, adjudication, prevention, and communication - helps “enact” the 
meaning of the law. For example, whether an expectation of compliance entails an adjudication 
model of an appropriately trained single fact finder or a panel of representatives from the 
university community may be determined by which models are adopted by other universities and 
become cultural norms, as well as which models compliance professionals or governing bodies 
interpret as more valuable. Responses perceived as legitimate will spread throughout the field, 
guiding the change process and constructing the meaning of compliance. To gain legitimacy, 
universities will emulate other organizations operating in ways they consider prestigious or 
exemplary. This has occurred within the past few years through the innovative training, 
adjudication, counseling, and prevention practices advanced by Glensborough, Adhemar, and 
Tundell’s actors.
Answering the Study’s Research Questions
This study’s over-arching purpose was to better comprehend the dynamic processes of 
understanding and responding to ambiguous and contentious compliance requirements while 
enhancing opportunity for the institution and its students. By addressing the following research 
questions, the study has provided insight into the organizational environment in which the 
interesting negotiation of social, organizational, and legal influences takes place.
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How is Institutional Policy Negotiated Around an Ambiguous, Multi-Interest, 
Regulatory Prompt? 
Findings from this study indicate that institutional policy is negotiated in different stages. 
First, the universities took initial steps to respond to the regulation to bring it “in sync” with the 
most recent legal requirements and reduce its vulnerability to compliance violations and liability. 
From the three participating institutions in this research, that step was conducted behind closed 
doors with only a handful of top university leaders. Second, the university commenced a more in 
depth examination of the issues the regulation raised. These universities did so by creating sexual 
violence, DCL, or Title IX review teams. Each team was given a broad charge to review the 
university’s existing policies and recommend areas of improvement based on the new regulation. 
Each of these universities had review teams that expanded this charge. Bringing together 
subject-matter experts to address and improve upon the university’s actions in areas of concern 
to them and their professional identities created an environment where “the right people” merged 
to command new attention to the problem. Thinking of the DCL changes as opportunities, these 
faculty, staff, administrators, students, and community members were driven to positively impact 
practice by overhauling the university’s sexual assault and/or gender violence policies and 
practices. Each of the universities in this study provided support from the highest levels of 
university leadership: backing the teams’ efforts, giving them leeway to be flexible in their 
process, listening to their concerns, providing time and space away from campus to debate and 
deliberate, managing intense internal and external pressures demanding fast and exceptional 
results, and filling personnel gaps where possible through new hires. 
Throughout this second phase of policy negotiation, listening to people on the front lines, 
meeting with members of different schools and divisions, and fielding student questions and 
concerns were important to Tundell and Adhemar’s teams. Extensive outreach and incorporation 
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of the opinions voiced helped ensure the institutions adhere to its values of the process being 
community driven, co-created, student-centered, educational, balanced, fair, and responding to 
multiple constituencies. In part motivated by criticism of the first stage of policy negotiation 
being secretive and excluding community input, conscious effort went into making this second 
phase highly transparent. In this regard, as well as in their consideration of decision making 
strategies, the review team co-chairs signaled attentiveness to the negotiation process, not just 
the policy document outcome. Little evidence emerged from Glensborough exhibiting such 
institutional values. ‘Old school’ participants provide evidence of closed discussions with little 
accountability, transparency, or student or staff input. ‘New school’ participants with less 
institutional baggage took measures to break down these constructions, actively strengthening 
collaboration across campus to increase understanding of the post DCL ‘new order’ and attain 
significant ‘buy-in’ of the new protocols being developed in response to DCL mandates.    
 Dominant themes that emerged from the data that enabled team members across the 
institutions to overcome tension, ambiguity, and pressure from different constituents to 
successfully negotiate policy that not only advanced innovative and substantive solutions but 
created improvements for the institution and society were leadership and collaboration. Review 
team members provided crucial leadership expertise in multiple places to contribute to the 
success of the institution’s protocol, policy, and programming review process. Leadership 
exhibited from the top ranks of the university through the team chairs, and into the facilitation 
and “grunt work” of meeting with and synthesizing tremendous amounts of community input, is 
a core contributor of the successful negotiation processes undertaken at these three universities. 
Including a wide range of constituents who had both knowledge and expertise reaching across 
the institution also accounts for the organizations’ successful outcomes. Team members 
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recognized and overcame power dynamics, nontraditional viewpoints, and competing interests to 
work collaboratively to negotiate policy that benefited their own interests, those of the 
university, individual students, and society. Such contributions demonstrate that university 
members are not simply rational actors responding to top-down laws and regulations. Rather, 
actors cutting across the institution are involved in the social constructions that influence legal 
meaning. Institutional actors are shown to have wide discretion in how they respond to 
ambiguous compliance directives. The involvement of actors with subject-matter expertise is 
essential to comprehensively understanding and addressing multiple organizational issues. The 
findings also reinforce that constituents with competing interests can work collaboratively to 
advance innovation, and not “sell out” educational models when pressured by external 
compliance forces.
How do Multiple Interests Shape Understanding of the Issue? 
Multiple interests contributed to the universities having a broader understanding of issues 
contributing to campus sexual violence, promptly and equitably addressing its effects, and ways 
of preventing its recurrence. Considering these many complex issues from diverse perspectives 
proved helpful in moving the organization beyond minimal DCL compliance obligations to 
effect substantive change in addressing campus sexual violence. Cross-departmental insight 
promoted boundary-spanning strategies as institutional policy was negotiated. Because DCL 
guidance was vague, universities, and the individuals working within them, had the opportunity 
to shape how some of those guidelines should be interpreted. While the ultimate decision maker 
on this will be the Office for Civil Rights as the results of its investigations define acceptable 
forms of compliance, these three universities’ actions have already shown diffusion throughout 
the field and influenced federal policy makers. Each of the three participating universities has 
175
either advised the White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Violence or senate 
sub-committees debating and introducing related campus gender violence legislation. This 
advice has helped to shape definitions of key terms, guidelines for interim supportive measures 
for students, development of education and prevention programs, training expectations, and 
community partnerships designed to help universities better address and combat issues of 
campus sexual violence.  
Student interests, both through campus activism and involvement in the reform process, 
helped to keep universities accountable to its main constituent. Student affairs professionals 
asserted their interests through informed and convincing perspectives, ensuring student 
development values and an educational component in adjudication would not be lost in a sea of 
regulatory legal compliance. Lawyers ensured the universities were acting within legally 
permissible parameters and verified that proposed reform measures balanced multiple rights and 
interests. Collaboration among legal and non-legal professionals proved strong. Though 
disagreements arose between various viewpoints presented, participants almost unanimously 
spoke of the equality of voices and perspectives in the deliberations. While legal counsel had a 
necessary role to play in the protocol and policy revision process, it did not dominate the team’s 
direction, providing instead information and framing of legal considerations, rather than a decree 
of the reform that should be undertaken. Ultimately, input from multiple interests enabled the 
university to consider the layers of complexity involved from many vantage points. This 
diversity contributed to a greater understanding of alternative perspectives and expanded options 
that might otherwise have gone unaddressed. 
The role lawyers played shaping an understanding of the issues is perhaps one of the 
more unexpected findings from this study. The study’s conceptual framework highlights the 
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lawyer’s vital role filtering legal information for the organization, diffusing knowledge of legal 
issues throughout the organization, and constructing the meaning of the law (Edelman, 2016; 
Edelman et al., 2011; Edelman, et al., 1999). Fitting into this mold proved strongest at Adhemar, 
where in-house general counsel conducted much of the framing for the team to know what was 
and was not legally permissible. Tundell’s external legal consultants also provided such 
parameters in consultation with its review team. As members of the review teams, lawyers 
worked along side university colleagues to interpret the DCL and co-construct solutions suitable 
for the university’s particular constituents and community needs. Glensborough’s lawyers were 
initially less involved in the co-construction of policies and programming in response to DCL. 
Glensborough, having the smallest general counsel’s office of the three schools and seemingly 
the least interaction with student affairs divisions pre DCL, seemed to involve its lawyers in the 
review process much later. One participant alluded to the lawyers meeting separately from the 
review team to better understand and coordinate compliance obligations. With legal counsel 
making sense of the DCL’s ambiguity, other compliance professionals from student affairs 
divisions suggested programming solutions, diffusing their professional knowledge and expertise 
throughout the organization. Each group’s valuable perspectives contributed to the review team’s 
success by shaping a deeper review and comprehension of the issues needed to effect change. 
None of the study participants expressed feeling shut out of any of the review team 
discussions or decision-making. Where a student was silenced early on in the process by a senior 
administrator who tried to “put her back in her place,” team members rallied around her, 
influencing the dynamic of the team valuing all contributions. Even the dissenters, who clearly 
expressed some concern about the administration’s mindset that might hinder substantive 
change, nonetheless appreciated the review process and the interpersonal relationships that 
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fostered their success. It is possible that there were review team members who felt silenced or 
who did not support the process or outcomes. Such individuals may have been among those who 
chose not to participate in this study. From the triangulated research data, however, study 
participants provide overwhelming evidence of a collaborative, professional experience in which 
multiple layers of leadership were crucial to the teams’ success. 
What Influences the Compliance Outcomes Chosen? 
Because this research study examined the organizational processes involved in the review 
teams arriving at innovative solutions, rather than the benefits of the solutions themselves, the 
soundness of one outcome chosen over another (such as an adjudication model of a single fact 
finder versus a panel) was not studied. Themes underlying the reasons for choosing one outcome 
over another, however, were evident in the data. What emerged from the study as a primary 
motivator in choosing a given outcome was the institution’s agenda. One determinant of the 
agenda was the institution’s values. Each university was committed to ensuring a safe, equal, and 
socially just educational environment. They exhibited this commitment through an openness to 
hearing and incorporating student views and expert opinions on relevant matters. For example, at 
one of Tundell’s meetings where a powerful university administrator attempted to silence a 
student member, other team members called out the power dynamic and buttressed her 
importance to the team. Upholding the value of student contributions in the review, especially 
where students expressed dissenting views, helped the university live up to its rhetoric that it was 
listening to student concerns, and bridging the gaps of a socially just ideology. 
Challenging “old school” power and politics, “new school” insights also influenced 
outcomes the team adopted. The DCL and its related organizational reviews seemed to usher in a 
new wave of thinking: That the playing field had changed. Old ways of responding to issues of 
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campus sexual assault were increasingly regarded as insufficient to address the new demands 
being placed upon universities. As a result, new approaches supported by research and backed by 
professional organizations, were instrumental in influencing the teams’ deliberations. Idea 
champions often guided the teams toward alternatives, with facilitators supporting an 
environment that robustly debated the issues. Many members of the review teams were involved 
in issues related to sexual assault practice before the DCL was issued. Because of their extensive 
involvement, they had a fairly well developed knowledge base, laying the groundwork that 
enabled their universities to “hit the ground running” once the DCL was released.    
Having the right people at the table suggests that the compliance outcomes chosen are at 
least partially influenced by insight into what the Office for Civil Rights might be looking for in 
terms of compliance. Team members from all three institutions had interacted with federal policy 
leaders in the development of standards and best practice recommendations. They later also 
interacted with the Office for Civil Rights when the department was on campus as part of its 
investigations, establishing networks they could contact later for additional interpretation. 
Despite the ambiguous and contentious post DCL compliance environment universities found 
themselves in, members from Tundell, Adhemar, and Glensborough had insight into, and had 
potentially influenced, federal policy. These institutions were able to draw upon this insight to 
shape their compliance outcomes. According to Suchman and Edelman’s (1996) socio-legal 
conceptualization, these organizational responses - influenced by the internal construction of the 
law (‘what does Title IX compliance entail?’) - subsequently influence practice norms used to 
determine acceptable organizational responses to the law (‘based on what universities have 
demonstrated works, this is what compliance entails’). By incorporating knowledge of federal 
policy makers’ ideals into their own policies and practice, these universities’ actors are shaping 
179
the construction of compliance – establishing informal practice norms addressing what it means 
to remedy campus sexual violence, prevent its recurrence, and promptly and equitably address its 
effects.
In What Ways are Strategies on Preventive Solutions Developed? 
Institutional participants in this research study developed strategies on preventive 
solutions by developing a broad understanding of the issues as they relate to a comprehensive 
range of university considerations. These considerations include knowledge of traditional and 
non-traditional needs, alternative services, and ways to improve education and prevention efforts 
(as opposed to focusing all of its strategies on conduct and adjudication issues). Drawing on 
professional expertise and community voices, the universities followed up on its interim policies 
with carefully considered review and revision of affected policies and programming. Review 
team members ensured proposed initiatives were informed by research and included subject-
matter experts among the decision makers. If the team did not possess expertise on a particular 
issue, it sought it out. Tundell and Adhemar, in particular, went out of their way to listen to 
colleagues, student groups, staff working “in the weeds,” and constituents from highly affected 
groups (such as athletics, housing, and fraternities, for example) across campus. It then took 
explicit steps to incorporate the input, creating drafts, seeking feedback, and making further 
revisions. Tundell took the process even further by holding open meetings of the review team 
deliberations and sharing policy drafts to increase transparency and accountability. Tundell also 
demonstrated flexibility in adapting to the feedback, for example incorporating a new decision 
making model of modified consensus to address concerns of the institution’s commitment to a 
thorough and fair review.    
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Staying abreast of preventive solutions as the legal and cultural environments continue to 
shift requires the involvement of practitioners who “live and breathe” this work and are 
committed to “protecting the rights of all the parties involved.” Such advocates of ongoing 
attention to university policies and procedures to improve practice stress the importance of 
having a range of solutions available to fit their student population and the unique scenarios that 
arise. Given the intensity of gender violence based work, universities must support these 
professionals to avoid burn out. Having practitioners and researchers staying well connected to 
professional organizations that influence the issues, attending conferences to confer with 
colleagues from other institutions, making good use of resources by adequately staffing relevant 
units, and being open to exploring emerging research and practice are all ways participants felt 
supported by their institution as they sought to advance preventive solutions. 
How is Space for Innovation, Collaboration, and/or Proactivity Created in the 
Decision Making Process? 
The primary component identified in this study as necessary to establishing the space in 
which review team members could creatively deliberate and think “out of the box” was creating 
an environment of trust. This started from the top, with key university administrators publicly 
supporting the review team’s work. Beyond what could be regarded as ‘lip service’, review team 
members spoke of the chair having the president’s ear, and speaking with the president about the 
team’s progress and challenges. Presidents, in turn, acted on any major concerns. This deliberate 
support was especially important given the contentious climate and pressure to produce in which 
the team was operating. The chair, idea champions, and facilitators from the team also had to 
build trust among team members to address issues of power and politics. This took months to 
bring about, as the teams worked through positioning tactics to establish shared values for the 
work. With moral and structural support in place, participants also spoke of flexibility being a 
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key element necessary to support an innovative environment. Flexibility was demonstrated 
through meeting agendas (switching topics depending on the need for further clarity or push 
back), membership (people leaving or being added at various stages), review process mechanics 
(decision making becoming a co-created model based on consensus; or requiring additional 
revisions to a draft based on constituent input), and adapting changes in the adjudication process 
to suit different scenarios. 
Bringing diverse voices into the conversation also created trust. This was most evident at 
Tundell and Adhemar, which brought a richness of opinion to the group by bringing in people 
with different gender identities, racial backgrounds, age, status, life experiences, socio-economic 
levels, disabilities, and understandings of trauma. In an effort to prevent serving a single mindset 
as a community and to bring in as many voices as possible, Tundell and Adhemar also conducted 
extensive outreach across campus, with team members also individually reaching out to 
colleagues whose constituents were not on the committee, to ensure that anyone who wished to 
contribute to the issues could do so. Glensborough, with its more complicated structure of teams 
and committees at local and system levels, did not appear to accomplish the same level of 
outreach. Glensborough balanced an openness and inclusivity on its campus with system level 
review that welcomed only Glensborough’s idea champions to the table. Politics and positioning 
were more apparent at Glensborough than with the other two institutions, with Glensborough 
having been traditionally excluded from system level decision-making. By proactively 
addressing concerns “coming down the pike,” Glensborough’s review team developed local 
protocols and programming brought about largely at a grass roots level by the commitment, 
expertise, and vision of its members. Glensborough was able to demonstrate positive impacts on 
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practice and a growing reputation as innovators in the field, which enabled Glensborough’s idea 
champions to break down traditional structural barriers to influence system level decisions. 
Viewing the study’s findings through Siedel (2002) and Siedel and Haapio’s (2010, 
2011) four-step model examining how organizations create environments that promote 
innovative responses to legal compliance, we see that all three universities first created a shared 
understanding of the legal, cultural, and environmental issues involved (step 1: clarity). At 
Tundell, this was established through information sharing in the early meetings and check-ins by 
constituents across campus to capture the full extent of what the community wanted to address 
and the allowable legal parameters in which the team could act. At Adhemar and Glensborough, 
it involved a more insulated discussion among team members to better understand the parameters 
before opening it up to outside discussion. 
In the proactive four-step model, the second step involves responding to the new legal 
obligations imposed (step 2: reactive). Adhemar and Tundell each issued an interim policy 
(created behind closed doors) to address immediate compliance concerns, such as the change in 
evidentiary requirement. Taking this interim step allowed for more deliberative examination 
through the ensuing review process. Glensborough did not produce an interim policy. Rather, it 
hired new personnel and repositioned existing ones to oversee and overhaul any necessary 
compliance changes. Its reaction was slow and messy as it disjointedly tried to bring its outdated 
policies into compliance. In addressing the third step, implementing strategies to prevent the 
legal problem from recurring (step 3: preventive), each school initially viewed ‘the legal 
problem’ as a violation of DCL compliance and Title IX obligations, which could undermine the 
university’s existing protocols and programming, as well as create a risk management 
imperative. Their prevention strategies all focused on the review teams analyzing the 
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universities’ current policies and responses and making recommendations aligned with the new 
regulatory requirements. Because of the membership of the teams and their commitment to 
creating positive, substantive change impacting student’s wellbeing and reducing sexual assault, 
review team members expanded the preventive lens to a proactive one, in which they could 
interpret the DCL requirements as minimal obligations, and expand practice beyond such 
minimums. As the review process matured and ambiguities in the DCL became somewhat 
clearer, the ‘legal problem’ the teams were trying to prevent shifted more from a DCL 
compliance issue to an eradication of campus sexual assault issue. Team members successfully 
implemented strategies at this stage that addressed broad university goals, such as serving 
student needs, creating a fair and impartial system, and avoiding legal liability.
  Finally, in step four of the proactive law model, organizations foster collaboration and 
innovation to take into account not only legal obligations, but other considerations of importance 
to the organization and society (step 4: promotive). This is the crux of what sets apart institutions 
that simply comply with minimal legal obligations with those that exceed expectations and make 
positive contributions beyond minimal legal requirements. Adhemar, Glensborough, and Tundell 
all supported collaborative decision making by valuing a range of perspectives, including non-
traditional perspectives in legal decision making such as those from students and student affairs 
personnel. Each review team respected the multiple viewpoints for the expertise and insight they 
brought. While not all decisions were arrived at collaboratively, with Adhemar’s co-chairs 
having the final say in their model for example, all team members felt their opinions were heard 
throughout the process and included in the final outcomes. By taking into account not only the 
university’s legal obligations, but other considerations of importance to the organization and 
society, namely reducing gender violence to affect change in campus sexual assault, review team 
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members confronted issues that had only been on the periphery of the discussion, such as 
excessive drinking, party culture, gender identity, and mysogeny, expanding the scope of issues 
they regarded as necessary to address in universities’ long-standing problem of campus sexual 
misconduct. 
Contributions to Theory
Institutional theory shaping this study, particularly new institutional theory, emphasizes 
the skillful performance of select actors in envisioning new ideas, using rules and resources to 
achieve those ideas, and inducing cooperation to motivate others (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 
2001b; Giddens, 1984). The main contribution of this research study in advancing this insight is 
in providing additional empirical evidence of the important role actors play in transforming 
various aspects of organizational life. In this case, actors from across the university displayed 
distinct and necessary skills throughout the revision process. These were most evident in framing 
the compliance review and policy construction process, setting the agenda necessary to 
accomplish the work, facilitating interpersonal dynamics to overcome power imbalances and 
include a breadth of constituent voices, and engaging in robust action to conduct the review and 
revision tasks.20 This study’s emphasis on actors was necessary to better understand how the 
institutional construction of compliance takes place and whose contributions influence the 
university moving beyond basic DCL compliance.
 Relying on a proactive law conceptualization to examine how universities create 
environments that promote innovative responses to legal compliance, this research demonstrates 
that decision makers can move beyond a reactive response to legal obligations toward reframing 
20 Each of these sub-areas of strategic action has its own developed literature (“framing” – Snow, 
Rochford, Worden & Benford, 1992; “agenda setting” – Lukes, 1974; “brokering” – Gould, 
1993; and “robust action” – Padgett & Ansell, 1992).
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legal problems as opportunities for the organization to create substantive contributions to 
practice. Cultivating teamwork and a collaborative, cross-professional, flexible process enabled 
each university to achieve transformative organizational strategies in solving challenges raised 
by the DCL, legal, and cultural environments. Although concepts within institutional theory such 
as isomorphism and socio-legal construction of compliance help scholars of higher education 
understand the process of organizational change and structural elaboration resulting from DCL 
and Title IX mandates, there are nevertheless shortcomings of applying this theory to examine 
decision making in higher education related to the legal environment. One of the shortcomings is 
that the socio-legal view of the exogeneity (determined outside the boundaries of the 
organization) and endogeneity (influenced by the internal meaning attributed by organizations) 
of law do not adequately address numerous other influences affecting the law’s development.
In the “old” institutional, exogenous view, law is a coercive and determinative downward 
force that organizations either comply with or risk sanctions for noncompliance. It is a ‘top 
down’ model. The “new” institutional, endogenous view theorizes that organizations develop 
symbolic responses, through policies, programs, and structural elaboration, in response to the 
law. These responses become taken-for-granted, expected forms of compliance. This is a ‘bottom 
up’ model where the meaning of the ambiguous law evolves through the organization’s 
articulation and resolution of problems (Edelman, 2016; Suchman & Edelman, 1996). Both of 
these concepts are one-directional relationships (top down or bottom up).
This study provides evidence that these perspectives fail to adequately account for the 
internal and external pressures that contribute to the construction and interpretation of the law. 
Though the DCL provided one catalyst prompting universities to address and respond to new 
legal mandates, the results of this research indicate that other external factors proved to be equal 
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or greater incentives instigating universities to act. Status and reputation, tainted by negative 
media, drove damage control. Tundell and Adhemar, both elite schools, were early adopters of 
DCL reform, having had knowledgeable internal experts in place to address emerging DCL 
issues. These institutions invested financial and personnel resources to “hit the ground running” 
to quickly address DCL obligations and contain negative publicity. Glensborough, not 
considered as elite as the two other participating schools and without the same media fallout, 
took more time to examine the issues - behind closed doors - before rallying its experts. Initially 
concerned with ensuring it met the new compliance requirements, as its review progressed, its 
“idea champions” and “doers” proved to move the university beyond minimal compliance to 
address more trauma-informed and culturally competent aspects involved in responses to campus 
sexual assault. Early adopters helped to infuse knowledge into the public sphere. Actors from 
these universities contributed to professional organizations’ understanding of the issues, shaping 
field level interpretation and response. Media attention influenced public opinion. This research 
found that such multi-directional pressures influence the internal, endogenously created meaning 
of the law. Their influence is not adequately recognized, however, in the top-down, bottom-up 
models relied on in socio-legal conceptualizations. 
Implications for Practice
This research demonstrates that although fraught with challenges and uncertainty in how 
best to proceed, creating or revising institutional policy in response to legal mandates that satisfy 
legal obligations and create value can be accomplished in a proactive and restorative manner. At 
its core, leadership, collaboration, and transparency greatly impact the project’s success. In 
addition to the leadership roles adopted within the teams themselves, top university officials 
must visibly and unmistakably back the process. This can be facilitated through such actions as 
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the university president publicly supporting the importance of the issue and the review team’s 
work, the institution committing sufficient human and financial resources to address the team’s 
recommendations, as well as ensuring protected time away from one’s regular job 
responsibilities to devote to the team’s charge. This protected time involves using off-site 
meeting space complete with numerous breaks, fresh meals, and ample snacks, all of which may 
seem rudimentary, but enable participants frequent breaks to talk in small gatherings away from 
the larger setting. Such breaks enable members to get to know one another, develop 
relationships, build trust, find common ground, and release the mounting pressure of the intense 
meetings and contentious cultural environment. But the protected time also extends to providing 
an infrastructure that supports team members focusing on high level policy issues while someone 
back at the office covers the day–to-day workload of the unit. Not all universities have such an 
infrastructure, with directors lacking staff to meet with students, or being the only person able to 
respond to urgencies. One of the study’s contributions to practice is the understanding that the 
team’s success is tied to the resource infrastructure available to it. It is not sufficient for the 
university to simply appoint a team to review the situation at hand and wait passively for the 
team to produce results. Rather, university leaders must take an active role promoting and 
sustaining the team, both through moral support and an infrastructure where sufficient time and 
mental space can be freed up for review team members to be physically and mentally present to 
vigorously engage in the team’s charge.   
This research demonstrates that when making far-reaching policy changes universities 
benefit from multiple contributions from various groups across campus in the policy negotiation 
and decision making process. By calling on diverse groups to represent their constituents’ 
viewpoints, the university captures the pulse of the community and can incorporate their 
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feedback to have more voices heard, enabling agency by various groups across campus into 
policy decisions while enhancing collaboration, trust, and transparency in the process. The 
university must still create accountability to demonstrate that it is critically examining the ideas 
raised, incorporating constituent feedback when appropriate and communicating to the 
community its courses of action. This study’s review team members were satisfied that the teams 
had solicited feedback from diverse campus constituents. Many expressed, however, the desire 
that more student voices be represented directly at the table. Adhemar had two students on the 
team, Tundell four, and Glensborough initially none (though two were added as the review 
progressed). The student members interviewed felt pressure being the sole representative on the 
committee for their constituency (one representative for all undergraduates, for example). With 
review team members overwhelmingly expressing that students were central to the process and 
provided valuable input, and universities espousing a belief in co-created outcomes, universities 
might satisfy questions of trust and transparency by involving more students as members of such 
decision making teams. 
Findings from the study also reveal that key administrative units lacked adequate 
representation on the review teams. Student affairs practitioners in adjudication, prevention, and 
counseling were represented across all three teams. Members expressed a desire to have more 
representation at the table from staff involved in additional aspects of the issues. A range of 
professionals whose expertise was needed to address process questions around accommodations, 
training, investigations, resources, or procedures, for example, were absent to some degree on all 
of the teams. Though members admit that involving everyone of significance would make the 
process unruly, they felt that notable absences limited the team’s ability to fully address all 
aspects of the issues, including benefiting from non-traditional or adversarial views points. In 
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making choices around who to include on future review teams, universities must consciously and 
deliberately weigh the benefits of membership to the team’s charge and goals, versus the 
availability of consulting with certain groups as needed.
Another implication and recommendation for practice is to ensure that the new policy and 
programming rollout is made part of the review team’s charge. Review team members were 
satisfied that their institutions perceived their undertaking as an evolving process and had given 
them a long-term approach to develop solutions. Many expressed that once the policy was 
revised and submitted for approval, the review process was considered complete. Proceeding 
through the necessary administrative channels for approval, momentum for the new policy was 
lost, however. The energy that went into revising the policy was not met with sufficient 
resources to rollout the policy. In many cases, its launch faltered. Participants felt the policy was 
not well explained, supported, or promoted. Many expressed feeling their long and hard work 
had been diminished as the institution let the opportunity to create a strong impact on students 
slip away. Resulting from this insight is a recommendation for practice that the university more 
consciously and deliberately formulate a dissemination plan in conjunction with the review 
process. A dissemination team might work collaboratively with the review team, even sharing 
certain members for greater fluidity and continuity. Ultimately, if the dissemination falls short, 
the revised policy and new protocols will go unnoticed by most students and miss the mark of 
creating an impact on their attitudes and behavior around campus sexual assault. 
The final implication for practice offered is for the university to build relationships 
through national professional organizations, conferences, and advocacy in gender equity and 
violence issues to encourage its champions to expand their expertise and networks. Adhemar and 
Glensborough developed proactive responses in the contentious post DCL environment in large 
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part due to their champions’ high involvement in professional organizations, not just as members 
but active contributors to leadership, policy development, and emerging best practice. These 
champions were aware of expected compliance changes and were in a position, when the DCL 
was released, to “hit the ground running” to lead change on campus. While champions at Tundell 
were not as involved in the national scene pre DCL, the university addressed the post DCL 
turmoil on its campus by partnering with consultants having national expertise examining 
campus sexual violence obligations and best practice. All three universities wanted to contain 
both public relation and compliance damage, and take steps to remedy them. Each was able to 
proceed proactively because of champions at the institution, or hired to fill this need, who had a 
heads-up of the important issues. This enabled the universities to have a jump start on its 
response and action. Cultivating this expertise must be done before the triggering event occurs. It 
is recommended that universities invest in champions, in their professional development, in 
leadership opportunities, and devise a method to assess and integrate promising information the 
champions uncover.   
Implications for Research
This research demonstrates that conducting an effective post DCL sexual assault policy 
review is fraught with challenges. The process is long and arduous, involving a tremendous 
commitment of university resources, personnel, and expertise. Tundell and Adhemar have 
committed to reviewing the policy annually, in part because the review team members know the 
environment continues to be in flux and policies need to evolve, incorporating not only new legal 
and cultural expectations, but emerging best practices. Revising university policy, procedures, 
and protocols, however, is but one aspect of complying with the DCL. Articulating student rights 
and responsibilities in university policies and codes of conduct is an activity most universities 
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have experience with. If these three promising examples of proactive responses to the DCL had 
difficulty negotiating policy, how will universities be able to address the even more ambiguous, 
complicated climate and causal issues underlying campus sexual assault? DCL obligations 
extend not only to promptly and equitably addressing the effects of sexual violence, but 
preventing its recurrence, with a goal to eliminate it altogether. The three participating 
universities invested greater effort and resources in policy revision over prevention 
improvement, though certainly much has been done at each advancing prevention and education 
initiatives as well. With review team members espousing the value of universities adopting this 
cross-institution, collaborative, team approach as it considers moving forward with other 
important boundary-spanning campus issues, applying the policy review model to prevention 
efforts is reasonable. Universities would benefit from additional research into how to best 
support such teams’ success. This research has demonstrated that building strong relationships, 
taking the time to understand different perspectives, encouraging communication, and creating 
transparency all contribute to the success of the teams. Having leaders and champions that 
harness information and ideas beyond campus also adds to the ability to move beyond minimal 
standards into a space of innovation and creativity. Future research could add to our knowledge 
of other contributing elements that empower some organizations to move beyond merely 
responding to a catalyst to proactively transforming traditional expectations.
Additional research into the advantageous composition of review teams would also be 
beneficial. Were teams with high level administrators who had knowledge and experience across 
different units but did not work directly with students on a daily basis more effective in bringing 
about successful results than teams with more mid-level administrators, who generally have less 
power on campus but more experience working “in the weeds?” What is the tipping point after 
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which the team becomes too large and unwieldy? What proportion of student voices adds value 
to the deliberations? Establishing a body of research specific to higher education characteristics, 
values, and issues would help equip university leaders with research-informed models they could 
draw on when catalysts (such as crises or new regulations) require universities to take swift 
action. A one-size-fits-all model clearly would not work. Tundell, Adhemar, and Glensborough’s 
different models each met their community’s needs, but might not be effective elsewhere. More 
research is needed to know what would be effective in different settings and why. Such 
knowledge of process could then be used to better support each university’s values and goals. 
One way to accomplish research of this nature would be to conduct a field-level study of other 
universities’ processes of reviewing their Title IX policies and procedures post DCL. Learning 
from their successes and failures could better inform effective decision making practices.
A field-level study of other universities’ post DCL Title IX policies and procedures 
would not only enhance our knowledge of process, but could also be used to understand what 
other institutions are doing to comply with DCL/Title IX, and what has influenced the courses of 
action they took. With institutional theory arguing that responses perceived as legitimate will 
spread throughout the field, guiding the change process and construction of compliance, such a 
study could uncover which practices have been imitated and have diffused throughout the field 
and how normative context shaped interpretation and practice. Insight into why those practices 
gained legitimacy and which ones fizzle out would then better inform our understanding of what 
is regarded as adequate versus outstanding response. Once researchers know what is happening 
across the field in terms of compliance, we can then begin to ask what is driving these responses 
and what might be holding universities back. Such research could drive universities’ systematic 
transformation of gender-identity, party culture, and violence related challenges universities are 
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likely to address as the next agenda in the federal government and student activists’ movement of 
responding, preventing, and eliminating sexual violence on campus.
Although this research has established the importance of understanding different 
perspectives and ensuring diversity in review team membership, there is a void in the research as 
to how sexual assault and its consequences affect traditionally marginalized populations. The 
existing research and narrative on campus sexual assault predominantly addresses the situation of 
middle-class white women. A more comprehensive understanding of the situational context in 
which sexual violence is experienced by additional students - international, disabled, male, 
LGBTQ, Native, Muslim, African American, and Latinx, among others - and their post-assault 
actions and consequences is needed for universities to design the most appropriate and effective 
responses, services, and prevention programming to serve all of its students (Badejo, 2016; 
Krebs, Barrick, Lindquist, Crosby, Boyd, & Bogan, 2011; Linquist, Barrick, Krebs, Crosby, 
Lockard, & Sanders-Phillips, 2013; Milam, 2015). The absence of research in this area creates a 
discernable gap in team members’ abilities to fully support the entire university community as it 
seeks to clarify, respond, prevent, and promote sexual violence policies that move the institution 
beyond minimal compliance obligations to fully understanding and addressing sexual violence 
and its aftermath in an effort to eradicate it for all students.
An unexpected finding from the study involved the extent of collaboration and support 
among lawyers and non-lawyer participants from the review team in creating strategies that 
moved the institution from a focus on compliance to one of innovation, strength, and 
transformation. Unfortunately, no lawyers agreed to be interviewed for this study, therefore the 
results from this research are one sided. Perspectives in this study were primarily those of student 
affairs professionals and student members on the teams. Additional research could address the 
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perspectives of lawyers as well. With suggestions in the research that legally and non-legally 
trained decision makers interpret and transmit legal rules differently within organization (Sitkin 
& Bies, 1994), insight into the lawyers’ perceptions of collaboration and power would be helpful 
in providing additional data, from a relatively untapped source, to support or refute the study’s 
conceptual framework, and the proactive law movement’s contention, that decisions undertaken 
collaboratively, benefiting from the expertise and judgment of professionals within the 
organization in addition to the traditional services of competent legal counsel, contribute to the 
organization’s ability to construct innovative responses to legal compliance beyond expected 
norms. 
A final suggestion for future research would be to conduct a longitudinal study of the 
three institutions to study developments over a number of years. The review team outcomes 
could be examined to see which ones succeeded, which were emulated, and which became 
standardized norms in the field. It would be beneficial to understand the reasoning underlying 
why some succeeded whereas others failed. How did external influences and pressures (such as 
student activism or the Office for Civil Rights’ agenda) contribute to their fate? Where did the 
strongest pressures originate, and why? In addition, researching internal factors (such as the 
existence of champions, institutional support, resources, or lawsuits, for example) that impacted 
the initiatives’ success or demise would expand our knowledge of the dynamics that contribute to 
university actors’ construction and interpretation of important social, cultural, and legal issues. 
Given that establishing a comprehensive and responsive sexual violence policy is only one of the 
many legal obligations universities must address under the DCL guidance and Title IX law, how 
did these universities address its other responsibilities to put an end to campus sexual violence, 
or until that is accomplished, prevent its recurrence and address its effects? How are universities’ 
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efforts at addressing campus party and drinking cultures fairing? Have they brought athletics and 
Greek Life into the process to ensure their voices also have significant meaning in developing 
solutions, if so how? How have efforts to further the DCL’s goals materialized on campus and 
why is this important? In order to understand the law’s capacity as a tool for social change, 
additional research is needed to analyze which compliance efforts triumphed, what actors were 
involved in creating them, how stakeholders competed or collaborated in the construction of 
compliance, and why certain views and actions prevailed. 
In addition to further research examining the review teams’ proactive outcomes and 
additional responses specific to DCL/Title IX compliance obligations, process issues concerning 
their handling of other subjects would also be interesting to study. Was the collaborative, 
transparent model used in the DCL review applied to the universities’ examinations of 
subsequent legally generated issues? If so, how was it modified? If not, what took its place? How 
did universities construct compliance involving different legal matters? Did these same 
universities continue to exceed compliance minimums? Were they leaders in other areas of 
socio-legal concern? If not, why? Given the influence of university goals and values on the 
actions it takes, developing a body of research examining how legal mandates are causing 
university decision makers to act would significantly advance the field’s understanding of how 
regulations and changes in law affect university functioning, mission, service to students, and 
whether they have come to value the appearance of legitimacy in creating symbols of compliance 
over substantive actions advancing student interests and creating a public benefit.
Conclusion
Universities have the opportunity to use a change in law as a catalyst to design 
procedures and reframe issues to move beyond basic compliance toward strengthening campus 
196
culture and values. Examining this issue through the organizational process of how universities 
acted to understand and address their legal responsibilities, the study offers insight into the 
interpersonal dynamics and organizational investment required to think broadly about the law to 
implement policies that become a source of institutional and societal opportunity and 
advancement as universities shape the law’s meaning.
This research looked at how a change in law prompts shifts in organizational practice. 
Through its actors, universities constructed DCL compliance. Despite universities operating in a 
highly legalized environment in which concerns for risk management are often regarded as 
dominating social and educational values, this research provides evidence to the contrary, 
namely that educating and protecting students remained in the forefront of the universities’ 
policy reviews and proposed compliance solutions. The three universities in this study, well-
resourced and with highly specialized staff engaged in professional associations and policy 
reform, had champions in place to help guide their universities through the chaotic post DCL 
period. Each university brought together a wide inclusion of subject-matter experts to 
collaboratively examine its policies and protocols in response to the new legal mandate. The 
three participating schools demonstrated that organizational actors have wide latitude in 
responding to ambiguous laws with a variety of policies and programs. While it is too soon to 
know which ones will ultimately diffuse throughout the field and become expected best practice, 
there is evidence of new organizational structures adopted by these universities being imitated. 
By providing evidence of how university actors can shape the construction of compliance 
while maintaining university’s identity and goals, this study provides university leaders with 
insight into how higher education professionals can think broadly about changes in law to 
develop policies and programs that enhance institutional opportunity and advance public 
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benefits. In the wake of ambiguous and contentious external legal requirements, this research 
demonstrates that universities can elevate decision-making processes and policy outcomes by 
affirming normative values of academe within the scope of new compliance obligations. Looking 
at the process of policy negotiation resulting from a change in the university’s legal environment, 
this study benefits university scholars and practitioners by expanding our understanding of 
theories and cultural practices that can be used to advance transformative policies and facilitate 
institutional change at the intersection of legal, cultural, and social issue of critical importance to 
campus life.
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Appendix D: Letter of Interest Emailed to Potential Study Participants
September 17, 2014 
Dear ------------------, 
I am a doctoral candidate in the higher education program at the University of Michigan 
conducting my dissertation research on ways universities develop responses to outside legal 
pressures. 
My study examines the interplay between the complex institutional considerations of compliance 
obligations, legal risks, shared governance, and institutional vision through the quickly evolving 
area of federal oversight on campus sexual violence and misconduct. My research is designed 
to look beyond institutional policies to examine the mechanisms that enable university decision 
makers to develop expansive policies that not only advance institutional interests and risk 
management obligations, but might also serve to address the public good. The intent of my 
research is to examine how institutional policy is negotiated around an ambiguous, multi-interest 
regulatory prompt. It is not to inquire into individual cases, outcomes, or the efficacy of specific 
policies. 
I am writing to explore whether you might consider being interviewed for my study. Using the 
U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights 2011 Dear Colleague Letter on campus 
sexual violence as a starting point, I am conducting case studies at three universities to examine 
institutional decision-making in response to changes to Title IX. In order to successfully examine 
the nuances from a broad range of perspectives, I will be interviewing stakeholders engaged in 
multiple dimensions of the issue. This may include Title IX coordinators, student affairs 
professionals, general counsel, faculty and student working groups, campus climate advisory 
committee members, counseling professionals, public safety directors, athletic directors, and 
other contributors to the review and development of the university’s sexual misconduct 
protocols. Such a study is important to the field of higher education in order to expand our 
understanding of how institutions respond to their growing responsibilities under Title IX and 
other regulations. Knowing more about such responses will help to shape normative practices 
currently being redefined as universities are thrust into the role of investigators and adjudicators 
of serious crimes. 
Your participation in this study would entail one 60-75 minute interview. If you are 
currently involved in reviewing and updating the University’s protocols on sexual misconduct 
and felt comfortable with my observing any meetings addressing the issue, I would welcome the 
opportunity to observe (but not participate) in such meetings. Any observations would be at your 
discretion. Neither the University nor individuals participating in the study will be identified in 
my study write up. Instead, pseudonyms will be created and data reported in such a way as to 
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assure anonymity. The University of Michigan Institutional Review Board has determined that 
this research is exempt from IRB oversight. 
Thank you for your time in reading this letter and considering my request. I would be delighted 
to talk with you further about this study and learn more about your work in this area. Email is the 
best way to reach me (larakov@umich.edu) to set up a time to talk or meet. I will follow up with 
you in a few days to determine your interest in participating in this study. 
Very best wishes, 
Lara 
Lara Kovacheff Badke, JD 
Ph.D. Candidate, Center for the Study of Higher and Postsecondary Education 
Research Associate, The National Forum on Higher Education for the Public Good 
University of Michigan 
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Appendix E: Interview Protocol
Intro 
1.  How would you describe your role at the University with respect to matters relating to 
campus sexual misconduct?  
2.  How did you become involved in the University’s response to the Dear Colleague Letter? 
 
3.  What did you understand the University’s values to be surrounding campus sexual 
misconduct at the time of the Dear Colleague Letter review?  
Clarity 
4.  How did the University’s review team define what it was being asked to do (goals and 
objectives)?  
5.  How did the team address ambiguities in interpreting the Dear Colleague Letter?  
Compliance 
6.  Would you please describe for me the process that the team went through to respond to 
the Dear Colleague Letter directives?  
7.  Can you explain the policy/model created?  
8.  How does this model enhance the University’s response and prevention of campus sexual 
assault and harassment?  
9.  What alternative models or courses of action did the team consider?  
10. Why did the one chosen ultimately prevail?  
Intragroup relations 
11. Can you walk me through the team’s dynamics as it addressed options?  
12. How would you characterize the collaborative nature of the review team?  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13. Can you give me a sense of how the diverse stakeholder groups at the table contributed to 
the policy’s development?  
14. Would you elaborate on any interests that seemed to carry more weight?  
Prevention 
15. How did the University’s framing of campus sexual misconduct change following the 
review?  
16. Have any new strategies emerged that might help the institution learn from this 
experience?  
17. Can you describe any deliberations regarding populations in the university community 
who may present non-conventional needs? (examples of these populations could include 
the LGBTQ community or male survivors of sexual assault).
Re-framing 
18. Can you describe any opportunities that have been created for the University to reflect on 
its response to the Dear Colleague Letter directives?  
19. How do you think this University’s response/model differs from those of peer 
institutions?  
20. Do these differences provide any advantage over institutions that may have addressed the 
issue differently?  
Concluding questions 
21. Can you think of examples in which the University has made positive advances in 
response to a legal imperative? 
22. How have such developments improved higher education practice?  
23. How might these responses have contributed to the public good? 
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Appendix F: Select Examples of Open Coding, Axial Coding, and Selective Coding
Emergent theme from literature (deductive analysis): 
fulfilling legal requirements (compliance)
Open Coding 
(inductive analysis): 
initial themes from data
Axial Coding
creating categories from 
connections among themes
Selective Coding
developing patterns by 
relating subordinate and sub-
categories to core categories
balancing rights & obligations
relationship building
conflict, tension
collaboration
lawyers’ roles
resolution of conflicts
decision making model
senior officers’ authority
ego/ self-serving interests 
dominant voices 
self-awareness
heated debate
compromise
all voices heard
pushing constituent’s agenda
review team composition
controversy 
case-by-case flexibility
constituent input
media/ public image/ reputation
going beyond compliance
cross campus expertise
focused/deliberative mindset
importance of getting it right
prior relationships/high trust
constituent feedback important
committed actors/players
consultants as guides
moving past status quo
Review teams formed following 
“interim” response 
- team composition
- power
- dynamics
- ego
- privilege
- representation
- collaboration
- compromise
- trust
- decision models
- institutional support
- media/PR/ image 
- member dedication
- student orientation
Relationships
- importance
- trust
- flexibility
- buy-in
- coalition building
- managing group 
dynamics/ power/ 
expectations/ world 
views/ spotlight
- facilitating discussions 
Resources
- time
- personnel
- new hires
- institutional support
- prevention vs. response
interpersonal dynamics critical 
in creating and putting into 
practice forward thinking 
policies and protocols
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Open Coding 
(inductive analysis): 
initial themes from data
Axial Coding
creating categories from 
connections among themes
Selective Coding
developing patterns by 
relating subordinate and sub-
categories to core categories
long-term approach
organic process
flexibility/ adaptability
evolution in thinking
disjointedness (silos)
ongoing effort
significant constituent input
time demands (2 years)
transparency
information sharing
pitfalls
student activism
hard work
not black & white: lots of grey
shifting culture
lack of resources
creating balance
no built-in reflection
advancing public good
unintended consequences
expanding knowledge 
expanding research
opportunity for growth
law enforcement attitudes
students coming forward
shifts in campus climate
national dialogues on issues
opportunity to advance change
champions already in place
no/little reflection
applicability to other issues
de-stigmatize sex assault disc
creation of new positions
DCL provided needed push
Process buy-in
- Student centered
- Fair and impartial
- Institutionally supported
- Community vetted
- Constituent informed
- Broad expertise
- Transparent
- Research informed
- Sharing info
Cultural shift
- discussions in new 
circles (i.e.: male 
faculty)
- education more 
prevalent
- links to underlying 
cultural contributors 
(Greek Life, drinking, 
partying)
- awareness of 
neurobiology of trauma
- reduction in victim 
blaming
- more complaints, trust 
in system, better 
services
intended/ unintended cultural 
and societal transformations
Emergent theme from literature (deductive analysis): 
creating practices that provide institutional legitimacy/advantage
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